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Executive summary 
In the context of the German-Japanese Energy Policy Dialogue between the German 
Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi) and the Japanese Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), hydrogen has been identified as having potential for 
closer cooperation. This study aims at supporting mutual learning and at exploring 
undeveloped fields of collaboration by providing an analysis on similarities and differences in 
the respective debates, strategies and policies. 
After a short introduction to the technologies and economics of the production, transport, 
storage and usage of hydrogen and of other synthetic fuels, Chapter 1 provides an overview 
of demand-side deployment by sector (residential, transport, industry, power generation and 
power-to-x) for both countries, as well as of their hydrogen policy debates, key institutions, 
R&D programs and demonstration projects. Finally, a short survey on relevant international 
platforms and initiatives in which Japan and Germany participate is presented. On the basis 
of a meta-analysis of the role of hydrogen in 18 long-term energy system scenarios for 
Germany and 12 scenarios for Japan, Chapter 2 of this study draws conclusions on the 
possible future role of hydrogen in the transformation of the energy systems in Japan and 
Germany. Subsequently, Chapter 3 discusses sustainability criteria and certification 
schemes for clean hydrogen, compares the GHG intensity of different hydrogen supply 
chains and provides a data-based analysis to identify countries which could become 
important suppliers of clean hydrogen. 
Germany and Japan have both gained substantial experience with hydrogen production 
and applications, albeit with focus on different sectors (see chapters 1.2 and 1.3). They 
also share similar drivers for hydrogen development (chapters 1.4.1 and 1.5.1) and, of 
course, similar technical and economic opportunities and challenges (chapter 1.1). However, 
there also are relevant differences in the policy priorities and approaches (chapters 1.4 and 
1.5). 
Japan’s plans for a “hydrogen-based society” were first introduced in the 4th Strategic Energy 
Plan of 2014 and further developed in the Strategic Roadmap for Hydrogen and Fuel Cells of 
2016. With the Basic Hydrogen Strategy of 2017, Japan was the first country in the 
world to publish a comprehensive government plan for hydrogen and fuel cell technology 
development. Germany has been pursuing a very ambitious paradigm shift to an energy 
system based on renewables – known as the Energiewende – with increased determination 
since the turn of the century. While in the earlier years the focus was on increasing 
renewable energy production, recently, the German debate has started to also revolve 
around the long-term role of hydrogen. Currently, the German federal government is in the 
process of adopting the first German National Hydrogen Strategy, expected to be 
released by the end of 2019. 
Notwithstanding differing emphases and patterns, the two countries share three main 
drivers for hydrogen development and deployment: climate mitigation and other 
environmental goals, energy supply diversification, and technological leadership. 
Long-term energy scenarios for both countries analysed in this study assume similar climate 
mitigation targets: Germany aims at 80% to 95% greenhouse gas (GHG) emission 
reductions by 2050 in comparison with 1990, Japan at 80% by 2050 in comparison to 2010. 
As discussed in more detail below, hydrogen is expected to play an important role for 
decarbonising industrial processes, segments of the transport sector and, to a smaller 
extent, heating supply and the power system. Both countries are currently profoundly 
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dependent on oil, natural gas and coal imports and are thus vulnerable to geopolitical shocks 
affecting the extraction countries or supply routes. Therefore, the diversification of the 
imported energy carriers, origin countries and supply routes is an important driver for the 
use of hydrogen in both countries. Green hydrogen also offers the opportunity of substituting 
a share of imported fossil energy carriers with domestic energy production. Technological 
leadership in a field which might become a keystone of the future global energy system is 
additionally an important driver for both countries; as each are already seen as leaders in 
key hydrogen technologies. 
So far, Japan has more experience in deploying demand-side applications, especially in 
the building sector (250,000 CHP units in Japan, versus 5,500 in Germany) and in the 
transport sector (2,400 versus 500 cars). Germany has so far focused more on the 
supply side, with more than 50 Power-to-X (PtX) projects in planning or operation (versus 3 
in Japan) and plans to drastically increase the electrolyser capacity during the next few 
years. Germany also has more than 500 uninterruptible power supply systems in operation 
whereas no hydrogen-based UPS systems are in operation in Japan. The complementarity 
of the two backgrounds suggests a good potential for technical cooperation and mutual 
learning. 
On the demand side, Japan’s government has, for a longer time, pursued a more proactive 
market introduction policy through setting targets and providing support through public-
private partnerships and investment subsidies (such as for Ene-Farms). Germany has 
traditionally pursued a more hands-off strategy for hydrogen technologies market 
introduction, offering less intensive subsidies for residential fuel cell-based CHP systems and 
UPS systems and leaving it to equipment producers to take the initiative to launch products. 
It is only recently that Germany has increased its activities in supporting hydrogen 
deployment, especially since the start of the second National Innovation Programme 
Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Technology (NIP) in 2017. 
In regards to R&D programs, both countries offer support and deliver hydrogen 
demonstration projects. Japan is pursuing large hydrogen production facilities projects 
overseas to explore the possibilities of large-scale hydrogen imports. On its part, Germany 
has so far focused more on domestic R&D projects, including not only equipment testing, but 
also for legal frameworks and market governance. 
Chapter 2 of the present study provides a meta-analysis of the role of hydrogen in long-
term energy system scenarios for Germany and Japan. The meta-analysis covers 18 
scenarios for Germany, based on 6 studies published from 2015 onwards; for Japan, it 
covers 12 scenarios from 8 studies, plus one official government document. The chapters 
2.1 (Germany) and 2.2 (Japan) analyse and compare the studies and scenarios in regards to 
the respective countries, looking at the main drivers assumed to influence the demand for 
hydrogen (and other synthetic fuels) between 2030 and 2050, among other topics. Chapter 
2.3 provides a cross-country comparison of the scenarios, pointing to similarities and 
differences between the two countries. The main outcomes of this analysis are: 
• Hydrogen is likely to play a relevant role in the energy systems of both Japan and 
Germany by 2050 (however with a limited role until 2030) if their climate targets are 
to be achieved. There is a strong positive correlation between the level of 
ambition in GHG emissions reductions and the relevance of hydrogen – 
scenarios assuming 95% reduction in GHG emissions tend to lead to a much higher 
requirement for hydrogen and hydrogen based synthetic fuels than scenarios 
assuming an 80% reduction. 
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• Most German scenarios for 2050 feature hydrogen demand levels between 300 and 
600 PJ per year, or up to 10% of the total primary energy demand. Japanese 2050 
scenarios feature a total hydrogen demand between 600 and 1,800 PJ. 
• A significant point of divergence between both countries’ scenarios is the 
relationship between hydrogen and other synthetic fuels. While the Japanese 
scenarios barely mention the possibility of producing non-hydrogen synthetic fuels, 
all but one of the German scenarios analysed in this study envision a larger role 
(often much larger) for other synthetic fuels than for hydrogen in the end use sectors 
(Table 13); perhaps most tellingly, even one of the two German scenarios assuming 
that hydrogen technologies play a central role envisions a greater final energy 
demand for other synthetic fuels than for hydrogen in 2050. The key advantages of 
some non-hydrogen synthetic fuels are that existing infrastructures and end use 
appliances can be used, and that they can be blended with fossil fuels. 
• Another significant difference lies in the fact that, in Germany, hydrogen is generally 
regarded as a versatile molecule that helps to integrate renewables into the energy 
system. Therefore, the German short and medium term scenarios exclusively 
envision green hydrogen, whereas Japan’s Strategic Roadmap for Hydrogen and 
Fuel Cells envisions establishing global blue hydrogen supply chains first, and 
green hydrogen supply chains adopted after 2040. (See terminology text box in 
chapter 1.1.) 
• The short and medium term strategies generally fall in line with the main drivers 
for both countries’ energy strategies. For both Germany and Japan, hydrogen 
technologies are a promising element of their long term industrial policy. Apart from 
that, Germany exhibits bigger climate ambitions, while Japan more strongly 
emphasises the need to improve its energy security. 
• Scenarios for Germany also diverge from those for Japan in terms of hydrogen 
supply sources. While German scenarios consider it realistic to produce at least 
part of the hydrogen domestically (or even the entire hydrogen needs, while other 
synthetic fuels would be imported), Japan focuses on hydrogen imports from 
overseas in the form of liquefied hydrogen, chemically stored as ammoniac or in 
LOHC. However, some of the Japanese scenarios do mention the domestic 
production as an option. 
• The role of domestic PtX is much bigger in German scenarios than in the 
Japanese as German scenarios generally assume that significant shares of 
hydrogen can be produced domestically, and because they assume considerably 
higher shares of intermittent renewables in the German electricity systems. 
However, at least one of the Japanese scenarios values the ability of PtX 
applications to provide flexibility to the power system.  
• Both countries differ in terms of end-use sector priorities: Japanese scenarios 
see hydrogen used mostly for power generation, and to a smaller extent, in transport 
and industry. The German scenarios envision that hydrogen and other synthetic 
fuels will mainly be used in transport and industry and, to a lesser extent, for heat 
supply and for power generation. 
• Regarding the infrastructural needs related to the use of hydrogen, German 
scenarios either assume that hydrogen will be blended with natural gas in the 
existing gas infrastructure as far as technically possible, and/or that the existing gas 
infrastructure will be modified in order to accommodate higher shares of hydrogen, 
and/or that separate hydrogen pipelines will be newly built (or converted from 
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former natural gas use) to connect hydrogen production sites with hydrogen demand 
locations. For hydrogen use in transport, it is generally assumed (explicitly e.g. in 
Hecking et al. 2018) that the hydrogen will be transported to filling stations using 
trucks1. Japanese scenarios don’t consider the infrastructural needs in detail.  
Based on current German literature, Chapter 3.1.1 of the present study outlines the direction 
of the current debates in Germany about possible sustainability criteria for the definition 
of green hydrogen. These focus on the lifecycle GHG emissions balance of green 
hydrogen compared to conventional fossil fuels for the same application, on the additionality 
of renewable electricity production; on the sustainability of the usage of water and land 
needed for the electrolysers and the renewable energy capacity; as well as on the social and 
economic impact on regional communities. Chapter 3.1.2 shortly describes various existing 
standards and certification schemes for clean hydrogen which have been or are 
currently being established in Japan, Germany and other EU countries, as well as an 
example from California. Chapter 3.1.3 compares the various standards and certification 
approaches for clean hydrogen presented in the previous chapter, also in light of the green 
hydrogen sustainability criteria presented described in chapter 3.1.1. While discussing future 
standards for clean hydrogen, it will be crucial to strike the right balance between 
environmental soundness, practicality of the implementation and realistic economic 
considerations. In addition to failing to ensure environmental benefits of using clean 
hydrogen, too lax sustainability standards could be seen as greenwashing by the public 
which could erode the support for clean hydrogen. On the other hand, too strict sustainability 
standards early on might slow down the development of a global clean hydrogen supply 
chain. 
Chapter 3.2 presents a comparison of the GHG intensity associated with 18 different 
hydrogen supply chains based on different primary energy sources (natural gas, coal, EU-
electricity mix, biomass and wind), largely based on analysis carried out by the Joint 
Research Centre of the European Commission and published in 2014. The analysis shows 
that the energy source is the most significant individual factor for GHG intensity of 
hydrogen supply chains. For example, green hydrogen stemming from electrolysis based 
on renewable electricity features much lower lifecycle GHG emissions than hydrogen 
produced by any process based on fossil fuels without CCS. Without CCS, hydrogen from 
natural gas, the most widely used energy source for hydrogen production today, has about 
half the GHG intensity of hydrogen produced from coal via gasification. CCS can significantly 
reduce the GHG intensities of fossil fuels-based hydrogen: with CCS, hydrogen from natural 
gas has GHG intensity comparable to hydrogen from coal. However, green hydrogen 
produced by electrolysis from renewable electricity still is between 40% and 75% less GHG 
intensive than blue hydrogen, depending on the specific supply chains. If hydrogen is based 
on the current German and Japanese power mixes, the dominance of fossil fuels results in 
grey hydrogen GHG intensities comparable to those of coal gasification without the use of 
CCS, which do not contribute to overall GHG emissions reductions.  
Finally, chapter 3.3 provides an analysis of potential clean hydrogen supplying 
countries, differentiating between green hydrogen (based on renewables) and blue 
hydrogen (based on fossil fuels with CCS). For green hydrogen, the analysis is based on a 
model of the Finnish university LUT which combines granular data about wind and solar 
generation potential in small regions (less tan 50x50 km at equator) all over the world with a 
 
1 However, the federal hydrogen agency NOW assumes that in the long term, in case of a strong market uptake, pipelines might 
become relevant on certain routes. 
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cost optimisation of hydrogen production system based on wind, solar, batteries and 
electrolysers. The results are presented focusing on one hand on the countries with the 
cheapest green hydrogen resources and on the other hand on the countries which have a 
particularly large potential for relatively low-cost green hydrogen production. Argentina, 
Australia, Brazil, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, Namibia, Russia, South Africa and the USA belong 
to the top 20 under both categories. For blue hydrogen, the analysis largely relies on data 
from BP concerning the available reserves of fossil energy sources and on the CCS 
readiness indicator of the Global CCS Institute. The following countries rank top 20 in both 
categories: Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Germany, Norway and USA. However, taking 
into account Germany’s decision to phase out coal mining – already implemented for hard 
coal and in the process of being enshrined in law for brown coal – as well as the lack of 
public acceptance for carbon storage on German soil, Germany is very unlikely to become a 
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1 Hydrogen deployment and policies in Germany 
and Japan 
Both Germany and Japan have substantial experience with traditional hydrogen application 
in industry, such as refineries and ammonia. However, concerning the development of clean 
hydrogen the two countries have laid their emphases differently. 
The German federal government has provided extensive financial support for RD&D related 
to innovative hydrogen technologies, but it supported only to a lesser extent market 
introduction, value chain development and applications; abstaining, so far, from actively 
trying to shape the energy market so as to facilitate more widespread uptake of hydrogen 
applications. This has led to hydrogen technologies being widely seen as ready to assume a 
bigger role, and calls to the private sector for the necessary policy framework to allow their 
wide-scale deployment. 
On the other hand, Japan’s government has taken a much more hands-on approach. The 
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry has laid out a well-defined hydrogen strategy which 
is being pursued, among others, through the Institute of Energy Economics Japan (IEEJ), 
New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organisation (NEDO), and strategic 
partnerships with Japan’s technology corporations. Moreover, it put an emphasis on a quick 
transition from research and development into the market activation phase, betting on a 
handful of products deployed on large scale (such as the Ene-Farms, chapter 1.3.1).  
Germany has more experience with production of green hydrogen, which fits well with its role 
as one of the global leaders in solar PV and wind technologies. Currently, Germany hosts 50 
demonstration projects for Power to Gas (PtG) technology based on renewable electricity 
being demonstrated in MW scale (Rasmusson 2018, Golling et al. 2017). In 2015, less than 
1% of the German hydrogen production was through water electrolysis (NOW, 2016). Two 
projects with electrolysis capacity of 100 MW each have been announced in 2018. 
Japan has meanwhile focused on meeting its future demand with hydrogen produced from 
fossil raw materials, primarily natural gas via steam methane reforming (SMR) and coal via 
gasification. Mass deployment of carbon capture and storage (CCS) is envisioned for the 
future, primarily near the point of primary energy source extraction. Japan has more 
experience with fuel cell applications in the heating and transport sectors, where it is the 
global leader in terms of number of units deployed (be it CHP plants, fuel cell vehicles or the 
related infrastructure).   
1.1 Introduction on hydrogen production and use  
This chapter briefly summarizes the means of hydrogen production, transport and storage as 
well as the different usage cases for hydrogen.  
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Figure 1: Today's hydrogen value chains 
Source: IEA (2019) 
 
Key terminology as used in this study 
Green hydrogen is used to designate low-carbon hydrogen produced from renewable sources 
such as renewable power (via water electrolysis) or biomass. Blue hydrogen is used to designate 
low-carbon hydrogen, produced from non-renewable sources, typically from natural gas and brown 
coal, with use of carbon capture and storage technology. Clean hydrogen is used in this study as 
an umbrella term for green and blue hydrogen.2 Low-carbon hydrogen designates green, blue 
and nuclear-power derived hydrogen; the term is not is generally used in this study except where 
nuclear-derived hydrogen is explicitly included. CO2-free hydrogen is often used in Japan to 
designate low-carbon hydrogen (without explicitly mentioning nuclear power as a possible source), 
but is not used in this study.  
As for the differentiation between hydrogen, and hydrogen based fuels in this study: While 
hydrogen is indeed a form of a synthetic fuel, for greater clarity in this study, we use the terms 
hydrogen and other synthetic fuels separately; hydrogen is used to designate hydrogen in 
molecular form (H2), while the term other synthetic fuels (or non-hydrogen synthetic fuels) is 
used for synthetic fuels other than hydrogen in molecular form. Power-to-X (PtX) is used in this 
study in reference to the entire process of using electricity to produce hydrogen and hydrogen-
based synthetic fuels.3  
 
1.1.1 Hydrogen production 
The various processes used to produce hydrogen are described in other sources (Shell 
2017, IEA 2019). As of today, almost all hydrogen is produced from fossil fuels, releasing the 
entire carbon content into the atmosphere (CertifHy 2019d). The CO2 could be captured and 
 
2 The level of “cleanliness” of course depends on the lifecycle environmental impacts. For example, in the case of green hydrogen 
one should consider the low but not absent greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions caused by the production of the renewable energy 
systems and of electrolysers. As for gas based blue hydrogen, one should consider the sometimes substantial share of the CO2 
that remains uncaptured and, in the case of CCU processes, how long the CO2 remains chemically bonded. Especially in the case 
of coal-based processes, other toxic emissions may also be significant. 
3 The term PtX also includes power-to-heat (PtH), which is however not relevant for the present study and is not referred to when the 
term PtX is used.  
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stored underground (CCS) or used for other processes (carbon capture and utilisation, 
CCU), for example, the production of hydrogen-based fuels such as synthetic methane (JRC 
2014, Mizuho Information and Research Institute Inc. 2018). As long as the CO2 used for 
CCU processes has a fossil origin, it impacts the climate as it’s released into the 
atmosphere. Some CCU applications, such as production of construction materials, bond the 
CO2 long-term, possibly for centuries; others, such as synthetic fuels, only for weeks or 
months. 
Another option is producing hydrogen via water electrolysis. With assistance of electric 
power, water molecules are split into hydrogen and oxygen. The most common technologies 
are alkaline electrolysers (AEL) or proton exchange membrane electrolysers (PEMEL). Solid 
oxide electrolyser cells (SOEC) may offer better efficiency in the future, but are not a mature 
technology as of yet (IRENA 2018). The economics of hydrogen production by electrolysis 
depend to a large extent on electricity prices and the electrolyser CAPEX. Electrolysis is very 
energy intensive, with current efficiency rates typically just below 70%. Therefore, hydrogen 
electrolysis based on a power mix with a high fossil share is not interesting from a climate or 
energetic point of view (Kasten et al. 2019).  
At current price levels, electrolysis based on renewable electricity (green hydrogen) is more 
cost-intensive than steam reforming or coal gasification without CCU/CCS. Green hydrogen 
can become more competitive, assuming a continuation of the downward trend of renewable 
power costs, learning and scale effects for electrolysers, a strong policy framework including 
an effective carbon pricing and restricting the other environmental and health impacts of 
natural gas (e.g. methane leaks) or coal (e.g. mercury and other harming emissions).  
Hydrogen can also be produced from biomass through thermo-chemical (gasification or 
pyrolysis of solid or liquid biomass, or reforming and partial oxidation of biogas, biomethane 
or bioethanol) or bio-chemical processes (with the use of microorganisms). However, current 
quantities of hydrogen production from biomass are negligible and the bio-chemical 
processes have not yet reached market maturity.  
1.1.2 Hydrogen transport and storage  
Hydrogen can be stored and transported in pure form, blended with natural gas or bound in 
larger molecules such as ammonia or liquid organic hydrogen carriers (LOHCs). According 
to a literature review by IRENA (2018), blending is currently generally possible to about 
20%vol without considerable modifications to the gas network. For transport in pipelines, 
hydrogen must be compressed to the system pressure (2 – 4 MPa). Pure hydrogen pipelines 
can be built anew, or created by converting existing gas pipelines. 
Hydrogen in liquid form has a much higher energy density than hydrogen compressed at 
moderate pressures, making it more suitable for transport and storage. However, hydrogen 
liquefaction requires temperatures below -253°C and is very energy intensive. Compressed 
hydrogen (up to 700 bar) is usually transported via road trucks, trains or barges.  
Hydrogen can also be chemically bonded. Materials which enable this include metal 
hydrides, liquid organic hydrogen carriers (LOHCs, deployed by Japan, see the Brunei pilot 
project, chapter 1.5.4), carbon and other nanostructures, and reversible hydrocarbons. 
Generally, these technologies are considered feasible but not yet market-ready.   
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1.1.3 Hydrogen use 
Hydrogen can be used directly in pure form, or as the basis for the synthesis of liquid or 
gaseous hydrogen-based fuels such as synthetic methane or synthetic diesel, as well as for 
other energy carriers such as ammonia (dena 2018a).  
By far, most of the hydrogen is currently used in the industrial sector, mainly in refineries 
and for the production of ammonia and to a smaller extent to produce methanol and other 
chemicals, and in steel production (see Figure 1 above). In the medium and long term, the 
potential for growth of hydrogen use in industrial applications is limited, while other sectors 
have a much larger growth potential (IEA 2019).  
In the residential sector, hydrogen is used in fuel cell-based cogeneration applications (also 
called combined heating and power, CHP). Most commonly used are proton electrolyte 
membrane (PEM) and solid oxide (SO) fuel cell technologies. Both types of cells in CHP can 
be either heat- or power-driven and can be deployed as mini or micro CHPs due to their 
compact sizes. They can either be fuelled with hydrogen directly or with natural gas or 
biogas where conversion into hydrogen takes place inside the unit. If the heat produced is of 
sufficiently high temperature, such a system can also provide cooling via adsorption (tri-
generation).  
In a decarbonized transport sector, hydrogen becomes especially interesting when the 
ranges and loads of vehicles increase and more energy must be stored on board. Fuel cell 
vehicles (FCEVs) such as buses, trucks, long-distances passenger vehicles and trains as 
well as certain shipping options are the applications where hydrogen might establish itself in 
the future. 
Hydrogen can be used for power generation as it can be converted into electricity using a 
combustion process or a fuel cell. Combustion can take place in a stationary internal 
combustion engine (ICE) both of reciprocating (found in most cars) and rotary type (such as 
turbines). Fuel cell-based power generation are mainly deployed as uninterruptible power 
supply systems (UPS). These can be considered a mature technology and are available over 
a wide capacity range. Their main function is to provide backup power for critical processes 
such as hospitals, communication infrastructure and similar in case of black-outs and in 
remote locations. Their upsides are reliability, durability and low maintenance costs.  
1.1.4 Hydrogen, other synthetic fuels and direct use of electricity 
For applications in the transport and heating sector, the direct use of electricity, when 
compared to green hydrogen and other synthetic fuels, has the advantage of lower efficiency 
losses across the entire conversion chain.  
According to Agora Verkehrswende et al. (2018), for the transport sector overall efficiencies 
from the point of feeding the power into the grid to the wheel are 69% for electric vehicles 
(EVs), 26% for FCEVs and 13% for synthetic fuel internal combustion engine vehicles 
(ICEVs). In other words, compared to an EV, a hydrogen FCEV requires 2.6 times more 
energy, and a synthetic fuel ICEV 5.3 times more energy. However, the comparative FCEV 
efficiency improves with increasing energy needs resulting from heavier vehicles and long 
distance requirements (e.g. in freight transport). 
For heating, an electric heat pump with a COP of 3 delivers a 285% overall efficiency, 
compared to a combined efficiency of 45% for an FC CHP system, and 50% for a gas 
condensing boiler (Agora Verkehrswende et al. 2018). In other words, compared to such a 
heat pump, a gas condensing boiler uses 5.5 times as much energy, and FC CHP 6.3 times 
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as much. It must be noted, however, that with an FC CHP, almost half of the energy derived 
from hydrogen is in the form of electricity.  
In terms of energy storage capacities and timespans, it is generally assumed that batteries 
will remain competitive as short term (up to 1 or several days) energy storage. On the other 
end of the spectrum, synthetic fuels other than hydrogen (gaseous and liquid) are best suited 
for seasonal energy storage. Hydrogen is typically considered to fall somewhere in between.  
Different sources provide diverging estimations; some consider it to be closer to batteries in 
terms of capacity and discharge rates, while others consider it to be slightly below those of 
synthetic gas (Paulus 2014, Bogdanov et al. 2019). It is thinkable that both solutions 
establish themselves in the future, as hydrogen can be stored short-term and close to where 
it is consumed in storage tanks or long-term and centrally alongside synthetic gas in salt 
caverns and pore storages. 
In a deeply decarbonised energy system, a further advantage of a significant use of 
renewables-based hydrogen or hydrogen-based synthetic gases (PtG) is that it can provide 
energy storage services based on existing gas infrastructure, thus reducing the need for 
power grid expansion (Ecke and Fricke 2018). 
1.2 Overview of deployment by sectors - Germany 
The following chapter provides an overview of the current state of deployment of different 
demand-side hydrogen applications by sector.  
1.2.1 Residential sector 
Fuel cell-based mini- and micro-CHP systems are available on the German market, similar to 
the Ene-Farms in Japan; although their market uptake has been much slower than in Japan. 
However, thanks to a support scheme from the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Energy 
(BMWi), deployment speed significantly increased recently: with more than 3,600 new micro-
CHP units installed in 2018, the total number in operation almost tripled to 5,500 units and is 
expected to further increase in 2019 (NOW 2018, Blockheizkraftwerk.org 2016, McKinsey & 
Company 2017). Similar to Japan, the price is currently a major obstacle for the market 
diffusion of these systems. The price of a 700 kWhel system by SenerTec (including a 20 kW 
peak load boiler, hot-water tank and the heating loop) is about 20,000 EUR before taxes and 
subsidies.4 The market potential is nevertheless large; Herrmann et al. (2017) have 
estimated that about 3 million (or about one sixth of all) buildings in Germany can be 
equipped with a fuel cell-based CHP (Herrmann, Block and Hildebrandt 2017).  
The first apartment complex-scale systems have been contracted in 2017 which produce 
hydrogen from excess renewable power, store it and use it in a fuel cell-based CHP system 
or combusted in a boiler (Krog 2017, IWR Online (2018). Apart from that, a number of 
systems have been installed in residential and tertiary sector where not hydrogen but rather 
synthetic gas is produced (such as EXYTRON’s Climate friendly living, Chapter 1.4.4) 
(Strategieplattform Power to Gas 2019). Table 1 provides three examples of CHP-based 
projects in Germany.  
 
4 Information obtained by telephone from SenerTec representative on 19.02.2019 
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supply for buildings Energy park 
Input power max. 62,5 kWel 52 kWel 
max. 6 MWel (3 x 
electrolysers each 2 
MWel) 
H2-production 10 Nm³/h 10 Nm³/h PEMEL max. 1,000 Nm³/h 
SNG production 2,5 Nm³/h 2,5 Nm³/h None 
CO2 source 
Own SNG combustion, 
CHP and gas-fired 
boilers 




Heat exchanger, buffer 
tank None 
Source: Own compilation based on Strategieplattform Power to Gas 
1.2.2 Transport  
For Germany, the IEA (2019) lists the number of operational fuel cell passenger vehicles at 
about 500 (IEA 2019). The number of fuel cell busses in operation stands at 15, with 
additional 50 approved for deployment, with suppliers having experienced difficulties meeting 
the demand. Most buses are part of various pilot projects (for example BIC H2, Chapter 
1.4.4). Germany is currently in 4th place globally with 75 operating hydrogen refuelling 
stations and another 28 in planning or construction; by the end of 2019, the total number 
should reach 100 stations (H2 LIVE 2019). In contrast to Japan, these are not as 
concentrated in the few of the largest cities but distributed more evenly.  
In 2018, the first hydrogen-powered fuel cell train in Germany started service on a non-
electrified line. In naval applications, fuel cell technologies have seen so far very limited 
deployment (a tourist ship in Hamburg is the only identified operational example where a 
hydrogen fuel cell is used for propulsion; fuel cell-based auxiliary power units are also used 
in naval applications), but are currently being tested in several research and pilot projects 
(Institute for Combustion Engines VKA 2018).  
1.2.3 Industry 
According to NOW, the yearly hydrogen production in Germany amounts to around 15 billion 
Nm3. About three quarters are produced and used in refineries and chemical industry (NOW 
2016). Currently, several hydrogen-related research or demonstration projects are underway 
in the industry sector. Carbon2chem (chapter 1.4.4) aims at capturing gasses from steel 
production to be used in chemical industry, including hydrogen and CO2; Kopernikus-P2X 
project focuses on a number of hydrogen-related processes which could be valuable for the 
industry, and includes 27 industrial companies; GrInHy aims to develop a reversible 
generator based on the Solid Oxide Cell technology (Thyssenkrupp 2018, BMBF 2019, 
Green Industrial Hydrogen 2019).  
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1.2.4 Power generation 
Like in Japan, research on hydrogen combustion in gas turbines is underway in Germany, 
for example at the Technische Universität Berlin (Hydrogeit 2016). Current developments by 
Siemens allow operation of turbines on a fuel mix with up to 60% hydrogen content; future 
activities are expected to focus on the development of turbines operating with pure hydrogen 
(TMI Staff & Contributors 2019).  
With regard to UPS systems, an alliance of stakeholders from the research and industry 
sectors called Clean Power Net was formed in 2010 to advance the market uptake of fuel 
cell UPS applications (Clean power net 2019). Between 2010 and 2016, around 200 fuel cell 
systems have been installed as back-up power supply for the digital radio network of critical 
institutions (police and fire stations etc., Clean power net 2019a). They were supported by 
R&D-funding of the Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure (BMVI). In order 
to be eligible, the systems must provide 72 h of isolated operation; their typical power output 
was below 20 kW. In addition, 505 fuel cell UPS-systems for the digital radio network were 
supported under the funding guideline for market activation of the BMVI in 2018. These 
projects are mostly in realisation at the moment (NOW 2018a).  
There are several more fuel cell demonstration projects in different areas of application such 
as traffic control, security systems, oil and gas energy, water supply, measuring stations and 
sensor technology, with limited numbers of systems deployed at this point (Information 
obtained directly from NOW).  
1.2.5 Power-to-X 
In 2019, 50 Power-to-Gas (PtG) plants were in planning or operation in Germany, with a total 
electrical capacity of over 55 MW (PV-Magazin 2019). Some of these test and pilot projects 
sell hydrogen to tank stations or industrial customers. The first project with an electrolyser 
capacity of 10 MW is expected to start operating in early 2020 (Shell 2019).  
In a further step towards larger systems, plans to build a 100 MW PtG plant in northern 
Germany have been announced by the power transmission system operator Tennet in 
cooperation with two gas transmission system operators, Gasunie Deutschland and 
Thyssengas. This project intends to take advantage of the region’s vast wind potential. 
Partial operation is expected to start in 2022. In early 2019, Amprion, another power 
transmission system operator, together with Open Grid Europe, a gas transmission system 
operator, announced plans to build another 100 MW PtG plant, with an estimated investment 
volume around 100 million EUR. The project envisions using current hydrogen pipelines as 
well as adapting an existing gas network for transportation of pure hydrogen gas. Both of 
these plants are the first of their kind in Germany (IWR 2019).  
1.3 Overview of deployment by sectors - Japan 
1.3.1 Residential sector 
In Japan’s residential sector, a fuel cell heat and power co-generation system called Ene-
Farm is the most utilized hydrogen technology (Figure 2). By providing higher efficiencies 
compared to separate use of hydrogen for generating heat and electricity, it lowers the 
operating costs and reduces the CO2 footprint. Further decarbonisation is possible by 
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completely substituting the natural gas with clean hydrogen in the future. The Ene-Farm also 
improves resilience in situations such as blackouts and hot water shortages. Currently, two 
types of Ene-Farms are available (Table 2).  
Table 2: Ene-Farm Products in Japan 
Company Aisin Seiki Panasonic 
Application SOFC PEFC 
Power generation output 50 – 700 W 200 – 700 W 
Efficiency (LHV) 
Power: 52% 
Heat recovery: 35% 
Power: 39% 
Heat recovery: 56% 
Dimensions (mm) W780 × D330 × H1,220 W400 × D400 × H1,750 
Tank capacity/water 
temperature 28 l / approx. 70 ℃ 140 l / 60 – 80 ℃ 
Fuel City gas / propane gas City gas / propane gas 
Source: Own compilation by IEEJ based on information from Ene-Farm partners  
Despite the steady increase in numbers of Ene-Farms since their introduction, their share is 
still marginal, due to two main factors. The first is the high initial cost of a unit. In 2016, the 
price of an Ene-Farm was JPY 1,130,000 (~ 9,000 EUR) for the Polymer Electrolyte Fuel 
Cell PEFC type and JPY 1,350,000 (~ EUR 11,000) for the SOFC type.5 This typically 
represents a considerable mark-up compared to other heat supply systems. The second 
hurdle is unit dimensions, often making Ene-Farms too large for installation in individual units 
of apartment complexes. These constitute around 40% of total housing capacities in Japan, 
while 98% of Ene-Farms have so far been installed in detached houses. On both of these 
points, technical progress can potentially provide improvements. Despite the hurdles, 
250,000 units have been installed since its introduction to the market until July 2018. The 
target stands at 5,300,000 units by 2030 (Ehret 2018). This makes Japan the undisputed 
market leader in stationary fuel cells applications for residential buildings (IEEJ own data, 









5 Exchange rates applied throughout this study are 1 JPY ~ 0.80 EUR cent and 1 USD ~ 0,89 EUR (29.03.2019) 





Figure 2: Brief history of Ene-Farm development in Japan 
Source: Nagata (2014) 
1.3.2 Transport  
In Japan, serial production of fuel cell passenger vehicles was launched in late 2014 with the 
Toyota Mirai. By March 2018, the number of FCEVs in the end market use has risen to 2,440 
(IEEJ own data, unpublished, 2019). Currently, Toyota’s MIRAI and Honda’s CLARITY FUEL 
CELL are available in the market (Table 3). Toyota has also commercialized the SORA fuel 
cell bus in March 2018; five of these are currently operational in Tokyo. Deployment of FC 
buses is expected to provide a stable hydrogen demand, based on the estimation that 
hydrogen consumption of a fuel cell bus equals that of about 45 fuel cell passenger cars. No 
rail fuel call applications have been deployed yet.  





CLARITY FUEL CELL 




 JPY 6.74 million 
(~EUR 54,000) 
JPY 7.1 million 
(~EUR 57,000) 
JPY 105 million 
(~ EUR 850,000) 
Range 650 km 750 km 200 km 
Refuelling time 5 kg / 3 minutes 15 kg / 10 - 15 minutes 
Source: Own compilation by IEEJ based on information from Toyota and Honda  
One crucial issue has been the development of hydrogen refuelling stations. As of May 
2018, there were 108 hydrogen refuelling stations including planning and construction 
stages, making Japan the global leader. Most of them are located in the four major cities 
(Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya, and Fukuoka).  
1970s~
R&D on fuel cell in 
Japan dated back to 
late 1970s
2000~2005
•R&D of private companies supported 
by government
•Prototype released by private 
companies
•Small scale demonstration projects
2005~2009
Large scale field test led by NEDO
and participated by various 
stakeholders
2009 2000 2005 
2009
Enefarm launched to 
the market
Beyond 2009
•Government subsidy for 
large scale penetration
•Continuing government 
support for performance 
improvement and cost 
reduction 
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What is deterring the development of hydrogen refuelling infrastructure in Japan are primarily 
high investment costs. The cost of building a hydrogen refuelling station is estimated at 
about JPY 350 million (~ EUR 2.8 million), which is much higher than the cost for a gasoline 
station of JPY 100 million (~ EUR 800,000). Ultimately, the price of hydrogen for FCEVs is 
affected partially by the costs of building and operating a hydrogen refuelling station. There 
is a general notion that a chicken and egg problem in Japan exists with regard to hydrogen 
technologies deployment: Uncertainty about hydrogen demand has a negative effect on 
infrastructure investments; in turn, the availability of refuelling stations is fundamental to 
reducing consumers’ anxiety about purchasing FCEVs.  
1.3.3 Industry 
Hydrogen use in Japan’s industry sector was approximately 15 billion Nm3 in 2014, most of 
which was captive use in refineries (71%), ammonia production processes (16%) and 
petrochemical plants (10%). Other applications such as semiconductor, metal and glass take 
up around 3% (IEEJ own data, unpublished 2019). Industrial gas suppliers provide hydrogen 
from on-site hydrogen generators installed in the plants. Apart from that, hydrogen is 
transported to the plants in compressed hydrogen or liquefied hydrogen form.   
Fuel cells CHP systems of larger sizes for industrial and commercial applications are still in 
the early stage of market development. In Japan, SOFC is the technology that the 
government is prioritising for industrial and commercial use. The target of launching fuel cell-
based systems for industrial and commercial use in 2017, set in “the Strategic Roadmap for 
Hydrogen and Fuel Cells,” was actually achieved in the same year, as three different SOFC 
cogeneration systems entered the market (Table 4). Two further companies also planned to 
launch their products by the end of Fiscal Year 2018, i.e. March of 2019. Currently, Molten 
Carbonate Fuel Cell (MCFC) has not been commercialized yet and deployment of a 
Phosphoric Acid Fuel Cell (PAFC) cogeneration system has been bogged down by issues 
like maintenance costs, although it was already made available in 1998. 
Table 4: Fuel Cells for Commercial and Industrial Use in Japan 
Company Mitsubishi Hitachi 
Power Systems Miura Kyocera Fuji Electric 
Hitachi 
Zosen 
Application SOFC＋micro gas 
turbine 






4.2 kW 3 kW 100 kW 50 kW 20 kW 
Electrical 
efficiency (LHV) 




Heat recovery rate 
(LHV) 
‐ 42% ‐ ‐ 30% ‐ 
Overall energy 
efficiency (LHV) 
73% - 76% 90% 90% 91% - 
93%* 
85% 90% 
Launched year 2017 2017 2017 1998 FY 2018** FY 
2018** 
* Depending on fuel (city gas/biogas/pure hydrogen); ** FY 2018 ends in March of 2019 in Japan.  
Source: Own compilation by IEEJ based on METI information  
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1.3.4 Power generation 
Japan has set itself the target of commercializing hydrogen-based power generation around 
2030, and is presently conducting R&D and demonstration projects which aim to develop 
combustors that can fire hydrogen mixed with natural gas, or ultimately, hydrogen alone. The 
government directed that the premixed flame combustion method or a new combustion 
method which does not need water/steam dilution should be pursued for hydrogen power 
generation utilizing a large-scale gas turbine. With large-capacity CHP systems already 
available on the Japanese market (see chapter 1.3.3), fuel-cell power generation is 
considered to be mature enough for deployment at scale, at least from the technical 
perspective.  
1.3.5 Power-to-X 
PtX in Japan is still in the early demonstration stage. Besides the FH2R project described in 
the chapter 1.5, there are several other demonstration projects where the scale is much 
smaller. There are currently three PtG pilot projects in operation in Japan (Table 5).  
Table 5: Overview of other major power-to-gas demonstration project supported 
by NEDO 
Project Overview Stakeholder Main purpose Technology 
• Storage of 
renewable power 




• Yokohama National 
University 
• Storage of wind 
power in the form of 
hydrogen 
• Grid service by 
electrolyser 
• Alkaline water 
electrolysis 
• MCH for hydrogen 
storage 
• Fuel cell (SOFC) 
• Stabilization of 
variable renewable 
power output by 
power-to-gas 
• Toyota Tsusho 
Corporation 
• NTT FACILITIES, 
INC. 
• Kawasaki Heavy 
Industries, Ltd. 
• Hrein Energy Inc. 
• Technova Inc. 
• Muroran Institute of 
Technology 
• Using excess wind 
power to produce 
hydrogen 
• Supply hydrogen to 
a heat supply boiler 
in the nearby 
community 
• Alkaline water 
electrolysis 
• MCH for hydrogen 
delivery 
• Hybrid hydrogen 
boiler (with LPG) 




system by solar PV, 
electrolyser, and fuel 
cell 
• Tohoku University 
• Mayekawa MFG. 
CO., LTD. 










• Fuel cell (PEFC) 
Source: own compilation based on NEDO (2016)  
One of the major barriers of PtG in Japan is that the cost of hydrogen production via 
electrolysis from renewable power is very high. The current CAPEX levels for electrolysers in 
Japan lie between 150,000 and 200,000 JPY/kW (~ 1,200 – 1,600 EUR/kW). In comparison, 
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IRENA (2018) cites typical CAPEX levels at 750 and 1,200 EUR/kW for alkaline and PEMEL, 
respectively (IEEJ own data, unpublished, 2019, IRENA 2018). Further, renewable power 
cost levels are currently twice as high as those in Europe; the government has set the 2030 
targets to 7 JPY/kWh (~ 0.06 EUR/kW) for solar PV and 8 - 9 JPY/kWh (~ 0.07 EUR/kW) for 
wind, which is still higher than the current international lowest levels (ANRE 2018). A low-
cost renewable power supply could present itself from the renewable power projects after 
their guaranteed feed-in tariff (FIT) period has expired. FIT in Japan started in 2012, and with 
FIT periods for large scale wind and solar PV both lasting 20 years, first projects will run out 
in 2032. 
1.4 Overview of policy - Germany  
1.4.1 Political drivers  
Climate and energy policies are the main driver for green hydrogen development and 
deployment in Germany. Although Germany succeeded in reducing its greenhouse gas 
emissions by 31% in 2018 in comparison to 1990 (UBA 2019b), its national targets for 2030 
(-55%), 2040 (-70%) and 2050 (between -80 and -95%) are very ambitious. A large majority 
of the population supports these targets and considers them a high priority. Accordingly, 
nearly all political parties are strongly committed to Germany’s climate and energy targets. 
Given the higher costs and technical challenges in other sectors, such as industry and 
agriculture, achieving the climate targets requires a virtually complete decarbonisation of the 
energy sector, including electricity, heat and transportation. Especially for the latter, as well 
as for some industrial processes, a widely held view is that a significant use of green 
hydrogen and other renewables-based synthetic fuels are essential to achieve Germany’s 
energy and climate targets at acceptable costs. 
Regarding the power sector, green hydrogen and other renewables-based synthetic fuels 
can play an important role in balancing very high shares of variable renewables which are 
expected to become the prevailing electricity source in Germany over the course of the next 
years. Green hydrogen and other renewables-based synthetic fuels can provide large scale 
seasonal storage services.  
Regarding the transportation and heating sectors, in view of reducing GHG emissions and 
local air pollution, German energy strategy has so far focused mainly on energy savings and 
energy efficiency (e.g. building insulation, reduction of motorised individual transport) and on 
electrification (e.g. heat pumps, electric vehicles). However, these two approaches are 
insufficient to achieve a complete decarbonisation in these sectors (chapter 2.1). Green 
hydrogen or other renewables-based synthetic fuels are therefore expected to play an 
important role, especially for long distance road freight transport, shipping, air transport as 
well as for a series of industrial processes. 
Last but not least, technological leadership and export opportunities also represent an 
important driver for deployment of hydrogen technologies in Germany. German companies 
are leading in several hydrogen technologies, and therefore push for Germany to become an 
early adopter as a way of facilitating technology learning and economies of scale. 
Technology providers as well as power and gas transmission network operators have 
engaged in extensive R&D activities, equipment testing and pilot projects. 
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Given these drivers, there is a wide consensus that in the medium and long term, hydrogen 
produced in and imported to Germany should and will be clean. From a climate policy point 
of view, efforts to substitute natural gas are pointless if the hydrogen originates from SMR or 
from coal gasification without CCS. Whether the clean hydrogen used in Germany should 
only be green or could also be blue (see text box at the beginning of chapter 1.1 for the 
definitions of this terminology) is a more open debate. Due to strong public opposition6, the 
implementation of CCS on German soil in the foreseeable future is very unlikely. However, 
the growing awareness for the urgency of climate action could lead to increased political 
acceptance for imported blue hydrogen. 
1.4.2 Major policies 
Currently, the German federal government is in the process of adopting the first German 
National Hydrogen Strategy, expected to be released by the end of 2019. To date, in its 
National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP), currently under development and required to be 
submitted to the European Commission by the end of 2019, only one quantitative target 
specifically refers to hydrogen or hydrogen technologies (BMWi 2019b).  
1.4.3 Initiatives, partnerships, platforms and institutions on national 
and European level  
Germany participates in global, European and domestic initiatives concerned with hydrogen 
technologies. Following is an overview of the most visible ones in Germany and Europe. 
International initiatives are summarized in Chapter 0. 
Fuel Cells and Hydrogen Joint Undertaking 
The Fuel Cells and Hydrogen Joint Undertaking (FCH-JU) is a European initiative including 
the European Commission, industrial stakeholders represented by Hydrogen Europe, and 
stakeholders from the research sector represented by Hydrogen Europe Research. This 
public-private partnership focuses on supporting R&D and demonstration projects in fuel cell 
and hydrogen energy technologies. The first phase (2014 – 2020) has a budget of 1.3 billion 
EUR. The second phase will focus on reducing costs of hydrogen technologies across 
different sectors (FCH 2019).  
European Hydrogen Initiative  
The European Hydrogen Initiative was signed by 25 European countries in 2018. Its foci lie 
on conversion of hydrogen to renewable methane, direct injection into the gas grid, short- 
and long-term energy storage, sector integration and coupling as well as use of hydrogen 
technologies in industrial and transport sectors (FMRAST 2018).    
 
6 Plans for carbon storage in Germany have been abandoned due to public opposition based on two very different drivers and sets 
of people. On one hand, there was a widespread general opposition, supported also from several influential environmental NGOs,  
to CCS projects applied to (brown) coal power plants. This opposition was based on the argument that the power sector can be 
more effectively and more cheaply decarbonised by achieving very high, up to 100%, shares of renewables. For technical and 
economic reasons, large CCS coal power plants would not be compatible with a power system dominated by variable renewables. 
This argument is still valid, as Germany is in the process of agreeing a complete phase out of coal power plants, following the 
example of several other European countries. However, this argument does not apply to the use of CCS for industrial processes 
that cannot be (easily) electrified. The second reason for opposition is scepticism about the safety of carbon storage, which 
triggered fierce opposition from the local population of the areas close to the planned CO2 pipelines and storage sites. 
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German – French cooperation on energy transition 
Based on a directive passed by both countries, joint R&D activities to promote sustainable 
energy supply for Europe will be eligible for funding, addressing, among other issues, 
renewable energy conversion and storage. Hydrogen and fuel cells are specifically 
mentioned as target technologies. The funding is administered by Projektträger Jülich 
(BMBF 2019a).  
7th Energy Research Programme 
The Federal Government adopted its 7th Energy Research Programme in September 2018. 
Compared to its predecessor, it increases the support for research, development, 
demonstration and trial of technologies across all domains of energy. At the same time, it 
broadens the scope of funding, sets a stronger focus on sector coupling (in particular on 
interfaces with the transport sector), and increases its engagement in international 
cooperation. A special role is given to supporting large-scale field testing (Reallabor, the 
German term used to describe it, roughly translate into real-environment laboratory), 
including hydrogen production by water electrolysis. Approximately EUR 6.4 billion has been 
earmarked for funding until 2022 (PtJ 2019).  
National organisation for hydrogen and fuel cell technology / National 
innovation programme hydrogen and fuel cell technology 
The National Organisation for Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Technology (NOW) constitutes one of 
the key stakeholders as the partner of the German Government for hydrogen technologies 
and sustainable mobility. Acting as link between politics, academia and industry, the NOW 
coordinates and facilitates activities in various national and international networks. Beyond 
the national activities, the NOW represents the German ministries in the networks of the 
IPHE, IEA and IC-8, linking national to the international activities and developments. Within 
various European networks, NOW is strongly involved in the policy and regulatory, work as 
well as coordination of funding programs. It is also involved in specific bilateral partnerships 
with the goal of strengthening Germany’s technology leadership and addressing specific 
aspects of technology cooperation, e.g. within the Sino-German collaboration on regulation, 
the long standing partnership with NEDO with focus on PtX and hydrogen infrastructure, etc.  
Some of NOW’s most visible tasks are coordinating the National Innovation Programme 
Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Technology (NIP), as well as the funding guidelines Electromobility 
and Charging Infrastructure (NOW 2019a). In addition, the program for the mobility and fuels 
strategy (Mobilitäts- und Kraftstoffstrategie, MKS) has been set up to enable projects 
associated with the use and production of alternative fuels, including by PtX. On behalf of the 
Ministry of Environment (BMU), the Export Initiative Environmental Technologies extends the 
activities to evaluate and enable the use of hydrogen and fuel cell technologies worldwide. 
NIP I ran from 2007 to 2016 and represented the overarching platform for hydrogen 
technologies research. Over this timespan, it generated investments of 1.4 billion EUR in the 
hydrogen and fuel cell technologies, provided in roughly equal sums by the private and the 
public sector. Among recipients were about 240 private sector entities and about 50 research 
institutes. It focused heavily on basic research and demonstration projects while support for 
market introduction only amounted to about 1% of overall funding. The transport sector 
received just under half of the funding (McKinsey & Company 2017).  
NIP II was started in 2017 and is foreseen to run until 2026. While in terms of sectors, the 
transport remains in focus, more funding will go towards market introduction and integrated 
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projects in hydrogen regions (NOW conducted a survey in 2018 of all major electrolysis 
technology providers and came to the conclusion that the technology is ready for the market 
(Smolinka et al. 2018)). The NIP II website currently lists 13 running projects (NOW 2019b). 
The overall investments for the second phase of the NIP are foreseen to exceed 2 billion 
EUR, mostly provided by the private sector. NOW and Projektträger Jülich are jointly 
coordinating the programme (BMVI 2016).  
Strategic platform Power-to-Gas 
An important role has also been played by the Strategic platform Power to Gas, initiated by 
the German Energy Agency (Strategieplattform Power to Gas 2019). Its intention is to 
facilitate cooperation among relevant actors in order to promote market-ready technologies 
and facilitate market their entry. To date, it has generated more than 40 research and pilot 
projects, 24 of them already in operation and addressing all stages of hydrogen life cycle.  
Global alliance power fuels  
dena initiated the Global Alliance Power Fuels in 2018 with the aim of bringing international 
industrial enterprises together and building a broad network of partners from research, 
politics, and society in order to develop international markets for synthetic fuels from 
renewable energies (dena 2018b).  
Federal-state and regional initiatives  
Regional initiatives are also underway in Germany, for example the Fuel Cell Initiative of 
Baden Wuerttemberg, a network which aims to promote development and expansion of 
sustainable energy generation and storage technologies based on fuel cells and batteries in 
mobile, stationary and portable application, as well as infrastructure (BBA-BW 2019). 
Another example is the Coordination Centre of the Bavarian Hydrogen Initiative, which 
manages public relations activities concerning the topic of hydrogen, conducts energy and 
economic analyses and formulates long-term strategies for promotion of hydrogen (wiba 
2009). The hySOLUTIONS in Hamburg is a public-private partnership promoting the 
application of fuel cells and hydrogen as well as electric drive and supply systems 
(hySolutions 2017). The Fuel Cell and Hydrogen Network North-Rhine Westphalia connects 
relevant actors in the field of fuel cell and hydrogen to bolster the development and market 
integration (EnergieAgentur NRW 2019). On the regional level, Germany is represented in 
the European Association for Hydrogen, Fuel Cells and Electromobility in European Regions 
(HyER) which was established to represent member states’ interest on hydrogen and fuel 
cells in the 7th Energy Research Programme (EnergieAgentur NRW 2008).  
1.4.4 Demonstration and pilot projects  
Following is a list of 5 demonstration and pilot projects which is non-exhaustive but aims to 
outline the diversity of the hydrogen-related pilot projects currently underway in Germany. 
Since many projects cover more than one sector, a break-down of the projects by sectors 
has not been conducted.  
HYPOS East Germany 
The Hypos project was started in 2013 with the aim to develop a Germany-wide network of 
hydrogen stakeholders and currently has over 100 members from the private sector, 
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research institutions and academia. While also serving as a platform for knowledge 
generation and sharing, its most visible success has been the development of the HYPOS 
model hydrogen region for green hydrogen production, storage, transport and use 
connecting sectors transport, heating and in industry. HYPOS seeks to identify niche and 
entry hydrogen applications which have the potential to be some of the first economically 
viable green hydrogen use cases (HYPOS 2019).  
The HYPOS model region is concentrated in the former eastern states of Saxony and 
Saxony-Anhalt and built around a 150 km hydrogen pipeline, the second largest in Germany. 
The location offers sufficient renewable energies supply potential, demand from industrial 
and residential sector, the possibility of using salt caverns for storing of hydrogen, and 
existing pipeline infrastructure. The project’s website currently lists 25 individual projects.  
BIC H2 
The regional public transport operator in the region around Cologne has been using 
hydrogen-powered fuel cell buses on regular lines since 2011. This has been part of the 
company’s internal project designed to achieve a zero-emissions fleet operation. Initially, 30 
fuel cell buses and 2 refuelling stations have been introduced with the aim of demonstrating 
the technology’s readiness for large-scale deployment. The project is accompanied by 
private-sector technology manufacturers and research institutions which provide monitoring 
and evaluation. The project clearly states that one of its goals is to send a message to the 
policymakers that the hydrogen technologies have matured (NOW 2019c).  
BIC H2 is part of a EU-supported umbrella initiative JIVE (Joint Initiative for hydrogen 
Vehicles across Europe) which aims to deploy 139 fuel cell buses across the EU, bundling 
the orders with the aim of strengthening the buyer’s bargaining position towards producers, 
facilitate investments in R&D and price competition on the side of the producers, promote 
standardisation, expedite infrastructure deployment and generate knowledge (Fuel Cell 
Electric Buses 2019).  
Energiepark Mainz  
Energiepark Mainz was funded by the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Energy 
(BMWi) and ended in 2015 with the construction of an electrolysis plant with a peak capacity 
of 6 MWel which absorbs excess wind energy. The produced hydrogen can temporarily be 
stored on site and distributed to various industrial, mobility and power generation 
applications. Further, the project aims to develop a new plant operation concept which 
improves its economic viability (Strategieplattform Power-to-Gas 2019e).  
Climate friendly living  
An example of a comprehensive project in the residential sector is the Exytron’s Climate-
friendly living in Augsburg from 2018. A renovation of a building from 1974 included refitting 
it with a PtX facility which absorbs excess renewable power and converts it into synthetic gas 
which is temporarily stored on site. The subsequent combustion takes place in a condensing 
boiler-based CHP system, supplying 70 apartments with electricity and heat. The renovation 
also included a roof-mounted PV power plant (Strategieplattform Power to Gas 2019).  
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Carbon2Chem 
In 2018, Thyssenkrupp commissioned a pilot plant to use metallurgical gases for synthetic 
methanol production. The Carbon2Chem project, partly financed by the Federal Ministry of 
Education and Research, is focusing on using the CO2 produced during steel production for 
chemical products. The large scale of the project, if successful, would mean that 
considerable quantities of CO2 could be converted into precursors for fuels, plastics or 
fertilizers instead of released into atmosphere (dpa 2018).  
1.5 Overview of policy - Japan  
1.5.1 Political drivers 
From Japan’s perspective, hydrogen as energy carrier is seen as fulfilling three different 
roles. Firstly, while the need for decarbonisation of the country’s energy system is becoming 
ever more pressing, Japan’s option for low-carbon fuels is limited: high cost of renewable 
electricity, limited potential for CCS, and uncertainties regarding nuclear power. Given this 
situation, high expectations are connected with clean hydrogen. The second is improving 
Japan’s energy security. This issue has shaped Japan’s energy policy ever since the first oil 
crisis in 1973 (Thorarinsson 2018). Because clean hydrogen can be produced in different 
ways, for example from fossil fuels with use of CCS or by water electrolysis using renewable 
power, hydrogen can contribute to Japan’s energy supply becoming more diversified. The 
third is the development of new export technologies for the hydrogen economy. Japan is the 
world’s leading country in stationary fuel cell technologies and Japanese automotive 
companies are on the cutting edge of fuel cell vehicle manufacturing. 
1.5.2 Major policies 
The direction of energy transition set by the government is mapped in the Strategic Energy 
Plan. The latest Strategic Energy Plan (5th Strategic Energy Plan) was released in 2018. 
Although the pathway of energy transition towards 2030 is clearly set out with quantitative 
targets, there is only a general picture of what the energy system will look like in 2050, 
without any clear targets. The 5th Strategic Energy Plan contains a chapter dedicated to 
hydrogen. The discussion of future development of hydrogen is independent from the energy 
mix targets for 2030 since use of hydrogen is expected to scale up only after 2030. 
The detailed roadmap towards the hydrogen-based society (the term introduced by the 4th 
Strategic Energy Plan) can be found in the Basic Hydrogen Strategy and the Strategic 
Roadmap for Hydrogen and Fuel Cells (see below), two policies specifically dedicated to 
hydrogen and fuel cells. In them, both the application of hydrogen and fuel cell technologies 
and the supply of clean hydrogen are discussed. Power and mobility sector are envisioned to 
make the largest share in hydrogen demand. Despite the important role of stationary fuel 
cells in the hydrogen-based society, the policies don’t clearly address the issue of whether 
their demand for hydrogen is to be covered by clean hydrogen or by onsite natural gas/LPG 
reforming. Both policies envision that both, imported clean hydrogen, and hydrogen 
produced from domestic renewable resources will be the main sources for hydrogen supply 
in the future. 
adelphi  Wuppertal Institute  dena  IEEJ 018 
 
The 5th Strategic Energy Plan (2018) 
The Hydrogen-based society was already part of the 4th Strategic Energy Plan from 2014, 
granting hydrogen and fuel cell technologies a central role in Japan’s energy strategy, and 
ensuring it a strong government support. The 5th Strategic Energy Plan again emphasizes 
the importance of hydrogen’s role and lays out the pathway and targets. For hydrogen use, 
the 5th Strategic Energy Plan particularly focuses on the mobility and power sectors. Apart 
from that, further expansion of the deployment of stationary fuel cells is a priority. For the 
time being, the stationary fuel cell applications will continue to use hydrogen derived from 
natural gas and LPG via reforming. For hydrogen supply, imports of clean hydrogen as well 
as domestic PtX applications are seen as the two main important sources. The targets in the 
5th Strategic Energy Plan are in line with the Basic Hydrogen Strategy and Strategic 
Roadmap for Hydrogen and Fuel Cells (METI 2018a).  
Basic Hydrogen Strategy (2017) 
The Basic Hydrogen Strategy is the first comprehensive government plan for hydrogen and 
fuel cell technology development, summarizing and streamlining various supporting 
programs by different ministries. Although the strategy covers all aspects of development of 
the hydrogen-based society, it is essentially a summary of all the issues that have already 
been discussed. The mid- and long-term targets set out in this Basic Hydrogen Strategy are 
generally in line with those in the Strategic Roadmap for Hydrogen and Fuel Cells (METI 
2017).  
Strategic Roadmap for Hydrogen and Fuel Cells (released in 2014 and revised 
in 2016) 
The Strategic Roadmap for Hydrogen and Fuel Cells was drafted by the Council for a 
Strategy for Hydrogen and Fuel Cells (with METI in the role of the secretary) in 2014 and 
revised in 2016 (METI 2016). The roadmap envisioned three phases for hydrogen and fuel 
cell development in Japan:    
 
• Phase 1: Dramatic expansion of hydrogen mobility applications and deployment of 
stationary fuel cells (in the short term using on-site natural gas/LPG reforming 
instead of clean hydrogen).  
• Phase 2: Full-fledged introduction of hydrogen power generation and establishment 
of a large-scale hydrogen supply system by the second half of the 2020s; 
commercialization of large-scale & long-distance hydrogen transport technologies. 
• Phase 3: Establishment of a clean hydrogen supply system by around 2040.  
 
Table 6 provides targets related to hydrogen as defined by the documents central to 
Japanese official energy strategy.  
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Table 6: Overview of Hydrogen and Fuel Cell technology status and future 
development targets in Japan 
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1.5.3 Initiatives, partnerships, platforms and institutions 
In Japan, there are several initiatives and platforms formed by private companies, which are 
supported by the government or government-affiliated institutions, and are in charge of 
promoting the demonstration and commercialization of hydrogen technologies. 
HySTRA (Hydrogen Energy Supply-chain Technology Research Association) 
HySTRA was formed by four private companies in 2016 (Kawasaki Heavy Industry (KHI), J-
Power, Iwatani Corporation, and Shell Japan) and supported by NEDO to demonstrate the 
viability of brown coal gasification and hydrogen refining at Latrobe Valley in Australia, 
aiming to establish a Japan-Australia hydrogen supply chain.  
AHEAD (Advanced Hydrogen Energy Chain Association for Technology 
Development) 
AHEAD is an association formed in 2017 by Mitsubishi Corporation, Nippon Yusen, Chiyoda 
Corporation, and Mitsui & Co. with support from NEDO (AHEAD 2017). It is responsible for 
carrying out the Japan-Brunei Hydrogen Supply Chain project which aims to demonstrate the 
viability of long-distance methyl cyclohexane (MCH) hydrogen transport.  
Advanced research project on hydrogen application technologies  
The foci of this project lie on scientific research aimed at improving performance of 
electrolysis technologies, R&D of large-scale hydrogen application technologies, research on 
high efficiency power generation technologies and research on energy carrier systems. The 
program runs from financial year 2014 to financial year 2022; in 2018, the funding was about 
0.9 billion JPY (~ 7 million EUR) (NEDO 2019a).  
R&D on technologies for building hydrogen society  
This programme targets R&D and demonstration projects for hydrogen production from 
renewable energy, hydrogen transportation and storage, as well as hydrogen supply chains 
focusing on hydrogen production from overseas energy resources. It also concerns itself with 
R&D on hydrogen gas turbines and is trying to identify the direction of future technology 
development. The program runs from financial year 2014 to financial year 2020; in 2018, the 
funding was about 8.9 billion JPY (~ 72 million EUR) (NEDO 2019a).  
R&D on hydrogen application technologies  
The focus lies on FCEVs and hydrogen refuelling stations, in particular on research to 
support the streamlining of domestic regulation and consistency with international standards. 
Further, it strives to achieve cost reductions for FCEVs and hydrogen refuelling stations, and 
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improve the safety of hydrogen refuelling stations. It also focuses on research of global 
policy, market, and R&D trends for clean hydrogen. The program ran from financial year 
2013 to financial year 2017 and had a funding of about 4.1 billion JPY (~ 33 million EUR) 
(NEDO 2019a).  
Initiatives by the Tokyo Metropolitan Government 
For the Olympic and Paralympic Games 2020 in Tokyo, the Tokyo Metropolitan Government, 
supported by the national government, is taking efforts for implementing several hydrogen 
production and utilization facilities. A fund of about 40 billion JPY (around 322 million EUR) 
has been set up to be used for several purposes such as an increase in demand for 
passenger FCEVs, the introduction of fuel-cell buses, as well as the establishment of 
hydrogen refuelling stations in Tokyo, concentrated in areas relevant for transportation of 
athletes, officials and visitors to the Olympic Games. Further, implementation of green 
hydrogen supply systems which use renewable power from areas surrounding Tokyo is 
supported. For establishing a hydrogen supply system, the Tokyo Metropolitan Government 
is also promoting the introduction of technologies such as hydrogen pipelines and hydrogen 
fuel cells. An education centre was also opened in 2016 with the task of providing 
information about hydrogen energy to the public and interested companies (Tokyo 
Metropolitan Government 2018).  
1.5.4 Demonstration and pilot projects 
The New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization (NEDO) is the main 
government agency supporting and overseeing research and demonstration projects on 
hydrogen and fuel cell technologies. Following is a list of three visible projects which focus 
on hydrogen (the list is not exhaustive). 
Japan-Australia Hydrogen Supply Chain Project  
This pilot project aims to demonstrate hydrogen production from brown coal and large scale 
international hydrogen shipping in the form of liquid hydrogen. The project is comprised of 5 
parts: (1) brown coal gasification, (2) hydrogen refinery, (3) hydrogen liquefaction, liquid 
hydrogen storage, export terminal, (4) liquid hydrogen shipping, and (5) liquid hydrogen 
reception via receiving terminal (Figure 3).  
Supported by NEDO, four private companies – Kawasaki Heavy Industry (KHI), J-Power, 
Iwatani Corporation, and Shell Japan – formed the CO2-free Hydrogen Energy Supply-chain 
Technology Research Association (HySTRA, chapter 1.5.3) in 2016 to demonstrate parts 
(1), (4), and (5) (HySTRA 2019). Demonstration of parts (2) and (3) is supported by the 
Australian government and will be carried out by Kawasaki Heavy Industry, J-Power, Iwatani 
Corporation, Marubeni Corporation, and AGL Energy Limited. Hydrogen production and 
transportation will take place for one year between 2020 and 2021. Pending results of the 
pilot project, the decision for a commercial uptake that is planned to potentially include CCS 
will be made in the 2020s (HESC 2019). It is assumed that the large scale liquid hydrogen 
supply chain could probably be commercialized in the 2030s (J-Power 2018).  
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Figure 3: Overview of the Japan-Australia hydrogen supply chain project 
Source: Own depiction by IEEJ based on HySTRA information  
Japan-Brunei Hydrogen Supply Chain Project 
The main purpose of the project is to demonstrate the viability of hydrogen transportation in 
the form of MCH. Hydrogen produced from natural gas steam reforming in Brunei is mixed 
with toluene to form MCH for subsequent shipping to Japan. At the receiving end, a 
dehydrogenation process is required. The advantage of using MCH as the carrier for large-
scale hydrogen transportation is that it can be stored and transported under ambient 
temperature and pressure with relatively high energy density. The technology used for MCH 
formation and hydrogen production from MCH called SPERA is developed by the Chiyoda 
Corporation, a leading Japanese company specialized in engineering, procurement and 
construction. Figure 4 provides an overview of the project. 
 
 
Figure 4: Overview of the H2-MCH-H2 scheme 
Source: JASE-W (2014) 
The project is supported by NEDO and was announced in 2017 (NEDO 2017). AHEAD 
(Advanced Hydrogen Energy Chain Association for Technology Development, chapter 
1.5.3), an association formed by Mitsubishi Corporation, Nippon Yusen, Chiyoda 
Corporation, Mitsui & Co. in 2017, is responsible for project implementation (AHEAD 2017). 
The shipping of hydrogen is envisioned to start in January 2020 with capacity of up to 210 
tonnes of hydrogen per year. Pending the results of the demonstration project, it is assumed 
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Power to gas: Fukushima Hydrogen Research Field 
The largest PtX demonstration project in Japan is located at Namie-cho, Fukushima 
prefecture (Fukushima Hydrogen Research Field, FH2R). Hydrogen is produced by a 10 MW 
alkaline electrolysis hydrogen production plant. The project aims to demonstrate the entire 
PtX supply chain, from hydrogen production by renewable electricity to hydrogen storage 
and delivery, and finally to hydrogen end-use applications such as fuel cell passenger 
vehicles and buses, stationary fuel cells etc. The project’s second objective is the 
demonstration of hydrogen technologies in power-to-hydrogen-to-power application used for 
providing grid stability. Figure 5 provides an overview of the project. 
The project consortium consists of Toshiba Energy System & Solutions Corporation, Tohoku 
Electric Power Co., Inc. and Iwatani Corporation. The facility will start operation around 2020 
with planned hydrogen production capacity of up to 900 tonnes per year.  
 
Figure 5: Overview of the Fukushima Power to Gas demonstration project 
Source: NEDO (2018b) 
International initiatives 
Table 7 shows selected countries’ participation in the most visible intergovernmental 
initiatives (private initiatives such as the Hydrogen Council are not shown as they cannot be 
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Germany X X X X 
Japan X X X X 
Australia X X X X 
Austria X X X X 
Belgium X    
Brunei    X 
Canada  X X X 
Chile   X  
China X X X X 
Denmark X    
EU X X X X 
Finland X    
France X X X X 
Greece X    
Iceland  X   
India  X X  
Israel X    
Italy X X  X 
Korea X X  X 
Lithuania X    
Mexico   X  
New Zealand X   X 
Norway X X X X 
Poland    X 
Qatar    X 
Russia  X   
Saudi-Arabia   X  
South Africa  X  X 
Spain X    
Sweden X    
Switzerland X    
The Netherlands X X X X 
UAE    X 
UK X X X X 
USA    X 
Source: Own depiction based on various sources 
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1.5.5 IEA Hydrogen TCP 
The Hydrogen Collaboration Programme (TCP) of the International Energy Agency (IEA) is 
designed to accelerate the deployment of hydrogen technologies. If focuses on seven main 
areas: technology, energy security, environment, economics, market, deployment and 
outreach. It aims to leverage international cooperation, foster information exchange and 
facilitate R&D activities (IEA 2019c).  
1.5.6 International Partnership for Hydrogen and Fuel Cells in the 
Economy (IPHE) 
IPHE is an 18-country, inter-governmental partnership with the stated objective of facilitating 
the transition to hydrogen-based clean energy systems across all sectors and applications 
by activating the market potential of hydrogen and fuel cells technologies. The main focus of 
IPHE is harmonisation of regulation, codes and standards, and to serve as a high-level 
platform for exchanging information concerning technologies, policies etc. (IPHE 2019).   
1.5.7 IC-8 of the Mission Innovation  
The 8th innovation challenge (IC-8) of mission innovation aims to facilitate the deployment of 
hydrogen technologies at scale in order to enable a world market for hydrogen. It contributes 
the applied approaches on innovative projects to the international networks of the hydrogen 
and fuel cell Technology Collaboration Programmes of the IEA (chapter 1.5.5) and 
International Partnership for Hydrogen and Fuel Cells in the Economy (IPHE; chapter 1.5.6) 
addressing hydrogen on the policy level as well as from the industry perspective of the 
Hydrogen Council (Mission Innovation 2019).  
1.5.8 Hydrogen Energy Ministerial Meeting 
The Japanese government initiated and hosted the first Hydrogen Energy Ministerial Meeting 
in Tokyo in October 2018 with participation of cabinet members and government officials 
from 21 countries. The Tokyo Statement by the chair of the meeting, Minister Seko of METI, 
summarizes the main outcomes (METI 2018b). According to the statement several 
international efforts are necessary for realizing the hydrogen society: 
• International cooperation on technologies and the harmonization of regulation, codes 
and standards in order to speed up a decrease in costs for hydrogen supply and 
hydrogen products, such as FCEVs; 
• International cooperation on expanding utilization of hydrogen, for instance by 
improving the safety of hydrogen at hydrogen refuelling stations and storage 
facilities, and by establishment of hydrogen supply chains; 
• Research and evaluation of the potential economic impacts of hydrogen and its 
potential to reduce emissions; 
• Increasing awareness and understanding of hydrogen by communication and 
education in order to stimulate the growth of investments in business related to 
hydrogen. 
The second Hydrogen Energy Ministerial Meeting is to be held in September 2019. 
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1.5.9 Hydrogen Council  
The Hydrogen Council is a global initiative of private stakeholders from the energy, transport 
and industry sectors which have an interest in fostering hydrogen as one of the pillars of 
energy transition. Their foci lie on facilitating the commercialisation of hydrogen and fuel cell 
technologies, as well as encouraging public stakeholders to commit to supporting hydrogen 
through appropriate policies and supporting schemes. Both German and Japanese 
companies have a strong presence in the Hydrogen Council (Hydrogen Council 2019).  
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2 Meta-Analysis of existing scenarios concerned 
with the role of hydrogen in the future energy 
systems of Germany and Japan 
This chapter provides a meta-analysis of the role of hydrogen in long-term energy system 
scenarios for Germany and Japan, looking among others at the main drivers assumed to 
influence the demand for hydrogen (and other synthetic fuels) between 2030 and 2050. 
Chapter 2.3 provides a cross-country comparison of the scenarios, pointing to similarities 
and differences between the two countries. 
2.1 Analysis of German scenarios 
The Wuppertal Institute and dena identified 18 relevant scenarios from six different studies. 
These studies and scenarios were selected in consultation with BMWi based on their 
topicality (publication no earlier than 2015), the level of detail regarding the future role of 
hydrogen in the German energy system, and data availability. The six studies and 18 
scenarios analysed (referred to in the following chapters as “analysed scenarios”) in this 
meta-analysis are presented in the Table 8.  
For all these scenarios, detailed data and information concerning the overall energy system 
and specifically the role of hydrogen was extracted from the studies. In some cases, the 
authors of the studies were contacted and asked to provide relevant information which was 
unavailable in the studies themselves.  
Depending on the original research question and focus of the studies, the respective 
scenarios elaborate the future role of hydrogen in varying degrees of detail. In particular, the 
studies by Hecking et al. (2018), Ausfelder at al. (2017) and Repenning et al. (2015) provide 
a very extensive analysis on the future demand of hydrogen. The scenarios developed by 
Bothe et al. (2017) focus mainly on the future role of the German gas infrastructure. Hobohm 
et al. (2018) developed their scenarios to analyse particularly the future role of liquid energy 
carriers in the German energy system. Henning and Palzer (2015) were mainly interested in 
the overall costs of the German Energiewende. The foci of these latter three studies include 
only some aspects of what is at interest in the study at hand. Therefore, it was decided to 
focus on scenarios from the studies by Hecking et al. (2018), Ausfelder et al. (2017) and 
Repenning et al. (2015) when discussing the potential future role of hydrogen in the German 
energy system in this chapter, especially when making quantitative comparisons in the form 
of tables and figures. Specifically, the following six scenarios were chosen as the main 
scenarios on which the meta-analysis focuses on (referred to in the following chapters as 
“scenarios in focus”): 
• “KS95” from Repenning et al. (2015) 
• “85_H2”, “85_offen” and “85_PtG” from Ausfelder et al. (2017) 
• “TM80” and “TM95” from Hecking et al. (2018) 
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Table 8: Overview of the studies analysed in this study 
Publication Mitigation scenarios 
Title / 
Author(s), year 





(2050 vs. 1990) 
Klimaschutzszenario 2050 - 2. 
Endbericht 
Repenning et al. (2015) 
Bundesministerium für 
Umwelt, Naturschutz, Bau und 
Reaktorsicherheit (BMU) 
Oeko-Institut e.V. 
Fraunhofer Institut für System- und 
Innovationsforschung (ISI) 
Mitigation scenario 80 
• National and EU GHG emission mitigation ambition 
80% 
Mitigation scenario 95 
• National and EU GHG emission mitigation ambition  
• Use of industrial CCS  
• use of domestic renewable energy sources 
95% 
Der Wert der Gasinfrastruktur 
für die Energiewende in 
Deutschland - Eine 
modellbasierte Analyse 








Electricity and gas storage 
• End users mainly use electrical devices. 
• Storage: electricity storage and temporarily storage in gas form 
and reintroduced (power-to-gas-to-power) 
• Energy transport is generally electricity-based, gas transport is no 
longer required. 
95% 
Electricity and Green Gas 
• End users mainly use electrical devices. 
• Storage: electricity storage and temporarily storage in gas form 
and reintroduced (power-to-gas-to-power) 
• Energy transport: on an electricity basis. 
• Gas transport: no longer required. 
95% 
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Status und Perspektiven 
flüssiger Energieträger in der 
Energiewende 
Hobohm et al. (2018) 
Mineralölwirtschaftsverband e.V. 
(MWV) 







Mineralölunternehmen e. V. 
Prognos AG 
Fraunhofer-Institut für Umwelt-, 






• Climate protection in Europe/world  remains on current trend 
• Crude oil price on the world market 115 USD2015/bbl.,  
• RE Installed power 230 GW, PtX use, no CCS use 
80% 
PtX 95 
• Ambitious Climate protection in Europe/world  
• Crude oil price on world market 50 USD2015/bbl.;  
• RE Installed power 230 GW, PtX use, CCS use  
95% 
Was kostet die Energiewende? 
Henning and Palzer (2015) 
Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft 
und Energie (BMWi) 
Fraunhofer-Institut für Solare 
Energiesysteme (ISE) 
80/low/CH4 
• Low rate of energetic modernisation of buildings stack 
• Transport carrier CH4 
• Use of coal power plants until 2050 
80% 
80/low/H2/ 
• Low rate of energetic modernisation of buildings stack 
• Transport carrier H2 
• Use of coal power plants until 2050 
80% 
80/low/electronic 
• Low rate of energetic modernisation of buildings stack 
• Transport carriers electricity 
• Coal power plants in use until 2050 
80% 
adelphi  Wuppertal Institute  dena  IEEJ 031 
 
80/ambitious/Mix 
• Ambitious rate of energetic modernisation of buildings stack 
• Mixed transport carriers Mix 
• Ambitious timeline for coal phase-out 
80% 
90/ambitious/Mix 
• Ambitious rate of energetic modernisation of buildings stack 
• Mixed transport carriers Mix 




Überlegungen zur Entwicklung 
eines integrierten 
Energiesystems 
Ausfelder et al. (2015) 
Nationale Akademie der 
Wissenschaften Leopoldina  
 
acatech – Deutsche Akademie der 
Technikwissenschaften  
 
Union der deutschen Akademien 
der Wissenschaften 
85_offen 
• Technology composition is determined endogenously 
• Transport and heating technologies are open 
•  
H2 in the gas network reaches 5vol% 






Wuppertal Institut  
Fraunhofer-Institut für Solare 
Energiesysteme (ISE) 
EnBW  
ifo Institut  
TU Dortmund 
RWI 
Ruhr-Universität Bochum  
TU München 
85_H2 
• Car/truck sector is strongly based on H2 
• Process heat demand of industry approx. 440 TWh 
85% 
85_PtG 
• Heat pumps limited to 40% market share 
• BEV cars/trucks are limited to 50% market share 
• H2 in the gas grid 5vol% 
• Industry process heat demand declines by -0.5%/a. 
85% 




Hecking et al. (2015) 








Increased energy efficiency and electrification in all sectors, leading to a 
significant increase in electricity demand. Synthetically generated energy 
sources are taken into account when they become absolutely necessary. 
80% 
EL95 
Increased energy efficiency and electrification in all sectors, leading to a 
significant increase in electricity demand. Synthetically generated energy 
sources are taken into account when they become absolutely necessary. 
95% 
TM80 




Increased energy efficiency, broader variation in technologies and energy 
sources used 
95% 
Source: Own compilation based on scenario parameters
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The six scenarios in focus present the future role of hydrogen in a detailed way, taking into 
account the interplay between various sectors, technological innovations and infrastructural 
needs. They offer a comprehensive description of the possible German energy system and 
energy flows from primary energy sources to final consumption in the time horizon until 
2050. For these reasons, they were chosen to represent the backbone of the meta-analysis 
and are referred to in all the major steps of the meta-analysis. The rest of the 6 studies and 
18 scenarios identified as relevant but not taken into focus are referenced selectively where 
they are able to offer further relevant insights. In the following subchapter, the three studies 
and the six scenarios in focus are introduced in more detail. 
2.1.1 Studies and scenarios in focus 
2.1.1.1 Klimaschutzszenario 2050 – 2. Endbericht 
The study “Klimaschutzszenario 2050 – 2. Endbericht“ was commissioned by the Federal 
Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Construction and Nuclear Safety and 
published in 2015. It evaluates whether or not and how the targeted emission reduction of 80 
to 95% by 2050 (relative to 1990) can be achieved. It identifies the strategies and measures 
necessary to reach the climate targets and analyses the resulting cost-benefit for consumers 
and the economy. These questions are examined once in the context of a climate protection 
scenario with an 80% reduction in GHG emissions (KS80) and once in the context of a 
climate protection scenario with a 95% reduction in GHG emissions (KS95). The report is the 
second iteration; due to the continuously-evolving energy policy framework, a first version 
from 2014 was updated in the following year. The study forms the scientific pretext for the 
federal government’s Climate Action Plan 2050, a strategy paper released in 2016, which 
outlines emissions reduction targets for each sector.    
In its choice of scenarios, it does not attempt to compare different technology paths, but 
rather to evaluate a feasible development of the German energy system that would be 
compatible with Germany’s long-term emissions targets. In the reference scenario, based on 
the policy measures in place in 2012, all emission reduction targets are missed. Only gross 
electricity consumption is reduced as planned. In KS80, the less ambitious end of the 2050 
GHG emission reduction target is achieved without the use of carbon capture and storage 
(CCS). In KS95, the more ambitious end of the 2050 GHG reduction targets is achieved, but 
here CCS for industrial emissions is a central part of the technology mix.  
For KS95, a drastic reduction of emissions in all sectors is necessary. CCS technology is 
expected to be used to reduce industrial process emissions in particular. If this technology 
were not available, the 2050 GHG emissions would be almost twice as high as they are in 
KS95. KS95 also assumes a much broader penetration of technologies such as power-to-
heat or synthetic fuel production via PtX than KS80. 
A high to very high CO2 price is assumed in both KS80 and KS95, which is intended, among 
other things, as an incentive for investments in renewable energies. The renewable energy 
investment paths of the two scenarios are very different from 2020 on. Both scenarios show 
that the German government’s intermediate GHG reduction targets between 2020 and 2040 
are sufficient to achieve a GHG reduction of 80% by 2050, but for a 95% reduction, the 
intermediate targets must be set more ambitiously.  
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2.1.1.2 ‚Sektorkopplung‘ – Untersuchungen und Überlegungen zur 
Entwicklung eines integrierten Energiesystems 
The study  “‚Sektorkopplung‘ – Untersuchungen und Überlegungen zur Entwicklung eines 
integrierten Energiesystems" (“Sector Integration – Examination and Considerations for the 
Development of an Integrated Energy System”) by the Deutsche Akademie der 
Technikwissenschaften (National Academy of Science and Engineering, Acatech), the 
Nationale Akademie der Wissenschaften (German National Academy of Sciences) and the 
Union der deutschen Akademien der Wissenschaften (Union of the German Academies of 
Sciences and Humanities), published in 2017, outlines possible scenarios in which 
Germany’s current GHG reduction targets can be achieved with increasing sector 
integration. The study attempts to identify the necessary measures – both on national and 
EU level – that ought to be taken now to reach the future emission reduction targets.  
For the future energy system, four complementing scenarios of sector coupling are derived, 
all of which target an 85% emissions reduction by 2050 relative to 1990, but are based on 
distinct technology pathways. In the first scenario, electricity is used in a direct manner, 
including increased use in heating and transport. A second scenario examines the use of 
hydrogen as an energy carrier in all sectors, with hydrogen production based on renewable 
electricity. A third scenario analyses the conversion of hydrogen into synthetic gases, fuels 
and combustibles. Finally, a fourth scenario assumes increased energy generation from 
biomass, solar thermal and deep geothermal energy to reach the climate targets. The choice 
of scenarios mirrors the goal to compare different technology routes individually and assess 
the effects of sector coupling technologies such as hydrogen and PtG versus an energy 
transition that is solely focused on renewable electricity. In directly comparing a hydrogen-
based energy system with a system based on synthetic methane, it is able to quantify the 
trade-off between the benefits of higher energy efficiency (hydrogen route) versus the use of 
existing infrastructures, grids and applications (methane route).  
In all scenarios, generation from solar and wind power is increased, along with energy 
efficiency. To ensure a stable supply of electricity despite the intermittency of renewables, 
back-up power plants and/or energy storage facilities are installed, such as pumped hydro 
storage power plants and batteries as short-term storage facilities and easily storable fuels 
and combustibles for longer term storage.  
The analysis arrives at the conclusion that the conversion of the energy system from fossil 
fuels towards renewable energies and the transformation of the regulatory system are only 
possible through strong sector coupling and an integrated energy transition. In order to 
achieve the necessary market conditions, changes in the regulatory framework are 
necessary. These changes should primarily consist of a CO2 price signal across all sectors, 
leading to harmonised and equal conditions between fossil and renewable energies on the 
one hand and between the electricity, heat and transport sectors on the other. At the same 
time, price levels should be chosen so as to incentivise innovation and new investment and 
realistically reflect all costs, including infrastructure and environmental aspects. Since the 
system costs of the energy system transformation are generally covered by the end 
consumers, the distributional effects should be taken into account and cushioned when the 
regulatory framework is redesigned.  
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2.1.1.3 dena-Leitstudie Integrierte Energiewende 
The “Pilot Study Integrated Energy Transition” by the German Energy Agency (dena), 
published in 2018, compares and analyses different scenarios that achieve Germany’s 2050 
GHG reduction targets. The study follows a strongly cross-sectoral approach aimed at 
assessing implementation challenges and societal issues, and, if necessary, supplementing 
the current policy trajectory with further recommendations. In principle, the study identifies 
GHG reductions of both 80% and 95% as feasible by 2050. However, it clearly emphasises 
that much stronger measures must be taken in all sectors, the framework conditions adapted 
and the distribution of costs discussed. 
The parameters and technology choices were based on feedback from a large group of 
research and corporate partners obtained by an iterative process. Based on this input, an 
energy system model selects cost-optimized paths for the energy transition endogenously. 
The study distinguishes between two possible energy system developments. On the one 
hand, it identifies electrification scenarios that exploit all the potential for converting plants 
and processes to using electricity directly. In this case, two thirds of the total energy demand 
is covered by renewable electricity by 2050. Hydrogen and solar thermal energy only play a 
supplementary role. On the other hand, the study presents technology mix scenarios in 
which the climate targets are achieved with a combination of energy carriers, aiming to reach 
the climate targets at the lowest cost. Here, more emphasis is placed on the use of 
innovative processes and energy sources. In addition, the energy sources gas and oil, which 
can be easily stored, will cover possible peaks in energy demand in an increasingly climate-
neutral form. By deriving these two distinct narratives, the study attempts to assess the 
benefits of a technology-neutral approach to energy policy, versus one that is focusing 
primarily on energy efficiency and electrification.  
In the electrification scenarios, buildings, industry and transport sectors find themselves 
under increased pressure to reduce final energy consumption. Possible transformation paths 
between the electrification scenarios and the technology mix scenarios already differ 
significantly by 2030. By 2050, the paths based on a broad energy and technology mix are 
much more cost-effective than those based on the electrification. Further, systems with a 
diversified mix of technologies offer larger flexibility and can react more quickly to 
unpredictable developments.  
In order to achieve the climate targets, the study identifies a set of unavoidable measures: 
an increase in energy efficiency in all sectors, a grid expansion beyond the one planned 
currently, and further development of grid regulation. In addition, it highlights the necessity of 
synthetic fuels as a third pillar of energy policy to decarbonise applications that cannot (or 
only with difficulty) directly use renewable electricity. The demand for these fuels depends 
largely on the level of climate ambition: in the scenarios that achieve the 95% target the 
demand is about three times as high as in the scenarios that achieve the 80% target. 
2.1.2 Demographic and economic framework conditions  
2.1.2.1 Demographic Development 
In their assumptions regarding the future development and composition of the German 
population, the three studies took slightly different approaches. Repenning et al. (2015) use 
an endogenous population model, which forms part of ASTRA-D, the integrated model 
simulating economic activity, transport and demographic developments. Hecking et al. 
(2018) base their analysis on data provided by destatis, the Federal Statistical Office of 
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Germany (Destatis 2015). Ausfelder et al. (2017) do not report their demographic 
assumptions. 
Crucially, both Repenning et al. (2015) and Hecking et al. (2018) use comparable 
parameters on the most important determinants of demographic composition. They assume 
continuity in the current trend of fertility rate which stands around 1.4 children per woman. 
Net migration, which increased in the last decade, is assumed to continue on a net positive 
level. Similarly, life expectancy is assumed to continue on its current trend, achieving a 
moderate increase until the middle of the century. Table 9 compares these assumptions. 
Table 9: Comparison of demographic assumptions 
 
Model/Source Fertility rate 
Annual net 
migration Life expectancy 
Repenning et al. 
Endogenous 
(ASTRA-D) 
1.4 > 200,000 Moderate increase 
Hecking et al. 
Exogenous 
(Destatis) 
1.4 200,000 Moderate increase 
Ausfelder et al. Not reported Not reported Not reported Not reported 
Source: Own compilation based on scenario parameters 
Figure 6 below shows the development of total population. Despite increasing life 
expectancy and positive net migration, the fertility rate below replacement rate leads to an 
overall decrease in population until 2050 in both studies. Due to similar input parameters, 
total population follows a similar trajectory. However, there is a considerable difference in the 
overall number of around two million people throughout the analysed period. This difference 
can be explained by different starting points. The likely cause is the exceptional net migration 
of 1.2 million people in 2015 (the same year when Repenning et al. (2015) was published 
while Hecking et al. (2018) was published in 2018). In the composition of the population, the 
reported parameters lead to an increase in the average age of the population.  
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Figure 6: Total population trajectories 
Source: Own depiction based on scenario parameters 
Both studies assume that the current trend towards smaller household sizes continues, 
resulting in a moderate increase in the number of households up until 2030/2035. This leads 
to increases in the demand for living space and heating, despite a decreasing population.  
2.1.2.2 Economic Development 
Besides the assumptions on population growth and composition, economic development 
constitutes another important determinant of energy consumption. Ausfelder et al. (2017) 
does not report their economic assumptions. Both Repenning et al. (2015) and Hecking et al. 
(2018) base their assumptions on various external sources. Figure 7 shows the resulting 
growth rates. Evidently, Repenning et al. (2015) assumes a rather moderate growth path 
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Figure 7: Assumptions on Economic Growth 
Source: Own depiction based on scenario parameters 
 
 
Figure 8: GDP Projections (in billion 2010 EUR)7 
Source: Own depiction based on scenario parameters 
Hecking et al. (2018) further make assumptions on the growth rates of various industry 
sectors, which are used to determine their respective need for input materials and energy 
demand. The model ASTRA-D used in Repenning et al. (2015) similarly calculates the gross 
value added for each sector in the projected period.  
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2.1.3  Key energy characteristics  
All of the German scenarios in focus adhere to the current energy policy targets of the 
German government, among which is the shutdown of all nuclear power plants by 2022. The 
2050 GHG emission reductions achieved in all six of the scenarios in focus are also in line 
with the long-term target set by the German government of between 80% and 95% 
reductions in 2050 compared to 1990.  
The assumptions about the future use of carbon capture and storage (CCS) vary among the 
scenarios. While none of the scenarios in focus with moderate GHG emission reduction 
targets (80% to 85% reductions by 2050 compared to 1990) make use of the CCS option, 
four of the six scenarios with 95% GHG reductions (KS95, PtX 95, TM95 and EL95) 
introduce CCS technology in order to capture and store difficult-to-avoid CO2 emissions from 
industrial processes. The amount of CO2 captured and stored in these four scenarios differs, 
ranging from 16 Mt CO2eq/year (TM95 and EL95) to 56 Mt CO2eq/year (PtX 95). Unlike in 
the industry sector, CCS technology is not assumed to be used in any of the scenarios in 
focus to abate emissions from coal or natural gas power plants. 
2.1.3.1 Final energy demand 
Most of the scenarios in focus provide data for final energy demand for both 2030 and 2050 
(exceptions are scenarios from Ausfelder et al. (2017) and Henning and Palzer (2015)). Final 
energy demand in 2030 is estimated by the scenarios to decline from just over 9,300 PJ in 
2017 (AG Energiebilanzen 2019) to between 5,753 PJ (KS95) and 7,501 (TM80) for the 
scenarios in focus, and staying as high as 8,507 PJ for the scenarios outside the main focus 
(PtX80/95, not depicted in Figure 9). In 2050 the final energy demand is assumed to 
decrease further, to between 3,988 PJ (KS95) and 6,026 (TM80) for the scenarios in focus, 
and staying as high as 7,315 PJ for the scenarios outside the main focus (PtX80/95, not 
depicted in Figure 9).  
Final energy demand reductions in the TM80, TM95 and KS95 are mainly assumed to be 
achieved through further efficiency improvements. Examples include the switch to more 
efficient industrial processes, increased share of recycling, increased electrification (since in 
many cases, this enables the use of more efficient technologies), and more effective use of 
waste heat. The scenarios agree that in order to reach Germany’s 2050 climate targets, 
comprehensive energy efficiency measures in each sectors are inevitable. 
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Figure 9: Final energy demand by source in selected scenarios in 2030 and in 
2050 (in PJ)8 
Source: Own depiction based on scenario parameters 
In scenarios TM80, TM95 and KS95, the role of electricity in final energy demand increases 
over time, while the shares of coal and oil decrease. The share of renewables excluding 
electricity (biomass, solar thermal, geothermal heat) in final energy consumption increases 
considerably in some of the scenarios in focus, notably in the scenarios from Repenning et 
al. (2015), where it increases from 7% in 2017 to 30% by 2050 (KS95). Hydrogen and other 
synthetic fuels begin to play a relevant role in final energy demand in many of the scenarios 
in focus from about 2030 on. In TM95, for example, the consumption of hydrogen increases 







8 Until 2030, the climate targets (and thus the final energy demand) in scenarios TM80 and TM95 are identical. After 2030, the TM80 
and TM95 scenarios follow different GHG reduction paths, therefore their final energy demands are different. 
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Table 10: Shares of electricity, hydrogen and other synthetic fuels in the total 





TM80 TM95 KS95 
 








Share of electricity in 





27% 27% 28% 
 
34% 35% 50% 
Share of hydrogen in 





0% 0% 0% 
 
11% 10% 8% 
Share of other 
synthetic fuels in the 





0% 0% 0% 
 
15% 36% 9% 
Source: Own compilation based on scenario parameters 
Figure 10 shows an overview on the final energy demand by sector in selected scenarios in 
2030 and 2050. It has to be noted that the sector breakdown of the selected scenarios was 
not uniform. In the KS95 scenario, the final energy demand was divided into commercial, 
residential, industry and transport sectors. Hecking et al. (2018) differentiates between 
industry, transport and buildings in their scenarios (TM80 and TM95). “Buildings” stands here 
for the total final energy demand of the residential sector, as well as the final energy demand 
for space heating, cooling, hot water and lighting of the commercial and industrial sectors. 
“Industry” covers the final energy consumption for mechanical energy, process heating and 
cooling needs of the industrial and commercial sectors.  
 
Figure 10: Final energy demand by sector in selected scenarios in 2030 and 
2050 (in PJ)  
Source: Own depiction based on scenario parameters 
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In the KS95 scenario, the final energy need of the residential sector decreases by 54% by 
2050. The commercial sector reduces its final energy demand by 57%, the industrial sector 
by 47%. The transport sector decreases its final energy need by 57% (Repenning et al. 
2015).  
In scenarios TM80 and TM95, the final energy demand of the transport sector drops by 47% 
by 2050. The final energy consumption of the building sector in both of these scenarios 
decreases by 50%. Although the overall final energy demand of the building sector is roughly 
the same, there is a difference in the structure of the final energy sources between the TM80 
and TM95 scenarios. The TM95 scenario assumes a greater use of electricity for heat 
generation. TM80 and TM95 also diverge in terms of overall final energy demand of the 
industry. In the TM80 scenario, the final energy demand in the industry decreases by 1% 
until 2050. The non-energy consumption decreases by 15% until 2050. In the TM95 
scenario, the final energy consumption of the industry decreases more rapidly – by 10% by 
2050 – due to further energy efficiency gains. With regard to non-energetic consumption, 
scenario TM95 assumes different production processes in the ammonia production. 
Therefore the non-energetic use of natural gas in scenario TM95 is about 72 PJ higher than 
in TM80 (Hecking et al. 2018).  
2.1.3.2 Primary energy supply 
The development of primary energy supply is closely connected to the changes in final 
energy demand. More efficient energy transformation processes, especially the increasing 
efficiency of power generation (with the decline in relatively inefficient thermal power plants) 
lead to a further decrease in primary energy need in all the scenarios in focus. By 2050, 
primary energy demand in all of the scenarios in focus is considerably lower than today, in 
most cases about 40 to 50% below current levels. 
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Figure 11: Primary energy mix of selected scenarios (in PJ, including 
non-energetic use) 
Source: Own depiction based on scenario parameters 
Figure 11 shows the primary energy mix of the six scenarios in focus in 2030 and 2050. In all 
of the scenarios in focus, nuclear power is phased out by 2022 and use of coal is reduced by 
more than half by 2030. By 2050, coal does not play a relevant role in these scenarios 
anymore. If the recommendations of the Commission on Growth, Structural Change and 
Employment, commonly known as the Coal Commission, are followed, about two thirds of 
the current coal generation capacity will go offline by 2030; the end of coal use in the 
electricity sector is envisioned for 2038 as of latest. Oil use is also reduced quickly in the 
scenarios, although scenarios differ in terms of pace and the amount of oil still used in the 
residual sector in 2050. Similarly, the mid- to long-term role of natural gas differs in the 
scenarios. While most of the scenarios analysed foresee a stable or even increasing 
consumption of natural gas by 2030 relative to 2017, TM80 and especially KS95 envision a 
decline in the use of natural gas by 2030. In 2050, natural gas still plays a relevant role in 
scenarios that achieve an 80% to 85% GHG emissions reduction. In the more ambitious 
scenarios achieving a 95% GHG emissions reduction, the role of natural gas is however 
marginal. All of the scenarios in focus agree that the role of renewable energy sources in 
primary energy supply has to increase significantly, with most of that increase coming from 
bigger shares of wind and solar PV in the power generation mix (although some of the 
scenarios also foresee a relevant contribution from biomass, solar thermal energy and/or 
environmental heat).     
All of the scenarios in focus assume that by 2050, either renewable electricity and/or 
synthetic fuels will be imported (see next two chapters). However, with almost 2,700 PJ of 
PtX 
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imports of synthetic fuels other than hydrogen by 2050 (constituting 37% of primary energy 
supply), the scenario TM95 clearly stands out in this regard among the six scenarios in 
focus. Among all the 18 analysed scenarios, the PtX 95 scenario goes even higher with 
synthetic fuels imports of more than 3,000 PJ in 2050. At the same time, all scenarios in 
focus envision a significant decrease in demand for imported fossil energy sources by 2050.   
2.1.3.3 Hydrogen demand 
Before 2030, none of the German scenarios in focus assume that hydrogen will be used 
extensively. By 2050 however, five of the six scenarios in focus expect hydrogen to play a 
considerable role in meeting final energy demand (the exception being 85_PtG from 
Ausfelder et al. (2015); here it has to be noted that hydrogen nevertheless plays a role as 
precursor to other synthetic fuels). In these five scenarios, the hydrogen final energy demand 
ranges from 121 PJ (85_offen) to 562 PJ (TM95) in 2050.  
With the 12 German scenarios analysed but outside of the main focus, the hydrogen role is 
somewhat more ambiguous. Hobohm et al. (2018) expect that hydrogen will not be used 
widely due to infrastructural constraints. Bothe et al. (2017) see no hydrogen consumption in 
the scenario “Strom und Gasspeicher” (electricity and gas storage), and makes a simplified 
assumption in the scenario “Strom und Grünes Gas” (electricity and green gas) that in 2050, 
half of the domestically produced hydrogen, or 1,161 PJ, is used as final energy carrier, 
while the other half is converted further into synthetic methane.9 In three of the five scenarios 
from Henning and Palzer (2015), hydrogen achieves a considerable share in the final energy 
consumption, ranging from 205 to 326 PJ per year, while the other two scenarios instead 
achieve an 80% emissions reduction by focusing either on electrification or on a combination 
of synthetic and fossil methane. 
Overall, five of the 18 scenarios from the 6 studies (TM80, EL80, TM95, EL95, 85_H2, from 
Hecking et al. (2018) and Ausfelder et al. (2017)) exhibit relatively high shares of hydrogen in 
total final energy demand, reaching shares of 8 to 15%. These scenarios expect hydrogen to 
play an important role especially in the transport and industry sectors. They stress the 
positive characteristics of hydrogen, such as the fact that it can be stored relatively easily 
(unlike electricity), is free of carbon when consumed (unlike other synthetic fuels), can be 
produced in a CO2 neutral way, requires less overall energy than the production of other 
synthetic fuels, and can be fed into the existing natural gas grid to a certain extent. 
Regarding hydrogen use in the transport sector, Henning and Palzer (2015) developed 
scenarios with a focus on various technical and energy carrier alternatives (with scenarios 
focusing on hydrogen, methane and electric cars, respectively). Among these, only in the 
hydrogen scenario (80/gering/H2/n.b.), hydrogen covers a substantial share of the final 
energy demand for transport with 19% (while the total share of other synthetic fuels in 
transport is even higher with 20%). Hecking et al. (2018) distinguish between pathways in 
which the direct use of electricity dominates (EL80 & EL95) and pathways in which a broader 
future technology mix is assumed (TM80 & TM95). Hydrogen plays an important role in the 
transport sector in all the four scenarios from Hecking et al. (2018), reaching 331 PJ or 23% 
of final energy demand in the transport sector for both TM80 and TM95, while use of other 
synthetic fuels is much higher in the TM than in the EL scenarios. The role of hydrogen 
differs in the scenarios from Ausfelder et al. (2017) depending on the technology pathway. In 
 
9 Green gas was defined in this study as a sum of PtX produced from electricity from renewable energy sources and biomethane. 
adelphi  Wuppertal Institute  dena  IEEJ 045 
 
case of the hydrogen-dominant scenario (85_H2), hydrogen makes up 27% of final energy 
demand in the transport sector by 2050. In the other scenarios, the shares are 10% 
(85_offen) and 0% (PtG). Table 11 shows the total quantities and shares of hydrogen 
demand in the transport and industry sectors.   
Table 11: Hydrogen demand in transport and industry sectors in selected 
scenarios 
 TM80 TM95 85_offen 85_H2 85_PtG KS95 
 
2030 
Demand in transport in PJ 65 65 29 187 0 0 
Share in transport in % 3% 3% 2% 10% 0% 0% 
Demand in industry in PJ10 68 68 0 0 0 0 
Share in industry in % 2% 2% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
 2050 
Demand in transport in PJ 331 331 122 385 0 0 
Share in transport in % 23% 23% 10% 27% 0% 0% 
Demand in industry in PJ11 133 230 0 0 0 0 
Share in industry in % 5% 10% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Source: Own compilation based on scenario parameters 
In the industrial sector, from the six scenarios in focus, only those by Hecking et al. (2015) 
envision the use of hydrogen, as well as those by Hobohm et al. (2018) among the scenarios 
outside of the main focus. Hydrogen is mainly utilized as a non-fossil raw material, principally 
for production of ammoniac (Hobohm et al. 2018), and to a smaller extent, in steel and 
cement production, as well as in the chemical industry (Hecking et al. 2018). The scenarios 
of Hecking et al. (2018) see hydrogen used extensively only after 2040, with the authors 
citing expensive investments and long-term innovation cycles of alternative industrial 
processes. Generally, the shares of hydrogen in the final energy consumption in industry 
remain below those in transport in 2050, not exceeding 10%. 
Apart from the industrial and transport sectors, some scenarios also consider hydrogen for 
use in the power sector. For example, the KS95 scenario (Repenning et. al 2015) doesn’t 
see hydrogen used in any end use sectors, but rather (and to a limited extent) as energy 
 
10 In the scenarios TM80/TM95 the subdivision “industry” covers the final energy consumption of mechanical energy uses, process 
heat and cooling needs of the industrial and commercial sectors, while the final energy need of space heating and cooling, hot 
water and lighting of the industrial sector was excluded here.  
11 In the scenarios TM80/TM95 the subdivision “industry” covers the final energy consumption of mechanical energy uses, process 
heat and cooling needs of the industrial and commercial sectors, while the final energy need of space heating and cooling, hot 
water and lighting of the industrial sector was excluded here. A more detailed explanation is included in sub-chapter 2.1.3.1 
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storage and flexibility option in the power system. It envisions hydrogen and synthetic 
methane from 2040 onwards to be used for reconversion to electricity at times when 
electricity is scarce. In TM80 and TM95, hydrogen is – in addition to consumption in end use 
sectors – also used as seasonal storage by storing some of the generated hydrogen in the 
existing gas grid. In EL95 scenario, 432 PJ of hydrogen will be used in the energy sector in 
2050.  
According to the scenarios from the studies by Hecking et al. (2018) and Ausfelder et al. 
(2017), the existing German gas distribution and transmission network can carry up to 5 to 
10%vol of hydrogen without any significant infrastructural modifications. In order to reach the 
hydrogen expansion described in scenario 85_H2 (the highest among the scenarios by 
Ausfleder et al. 2017), the share of hydrogen in the gas grid had to be allowed to reach 
30%vol by 2050. The study notes that this will only be possible with considerable and cost-
intensive upgrades of the gas grid and several industrial processes (while other studies in 
focus assume even larger hydrogen demand, they do not explicitly mention the necessary 
infrastructure upgrades). Generally, pipeline was given the most consideration as the mode 
of hydrogen transport in the analysed scenarios. 
In all of the scenarios in focus, the hydrogen required in end use sectors is produced within 
Germany based on electricity from renewable energy sources.12 The argumentation is based 
in the relatively high costs of long-distance hydrogen transport which makes the domestic 
production of hydrogen somewhat more attractive; on the other hand, the transport of 
synthetic fuels other than hydrogen is often considered a more viable option due to their 
ability to use the existing infrastructure. Hydrogen can also be transported in the form of 
high-energy products such as ammonia, which is considered a viable option by some 
industry players, for example Kawasaki steel (Ammonia Energy 2017). 
2.1.3.4 Demand for synthetic fuels other than hydrogen 
Similar to hydrogen, the expansion of other synthetic fuels consumption is envisioned in the 
scenarios in focus for the timeframe between 2030 and 2050. Only the KS80 scenario from 
Repenning et al. (2015) does not foresee the use of synthetic fuels by 2050. The amount of 
synthetic fuels other than hydrogen to be used in end use sectors is estimated between 344 
PJ (KS95) and 2,707 PJ (TM95) in 2050 for the scenarios in focus, and up to 3,545 PJ (PtX 
95) across all six studies.  
The assumed need for synthetic fuels other than hydrogen varies considerably among the 
scenarios. In the TM80 scenario, the demand for synthetic methane amounts to 526 PJ by 
2050 (similar to the hydrogen demand of 529 PJ). In the TM95 scenario, synthetic methane 
plays a much bigger role with consumption of 2,268 PJ; in addition, 389 PJ of liquid synthetic 
fuels are consumed in the TM95 scenario. Unlike hydrogen, other synthetic fuels in the 
TM80 and TM95 scenario do not yet play a role by 2030.  
The scenarios from Hecking et al. (2018) focus more than other scenarios on the use of 
synthetic gas in the transport sector, arguing that the cost of synthetic methane is 
considerably lower than those of liquid synthetic fuels. TM95 (Hecking et al. 2018) envisions 
synthetic fuels other than hydrogen to cover no less than 43% of the final energy demand in 
the transport sector in 2050. The 85_PtG scenario from Ausfelder et al. (2017) sees a very 
 
12 With the possible exception of Hecking et al. (2018) which is not entirely clear in this regard. It is possible that a certain share of 
the hydrogen demand in these scenarios (EL80, TM80, EL95, TM95) is assumed to be imported by 2050. 
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similar role for these synthetic fuels (39% of the total final energy demand in transport 
sector); for 85_H2, this share is at 22% and for 85_offen at only 4%. KS95 from Repenning 
et al. (2015) has the share of synthetic fuels other than hydrogen in final energy demand for 
transport sector at 30% in 2050. Among the scenarios not in focus, both from Bothe et al. 
(2017) and the PtX80 scenario from Hobohm et al. (2018) describe high shares of liquid 
synthetic fuels in the transport sector (PtL). This development takes advantage of the 
chemical similarity of synthetic liquid fuels to the currently used fossil fuels, allowing further 
use of present applications and infrastructure without large investments.  
In the industrial sector, TM80 scenario (Repenning et al. 2015) does not specify the exact 
demand for synthetic fuels other than hydrogen in 2050; on the other hand, the TM95 
scenario has it relatively high at 39%. All three scenarios from Ausfelder et al. (2017) see it 
at about half of that value, between 18 and 22%. The KS95 scenario from Repenning et al. 
(2015) sees no role for other synthetic fuels as final energy carrier in industry. Table 12 
shows the total quantities and shares of demand for synthetic fuels other than hydrogen in 
the transport and industry sectors.   
In the TM95 scenario (Hecking et al. 2018), synthetic fuels other than hydrogen will also be 
used in the buildings sector (544 PJ in 2050). The scenario “Strom und Grünes Gas” from 
Bothe et al. (2017) also envisions synthetic methane to be used for heating on a large scale. 
In the scenarios from Ausfelder et al. (2017) synthetic methane will cover between 1 and 6% 
of the heating demand in 2050 (85_offen 4%, 85_H2 1%, 85_PtG 6%). 
In the scenarios from Ausfelder et al. (2017) and Repenning et al. (2015), synthetic fuels 
other than hydrogen do not play a role in the power sector. The scenarios EL80 and EL95 
(Hecking et al. 2018) expect that synthetic methane and biomethane will be used for 
electricity production on a larger scale. In the EL80 scenario, 4% of the electricity production 
will be covered by synthetic methane (and 24% from biomethane); in the EL95 scenario 71% 
of the electricity is produced from synthetic methane (and 29 % from biomethane) in 2050. 
Table 12: Synthetic fuel demand in transport and industrial sectors in selected 
scenarios 
 TM80 TM95 85_offen 85_H2 85_PtG KS95 
 
2030 
Demand in transport in PJ 0 0 155 40 227 0 
Share in transport in % 0% 0% 9% 2% 11% 0% 
Demand in industry in PJ13 0 0 65 180 101 0 






13 In the scenarios TM80/TM95 the subdivision “industry” covers the final energy consumption of mechanical energy uses, process 
heat and cooling needs of the industrial and commercial sectors, while the final energy need of space heating and cooling, hot 
water and lighting of the industrial sector was excluded here. A more detailed explanation is included in sub-chapter 2.1.3.1 
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2050 
Demand in transport in PJ n. s. 612 50 331 738 343 
Share in transport in % n. s. 42% 4% 22% 39% 30% 
Demand in industry in PJ14 n. s. 947 306 335 367 0 
Share in industry in % n. s. 39% 18% 20% 22% 0%  
Source: Own compilation based on scenario parameters 
In five of the six scenarios in focus, it is assumed that synthetic fuels will entirely be imported 
from countries with better renewable energy resources. The KS95 scenario is an exception. 
Here, half of the relatively little synthetic fuel demand is assumed to be met by domestic 
sources by 2050. Hecking et al. (2018) explicitly mentions the Middle East, North Africa or 
Central-Asia as possible suppliers because of the availability of cheap renewable electricity 
and the already existing natural gas connections. Import of PtCH4 is efficiently possible 
through the existing European natural gas transmission system (Hobohm et al. 2018). 
Ausfelder et al. (2017) assume that around 1,100 PJ of crude oil per year would need to be 
replaced by imported by non-hydrogen synthetic fuels by 2050 for reaching an 85% 
reduction in THG emissions compared to 1990 level. In the TM80 scenario, most of the 
synthetic methane is assumed to be imported from other EU countries. In the TM95 
scenario, most of the synthetic fuel quantities are imported as non-hydrogen synthetic fuels 
from non-EU countries (73%), followed by imports from countries within the EU (27%).  
2.1.4 Discussion on relationship between the roles of hydrogen and 
other synthetic fuels in the different scenarios 
 
 
14 In the scenarios TM80/TM95 the subdivision “industry” covers the final energy consumption of mechanical energy uses, process 
heat and cooling needs of the industrial and commercial sectors, while the final energy need of space heating and cooling, hot 
water and lighting of the industrial sector was excluded here. A more detailed explanation is included in sub-chapter 2.1.3.1 
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KS80 0 PJ 0 PJ 0 PJ • No use of hydrogen 
• No use of synthetic fuels 
KS95 328 PJ 344 PJ 672 PJ • Non-hydrogen synthetic fuel use in transport sector 
• H2 production for power generation (reconversion): 20 PJ;  






0 PJ 1668 PJ 1,668 PJ • End users across all sectors mainly use electrical devices; no use for 
hydrogen in final energy demand 
• Synthetic fuels other than hydrogen used for energy storage 
(reconversion in gas-fired power plants) next to electric storage.  
• Inland energy transport through the power grid. 
• Non-hydrogen Synthetic fuel demand is imported PtL 
Strom und 
Grünes Gas 
1,161 PJ 2,657 PJ 3,818 PJ • End users partly use green gas generated in RE-PtG plants in Germany.  
• It is assumed that 50% of PtG is used as hydrogen in industry and 
transport, while 50% of is further methanised and used for heating. 
Synthetic methane final energy consumption thus amounts to 988 PJ, all 
of it comes from domestic production; 
• Liquid synthetic fuels are imported and used for transport (Total final 
energy consumption of 1,669 PJ) 
• Existing gas infrastructure is used in parallel with power grid for inland 
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PtX80 39 PJ 2,673 PJ 
 
2,712 PJ • The focus of the study is on the investigation of liquid energy carriers, 
synthetic natural gas and hydrogen were not investigated in depth.  
• RE-powered PtX assumes a central role in the German energy system;  
• However, the role of hydrogen is minor and mostly limited to industry 
(ammoniac production, 29 PJ);  
• Most of the H2 generated by PtX is further converted to liquid synthetic 
fuels  for use in transport (58%) and gaseous synthetic fuels for use in 
the residential sector (20%) 
PtX95 41 PJ 3,545 PJ  
 










0 PJ 915 PJ 915 PJ • Main transport carrier  for the scenario development is methane 
• Synthetic fuels cover 30% of the final energy demand of the transport 
sector and 14% of the industry sector 
80/gering/H2/
n.b. 
326 PJ 763 PJ 1,089 PJ • Main transport carrier for the scenario development is hydrogen 
• Hydrogen is mainly used in the transport sector, covering 19% of the final 
energy demand  
• Non-hydrogen synthetic fuels are also used widely, covering 20% of the 
final energy demand in the transport sector and 17% in the industry 
sector 




0 PJ 508 PJ 508 PJ • Main transport carrier  for the scenario development: electricity 
• Hydrogen does not play a role 
• Other synthetic fuels cover 21% of the final energy demand of the 
transport sector and 9% of the industry sector 
80/amb/Mix/b
eschl. 
205 PJ 683 PJ 888 PJ • Mixed energy carriers  
• H2 is used in the transport sector (H2 covers around 12% of the total 
final energy demand of the transport sector) 
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• Non-hydrogen synthetic fuels cover 19% of the final energy demand of 
the transport sector and 11% of the industry sector 




205 PJ 1,017 PJ 1,222 PJ • Mixed energy carriers 
• Hydrogen is used in the transport sector, covering about 11% of the total 
final energy demand 
• Other synthetic fuels cover 33% of the final energy need in the transport 
sector and 26% in the industry sector 







85_offen 121 PJ 430 PJ 551 PJ • Mixed energy carriers 
• Share of hydrogen in the gas network up to 5%vol 
• Hydrogen is mainly used in the transport sector; PtL also has 12% in the 
final energy demand in the transport sector 
• PtX produced from RE and mainly used for low-temperature heating, 
process heat and transport (PtG is somewhat less important than in other 
scenarios) 
85_H2 386 PJ 681 PJ 1,067 PJ • Share of hydrogen in the gas network up to 30%vol 
• Transport sector relies strongly on hydrogen which reaches a 100% 
share in final energy consumption in the road transport in 2050; some 
modes of transport rely on liquid synthetic fuels 
• Industrial heat generation also relies strongly on hydrogen; 
• Synthetic methane is produced from RE and fed into the gas network 
85_PtG 0 PJ 1,212 PJ 1,212 PJ • Share of hydrogen in the gas network up to 5%vol; hydrogen as final 
energy carrier plays a minor role; 
• Synthetic methane is produced from RE and fed into the gas network; 
• 48% of the synthetic fuel need is PtL  for the transport sector 
Hecking et EL80 480 PJ 78 PJ 558 PJ • Hydrogen plays only a supplementary role 
adelphi  Wuppertal Institute  dena  IEEJ 052 





  • Electrolysis hydrogen produced mainly in Germany, but synthetic 
methane imported mainly from other EU countries 




1,919 PJ • Hydrogen plays only a supplementary role 
• PtX will be used in the transport (32%), industry (29%) and energy 
sectors (39%) 
• Most of the PtX quantities are imported from EU and non-EU countries: 
In the EL95 scenario, 74% of the total quantity is produced outside of 
Germany, with imports from non-EU and EU countries of roughly the 
same order of magnitude. Due to the less favourable conditions for 
renewable electricity generation (in terms of renewable energy potential 
and generation costs), only 26% of the total quantity is produced in 
Germany, especially hydrogen.  






• Climate targets will be achieved by a combination of energy carriers (i.e. 
H2), aiming to reach the climate aims at the lowest cost. 
• Electrolysis hydrogen produced mainly in Germany, but synthetic 
methane imported mainly from other EU countries 
TM95 562 PJ 
 




• Climate targets will be achieved by a combination of energy carriers (i.e. 
H2), aiming to reach the climate aims at the lowest cost 
• 29% of the PtX will be used in the transport sector, 36% in the industry 
sector, 16% in the building sector and 19% in the energy sector 
• Most of the PtX quantities are imported from EU and non-EU countries: 
In scenario TM95, an even larger share of 82% is imported from the non-
EU (60%) and the EU (22%). Due to the less favourable conditions for 
renewable electricity generation (in terms of renewable energy potential 
and generation costs), only 18% (TM95) of the total PtX demand is 
covered by domestic production, especially hydrogen. 
• CCS is necessary, only in Industrial sector after 2040 
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Table 13 provides a summary of the role of hydrogen and other synthetic fuels in the 
German scenarios in focus. The GHG emission reductions can be considered a key driver 
for the hydrogen and synthetic fuel demand in these scenarios. While scenarios with 80% 
GHG emission reduction targets typically envision less hydrogen and synthetic fuel demand 
by 2050, higher targets of GHG emission reductions lead to higher hydrogen and synthetic 
fuel use in 2050. Repenning et al. (2015) goes from 0 PJ in its 80% reduction scenario to 
672 PJ in the 95% scenario; for Hobohm et al. (2018), the total PtX demand goes from 2,712 
PJ to 3,586 PJ; for Henning and Palzer (2015) the total PtX demand is between 508 and 915 
PJ for the 80% reduction scenarios and 1,222 PJ for the 90% reductions scenario; for 
Hecking et al. (2018), the total PtX demand is between 558 and 1,058 PJ for the 80% 
reductions scenarios and between 1,919 and 3,269 PJ for the 95% reductions scenarios.  
The scenarios also describe different infrastructural impacts of hydrogen use. Scenarios with 
higher hydrogen (and total PtX) shares in the final energy consumption which actively use 
the gas transmission and distribution network exhibit lower overall costs for the development 
of the necessary infrastructure by 2050 (Ausfelder et al. 2017, Bothe et al. 2017, Hecking et 
al. 2018). The existing gas transmission and distribution network is deemed to require further 
investments and maintenance for the future use in light of significantly higher shares of 
hydrogen in the pipelines. Bothe et al. (2017) estimates the investments for the expansion 
and renewal of the gas grid to 1,182 million EUR per year by 2050, in addition to expenses 
for maintenance and repairs of 1,568 million EUR per year by 2050. The overall investments 
are nevertheless smaller than those associated with a more extensive expansion of 
electricity grids in scenarios with stronger focus on electricity in final energy demand (Bothe 
et. al 2017). Apart from the investments for the expansion of the gas and power grid, 
electrolysers and other equipment necessary for sector coupling and synthetic fuel 
production also needs to be procured. Hobohm et al. (2018) has estimated the difference in 
the necessary investments between BAU and the PtX80 and the PtX95 scenarios. For the 
PtX80, the investments for domestic PtX plants amount to around 5 billion EUR. By 2050, 
cumulative domestic investments of € 34 billion (PtX 80) and € 59 billion (PtX 95) by 2050 
are only slightly above the reference scenario (both values include the investments needed 
for infrastructure expansion as well as plants to cover the additional demand for hydrogen 
and other electricity-based synthetic fuels).   
In addition to injecting hydrogen into the natural gas grid, the scenarios TM80 and TM95 
(Hecking et al. 2018) consider the development and extension of separate hydrogen 
transmission and distribution pipelines, mainly for industrial consumers. Conversion of 
former natural gas pipelines necessary for connecting important industrial regions is 
associated with relatively low conversion costs compared to the construction of new 
hydrogen pipelines. The two scenarios assume that some of the existing natural gas 
pipelines will be converted for hydrogen transportation even if at the same time brand new 
hydrogen pipelines are also built. Hecking et al. (2018) assumes that 90% of the hydrogen 
needed in industry is supplied by converted pipelines and 10% by newly built pipelines.  
2.1.5 Main findings from the analysis of German scenarios 
The actual GHG reductions achieved in 2050 have a large effect on the necessary 
transformation paths. While GHG reductions of 80% across all sectors can essentially be 
achieved with existing technologies (albeit deployed much more broadly and within the 
necessary political framework), a further reduction of 15% requires new, qualitatively 
different solutions. All scenarios from the 6 studies analysed in this chapter with GHG 
reduction target higher than 80% assume mass deployment of hydrogen (and/or other 
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synthetic fuels) from 2030 onwards. Further, since Germany has decided to phase out its 
nuclear power plants and CCS in power generation is not a viable option due to low public 
acceptance, achieving the GHG emissions reduction targets means that renewable 
electricity must be used as the primary energy source for hydrogen and other synthetic fuels 
production. The general finding across all scenarios in focus is that Germany’s climate 
protection goals can hardly be achieved (and certainly not in the most cost-effective manner) 
without large-scale use of green hydrogen and/or other synthetic fuels. 
The second essential parameter is technological focus of the chosen transformation paths. 
These, along with the resulting energy system in 2050 described in different scenarios, are 
fairly diverse. Here too, the resulting infrastructure and the sector character of final energy 
consumption depend to a great extent on whether a high degree of electricity-based 
applications or a broader technology mix is pursued. This is one of the prisms which have to 
be applied when discussing the future role of hydrogen in Germany’s energy sector.  
Despite this divergence, another general observation can be made: Among the German 
academic publications concerning themselves with energy system transition scenarios over 
the timespan up to 2050 identified by the authors of this study, most generally foresee a 
bigger role for non-hydrogen synthetic fuels as the source of final energy consumption 
compared to hydrogen (while hydrogen is of course used as precursor for production of other 
synthetic fuels). While the hydrogen used as final energy source would be produced 
domestically, other synthetic fuels are assumed to be either entirely or mostly imported. The 
reasons for this assumption are manifold. Production costs in Germany – starting with the 
price of renewable power – are assumed to be higher than in many other parts of the world. 
This is exacerbated if hydrogen is to be further converted into other synthetic fuels due to 
additional efficiency losses. Further, renewable energy potential in Germany is limited by the 
available land surface. Third, unlike hydrogen, long-distance transport of other synthetic 
fuels can rely on the already existing infrastructure. Large-scale maritime hydrogen imports 
are not envisioned by the scenarios in the 6 studies analysed in this chapter; Hecking et al. 
(2018) explicitly mentions high transportation costs as the main reason for this. 
Certain trends in the scenarios can nevertheless be observed with somewhat greater 
confidence than others. In the transport sector, a mix of combustion engine (running either 
on fossil or synthetic fuels), electric and fuel cell vehicles is expected. It has been argued 
that due to technical and economic characteristics of competing drive systems, EVs will 
dominate most modes of transport over shorter distances, while hydrogen and other 
synthetic fuels will be used in for larger distances (Exponential View 2018). In the industry, 
hydrogen is likely to increase its role as a non-fossil raw material. In the power sector, 
hydrogen has potential to assume the crucial role of providing flexibility and both diurnal and 
seasonal energy storage. It should however be kept in mind that mass deployment of new 
technologies requires a certain timespan; this holds especially true for infrastructure. If 
hydrogen technologies are to be used on a mass scale from 2030 onwards, the time 
necessary for piloting, market uptake, and development of the necessary political framework 
has to be taken into account (Hobohm et al. 2018, Ausfelder et al. 2017, Hecking et al. 
2018).  
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2.2 Analysis of Japanese scenarios 
2.2.1 Demographic and economic framework conditions 
The IEEJ surveyed 11 hydrogen scenarios in Japan, plus the government’s targets for 
application and supply of hydrogen. Among the 11 scenarios, 6 have been developed by 
IEEJ. Two scenarios have been developed by the Institute of Applied Energy (IAE). One 
scenario was developed by Yoshiaki Shibata and is concerned with methanisation, and 2 
scenarios were developed by private companies (Table 14). In addition, the energy system 
development envisioned by the government strategic plan has also been included. Effort has 
been made to apply the same methodology to Japanese scenarios as for the German ones. 
However, differences in scenarios themselves in terms of assumptions, drivers and levels of 
detail for available data has made this possible only to a limited extent. The analysis of the 
Japanese scenarios therefore focuses on partially different parameters from those used for 
the German scenarios. Table 14 displays the assumptions and foci of the Japanese 
scenarios analysed. 
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Table 14: Overview of the Japanese scenarios surveyed 
Publication Scenarios 





Asia/World Energy Outlook 
2016 (The Institute of Energy 
Economics Japan 2016) 
IEEJ Tech. Adv. Scenario (base scenario) (Scenario 1) 
• Bottom-up econometric model 
• Hydrogen demand in Japan primary energy supply 
• Final energy consumption 
• Power generation mix available up to 2040 
/ 
High CCS power scenario (Scenario 2) 
• Bottom-up econometric model 
• Hydrogen demand worldwide  
/ 
Limited CCS power + low H2 scenario (Scenario 3) 
• Bottom-up econometric model 
• Impact on global GHG emissions  
/ 
Limited CCS power + high H2 scenario (Scenario 4) 
• Bottom-up econometric model 
• Impact on global GHG emissions  
/ 
Position of Hydrogen Energy 
and Prospect of Its 
Introduction Toward a Low-
Carbon Society in 2050 in 
IEEJ No CO2 emission constraints (Scenario 5) 
• Optimization (MARKAL model) 
• Geographic scope: Japan 
• Hydrogen demand in Japan by sectors 
/ 
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Japan (The Institute of Energy 
Economics Japan 2013) CO2 emission constraint (Scenario 6) 
• Optimization (MARKAL model) 
• Geographic scope: Japan 
• Hydrogen demand in Japan by sectors 
65% CO2 reduction 
against 1990 
baseline 
Experts group on hydrogen 
penetration action plan (AP 
research) (IAE 2016, 2017)  
IAE / (Scenario 7)  
• Optimization (MARKAL model) 
• Bottom up for demand projection 
• Optimization for supply 
• Geographic scope: global 
50% CO2 reduction 
against 1990 
baseline 
Mid- to Long-term Vision 
Prospect of energy 
technologies towards 2050 
(IAE 2018)  
 
IAE / (Scenario 8)  
• Optimization (MARKAL model) 
• Projection on energy service 
• Optimization for supply 
• Geographic scope: Japan 
• Hydrogen demand in Japan for certain sectors   
80% CO2 reduction 
against 2015 
baseline 
Future Potential of Carbon 
Neutral Methane, Combination 
of PtG and CCU: Towards 
Decarbonisation of City Gas 
(Shibata 2018) 
Yoshiaki Shibata Scenario on hydrogen methane (Scenario 9) 
• Optimization for supply 
• Domestic methane production potential (using RE 
hydrogen) and price 
/ 
Hydrogen Supply Scenario 
(Chiyoda Corporation 2017) 
Chiyoda Corporation Hydrogen supply chain (Scenario 10) 
• Hydrogen price 
/ 
Potential of Hydrogen 
Introduction (Insights from the 
History of LNG) (Kawasaki 
Heavy Industry 2017)   
Kawasaki Heavy Industry Hydrogen supply chain (Scenario 11) 
• Hydrogen demand in power sector 
• Hydrogen price 
• Hydrogen demand 
/ 
Strategic Energy Plan (METI 
2016) 
Government of Japan Government  targets (Scenario 12) 
• Primary energy supply 
• Power generation mix 
/ 
Source: Own compilation based on scenario parameters
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The available scenario data shows that assumptions on GDP and population do not vary 
much among different scenarios. Most of the scenarios assumed that long term real GDP 
growth rate (up to 2030) is less than 1%, resulting in a population in 2030 numbering about 
117 to 120 million. This constitutes a decrease of more than 10 million from the 2016 level of 
127 million.  
Based on the GDP projections and population assumption, the GDP per capita in Japan is 
estimated to be between 47,000 and 54,000 EUR per person per annum in 2030. Only 
scenarios 5 and 6 offer a GDP assumption for 2050; assuming that real GDP growth rate 
from 2030 to 2050 is around 0.6% per annum and the population has decreased to 97 million 
in 2050, the GDP per capita in Japan is supposed to be around 63,000 EUR per person per 
annum in 2050.  
For scenarios using a MARKAL-based optimization model (scenarios 5 to 8), constraint on 
CO2 emission reduction is an important factor. Scenario 6 by the IEEJ assumes a 65% CO2 
emissions reduction compared to 1990; this target is however hard to compare to the 
government target where some ambiguity regarding the reference year exists. Scenario 7 is 
the optimization model for achieving the 50% GHG emission reductions compared to 1990 
levels, as set by Japan’s INDC (Intended Nationally Determined Contribution). Scenario 8 
assumed a 26% CO2 emission reduction for Japan by 2030 compared to 2013 level and 
80% reduction till 2050 compared to 2015 level. The assumption is generally in line with the 
government’s GHG reduction plan.15  
2.2.2 Key energy characteristics 
2.2.2.1 Final energy demand 
Data for final energy demand by sector in the 2030s is available in scenario 1 by the IEEJ as 
well as in scenario 12 (the government target). Results from these scenarios do not show 
much difference. Total final energy demand in Japan is projected to be between 7,913 and 
8,499 PJ in 2030 (taking into account the effects of energy conservation efforts). In 2030, 
about half of energy demand will come from the industry sector, with buildings (commercial 
and residential) accounting for between 25% and 30%, and transport for between 25% and 
20%. Projection on final energy demand in 2050 is only available in scenarios 5 and 6 by the 
IEEJ and the scenario 8 by the IAE. They project the final energy demand in Japan in 2050 
between 5,862 and 6,448 PJ. Broken down by sectors, the shares of final energy demand in 
2050 do not show significant change compared to 2030 (Figure 12) 
 
15 It should be noted that in the INDC the GHG reduction does not come only from energy sector. Also, the government’s long term 
voluntary GHG reduction plan does not specify the base year for 80% emissions reductions. 
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Figure 12: Final energy demand by sectors in 2030 for Japan 
Source: Own depiction based on scenario parameters and IEA (2018) 
Only scenario 1 specifies final energy consumption by fuel type. According to the projection 
results, oil will still account for the largest share in final energy consumption in 2030 (no data 
is available for final energy consumption by fuel type in 2050).  
2.2.2.2 Primary energy supply 
Data for primary energy supply in 2030 also suggest that the power mix will depend on the 
CO2 constraints imposed by the policy. Scenarios 1, 8, and 12 suggest that in 2030, fossil 
energy sources will still account for 70% to 80% in the total primary energy supply. 
Scenarios 5, 6 and 8 provide some insights for 2050: scenario 5 assumes no constraints on 
CO2 emissions and projects the share of fossil fuel at around 60%. Scenario 6, which 
assumes a 65% CO2 emission reduction by 2050 from 1990 level, the share of fossil energy 
source in the primary energy mix is reduced to below 50%, while Japan is also importing 
hydrogen to cover around 8% of its primary energy supply. Scenario 8 assumes a constraint 
of CO2 emissions to the tune of 80% reductions from 2015 level, and the share of fossil 
energy sources in primary energy supply reduced to between 29% and 32%. This scenario 
also envisions hydrogen imports covering between 5% and 13% primary energy demand in 
2050.   
2.2.2.3 Hydrogen demand 
The scenarios analysed in this study estimate the Japanese hydrogen demand in 2030 to 
between 16.8 and 140 PJ. As mentioned above, the total 2030 final energy demand in Japan 
is projected to be between 7,913 and 8,499 PJ. Hydrogen is thus expected to have a limited 
role in 2030. The scenarios however envision that hydrogen demand could rise dramatically 
between 2030 and 2050, to between 600 and 1,800 PJ (Figure 13). With total final energy 
demand expected to be between 5,862 and 6,448 PJ, this corresponds to between 9% and 
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Figure 13: Hydrogen demand envisioned by various scenarios 
Source: Own depiction based on scenario parameters  
In terms of hydrogen’s role in different final energy demand sectors, the scenarios diverge 
for the year 2030. Scenario 1 and scenario 7 envisioned hydrogen demand in transport 
sector and possibly industry (oil refineries), with little hydrogen demand for power 
generation. On the other hand, scenario 11 and scenario 12 see nearly entire hydrogen 
demand coming from the power sector. 
In contrast, for 2050, most scenarios envision the power sector to contribute the bulk of the 
hydrogen demand. The hydrogen for power generation is expected to be imported as clean 
(low-CO2) hydrogen. The transport sector is also expected to contribute a considerable part 
of the demand. Regarding stationary fuel cells, their market penetration is expected to 
continue in the future; however, scenarios suggest that even in 2050, they won’t be running 
on pure hydrogen but rather use on-site steam reforming due to high costs of the hydrogen 
infrastructure.16 Only scenario 7 concerned itself with hydrogen use in the industry sector (in 
oil refineries). It suggests that hydrogen production units in oil refineries which produce 
hydrogen from petroleum products could be replaced by clean hydrogen, reducing the total 
fossil fuel input in oil refineries. The demand for clean hydrogen in oil refineries is estimated 
to be about 25 PJ in 2030 and about 50 PJ in 2050. 
Price is considered a key driver for hydrogen demand in the scenarios. Assumptions on the 
hydrogen fuel price in the scenarios stand between JPY 20 – 35 per Nm3 (~ 2.2 – 2.7 
EUR/kg). The general view in the scenarios is that the price for hydrogen would need to be 
below JPY 20 per Nm3 (~ 1.8 EUR/kg) for hydrogen applications to be competitive. In that 
sense, the government’s target for hydrogen price of JPY 30 per Nm3 (~ 2.7 EUR/kg) by 
2030 and JPY 20 per Nm3 (~ 1.8 EUR/kg) in the long term can be regarded as reasonable.  
2.2.3 Main findings in the Japanese scenarios 
Details of hydrogen demand envisioned by various scenarios are summarized in Table 15.  
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2050 Further information 
Scenario 1 
 
17 PJ / 
• No hydrogen application in power sector 
 
Scenario 2 / / • Worldwide no hydrogen power generation because of maximum use of CCS 
Scenario 3 
/ / 
• Hydrogen account for 5% of global power 
generation in 2050 
• Limited use of FCEV 
• Source of carbon neutral hydrogen supply: fossil 
fuel + CCS 
Scenario 4 
/ / 
• Hydrogen account for 13% of global power 
generation 
• High demand of hydrogen from power sector 
will help drive down the hydrogen fuel price 
• As a result, FCEV is expected to account for 8% 
in global LDV stock in 2050 
Scenario 5 / / • No hydrogen demand envisioned because there is no constraint on CO2 emission in this scenario 
Scenario 6 
/ 876 PJ 
• All hydrogen demand comes from power sector 
• Import hydrogen account for 7.6% in total 
primary energy supply in 2050 
• Hydrogen supplied from brown coal + CCS 
Scenario 7 
72 – 140 PJ 828 – 1,404 PJ 
• Hydrogen demand mainly comes from transport 
and oil refinery (replace of hydrogen production 
unit) sectors in 2030  
• In 2050, power sector accounts for 73% of the 
total hydrogen demand, transport accounts 
24%, and the rest for oil refinery  
• Fuel price of hydrogen needs to be less than 24 
JPY/Nm3 (2.2 EUR/kg), and preferable lower 
than 20 JPY/Nm3 (1.8 EUR/kg) 
Scenario 8 
/ 840 – 1,800 PJ 
• Hydrogen account for 5%~13% in total primary 
energy supply in 2050 
• Share of hydrogen in power generation depends 
on the penetration of nuclear and renewable in 
power generation: high nuclear and renewable 
result to low hydrogen power and vice versa   
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• Hydrogen is estimated to account for 41%~71% 
in the final energy demand in transport sector 
• However, hydrogen’s application in transport 
sector is significantly influenced by hydrogen’s 
use in power sector, high hydrogen demand in 




• 14%~64% city gas can be replaced by carbon 
neutral methane (hydrogen produced by water 
electrolysis using domestic renewable power 




• International hydrogen supply chain (hydrogen 
carrier: MCH)  
• Hydrogen CIF price: 30 - 40 JPY/Nm3 (2.7 – 3.6 
EUR/kg) in 2030, 25 - 30 JPY/Nm3 (2.2 – 2.7 
EUR/kg) in 2050 
Scenario 11 
27 PJ 1,080 PJ 
• Only envisioned hydrogen for power generation 
• Hydrogen supply from overseas (hydrogen 
carrier: liquefied hydrogen) 
• Hydrogen CIF price: 30 JPY/Nm3 (2.7 EUR/kg) 
in 2030, and 18 JPY/Nm3 (1.6 EUR/kg) in 2050 
Scenario 12 
36 PJ 600 – 1,200 PJ 
• Most of the hydrogen demand from power 
sector (both for 2030 and 2050) 
• International hydrogen supply chain 
commercialized after 2030 
• Hydrogen fuel price: lower than 30 JPY/Nm3 
(2.7 EUR/kg) by 2030 and lower than 20 
JPY/Nm3 (1.8 EUR/kg) in the long term  
Source: Own compilation based on scenario parameters  
The scenarios show that constraint on CO2 emissions is the precondition for penetration of 
hydrogen. For example, scenario 5 assumes no CO2 emissions constraint while scenario 6 
assumes a target of 65% CO2 emissions reduction for 2050 from the 1990 level (other 
assumptions being the same). Optimization results (least cost of energy system) of these 
two scenarios show that without a carbon constraint, there is also no demand for hydrogen. 
Vice versa, hydrogen applications become necessary as CO2 emission reductions become 
more ambitious.  
Even in scenarios with CO2 emissions constraints, the penetration of hydrogen varies 
depending on the development of other technologies. In scenario 8, which assumes an 80% 
reduction on CO2 emissions by 2050 compared to the 2015 level, the share of hydrogen in 
the power generation mix varies considerably, depending on assumptions regarding the 
shares of nuclear and renewable energies. With high shares of nuclear and renewables, 
almost no hydrogen is used for power generation, while in the case of limited nuclear and 
renewables, hydrogen’s share rises to around 30%. Discussions in scenarios 2 to 4 suggest 
that if CCS in combination with thermal power plants can be used to its full potential, there is 
no need for power generation from hydrogen. However, in case the use of CCS on thermal 
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power plants is limited due to high costs or lacking social acceptance, power generation from 
hydrogen becomes the preferable option to decarbonise power generation by substituting 
thermal power generation with one relying on clean hydrogen. 
Most of the Japanese scenarios share the view that because of the scale of the demand, the 
power sector could be the largest hydrogen consumer. This makes the prospect of hydrogen 
in large scale power generation an important factor in driving down the cost of hydrogen. 
This in turn would enable hydrogen’s penetration in the transport sector. Vice versa, if the 
demand on hydrogen power generation is low, the adoption levels of FCEV will also likely be 
low. 
The analysed scenarios generally agree that the hydrogen used should be CO2-free. 
According to scenarios 10, 11 and 12, hydrogen imports could be as high as 600 to 1,200 PJ 
in 2050.  
While some of the scenarios focus exclusively on imported hydrogen, others assume 
hydrogen produced by water electrolysis using domestic renewable resources as a viable 
option as well, with varying degrees of significance. In this case, domestically produced 
hydrogen would primarily be used for providing flexibility to the power grid rather than for 
large scale power generation. Only scenario 9 specifically discusses the potential of 
synthetic fuels other than hydrogen. The scenario envisioned a future with large intermittent 
renewable power capacities in Japan (solar PV and wind). Hydrogen would be produced 
from excess renewable power and used to produce carbon-neutral methane from CO2 
captured from carbon intensive industries and power plants. In the scenario, the methane 
generated in this way could replace 14% to 64% of total city gas demand. 
In contrast to the German scenarios, the Japanese scenarios don’t envision the non-
hydrogen synthetic fuels playing a significant role in the energy system in the timeframe up 
to 2050. The only exception is the scenario 9, mentioned in the paragraph above. For this 
reason, for the Japanese scenarios there is no chapter dedicated specifically to synthetic 
fuel demand, nor to the discussion on relationship between the roles of hydrogen and other 
synthetic fuels. 
2.3 Comparison of Japanese and German scenarios 
In the two previous chapters, selected scenarios from Germany (chapter 2.1) and Japan 
(chapter 2.2) were analysed and compared to other scenarios from their respective country, 
with a focus on the possible future role of hydrogen in the countries’ energy systems. In this 
chapter, a comparison is made between both countries.  
It should be noted that differences in data availability between the scenarios in focus from 
both countries constitute a challenge for the scenario comparison in this chapter. In general, 
more data is available for German scenarios than for Japanese scenarios. This has been 
noted in previous work (Arnold et al. 2017). It is apparently more common in Germany to 
publish relatively lengthy scenario studies with extensive data on various aspects of the 
energy system, while in Japan energy scenario publications tend to be shorter and focus 
more on specific topics, typically providing no full energy system data set. Apart from data 
gaps, non-uniform definitions also pose a challenge. For example, end use sectors are often 
defined differently in both countries (and sometimes even within the same country). 
In this chapter, the challenge of lacking energy system data especially in the Japanese 
studies is dealt with by choosing different Japanese scenarios for each of the topics to be 
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analysed. The German scenarios selected for the comparison however remain the same 
throughout this chapter. To keep the comparisons concise, it was decided to focus on four 
German scenarios (KS80, KS95, TM80, TM95) from the studies by Repenning et al. (2015) 
and Hecking et al. (2018). These four scenarios were selected because they provide detailed 
data on the assumed use of hydrogen in final energy demand and because they represent a 
wide range regarding the future role of hydrogen in the German energy system, ranging from 
no use of hydrogen in KS80 to around 560 PJ in 2050 in TM95. These four German 
scenarios are compared to up to five scenarios from Japan. 
It should also be noted that for Chapter 2 in general, and even more so specifically for this 
section, scenarios were chosen for the analysis in which hydrogen plays a relevant role in 
the future. This was done to gain relevant insights, including the preconditions which need to 
be met for hydrogen to become relevant. There are, however, other mid-21st-century energy 
scenarios for Japan and Germany in which hydrogen plays no or only a minor role in 2050. 
This is especially true for scenarios with no (strong) CO2 constraint; hydrogen does not play 
a relevant role in scenarios which do not meet mid- and long-term climate protection targets, 
and even in some scenarios which only meet the lower-end GHG reduction targets by 2050 
(for example, KS80 by Repenning et al.). 
The following subchapter compares key energy system drivers as well as key energy system 
characteristic for both countries’ scenarios. Chapter 2.3.2 will then focus on the role of 
hydrogen in these scenarios, deriving similarities and differences in the country-specific 
visions expressed through the scenarios.  
2.3.1 Comparison of key energy systems drivers and system 
characteristics 
Scenarios from both Germany and Japan assume that each country’s population will decline 
over the next three decades. In German scenarios this decline is less pronounced than in 
Japanese scenarios, with the study by Hecking et al. (2018) for example expecting the 
population to decline from 81.8 million in 2010 to 76.1 million in 2050, a decline by 7%. In 
Japan, a scenario study by IEEJ (2013) assumes that the Japanese population will decline 
during the same period from 128.1 million to 97.1 million, a decline by 24%. Alongside the 
absolute population decline expected, the populations in both countries are expected to 
become older on average, further decreasing the number of working-age people (Figure 14). 
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Figure 14: Population change assumed in different scenario studies (relative 
to 2010/2011) 
Source: Own depiction based on scenario parameters 
These demographic changes can be expected to curb economic growth in the two countries 
in the future. The scenario studies that explicitly make assumptions on future economic 
growth appear to support this notion. In Germany, the study by Hecking et al. (2018) for 
example assumes an average annual real GDP growth rate (AAGR) of 1.03% from 2011 to 
2050, while the study by Repenning et al. (2015) assumes an AAGR of 0.78% from 2010 to 
2050. This is both lower than the 1.2% AAGR observed in Germany from 2000 to 2016. The 
only Japanese scenario study making an explicit assumption on future GDP growth (IEEJ 
2013) assumes that the AAGR will stand at 0.65% from 2010 to 2050, lower than the 0.8% 
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Figure 15: Average annual real GDP growth rates from 2010/2011 to 2050 
assumed in different scenario studies 
Source: Own depiction based on scenario parameters 
The expected decline in population and in future GDP growth in both countries can be 
expected to have a dampening effect on future energy demand. However, it is unclear (and 
not discussed within the scenarios in focus) whether and how declining populations and 
GDP growth rates affect the challenges associated with energy system transformation. 
Apart from demographic and economic developments, a country’s GHG reduction ambition 
can also have an effect on the development of its energy system. Both, Japan and Germany 
have formulated absolute targets for domestic GHG reductions until 2030. Japan aims to 
reduce its GHG emissions by 26% by 2030, relative to 2013, while Germany aims to reduce 
its GHG emissions by 55% by 2030, relative to 1990. Using these targets, historic GHG 
emissions as reported by the UN (2019) and assuming 2030 population levels as projected 
by the 2017 Revision of World Population Prospects (UN 2017), these targets can be 
compared on a per capita basis. This method reveals that Germany’s 2030 target is 
significantly more ambitious than Japan’s 2030 target.17 Assuming that both countries are 
able to realise their respective 2030 reduction targets, Japan’s per capita emissions would 
fall from 10.3 ton in 2015 to 8.6 ton in 2030, a reduction of 17%, while Germany’s per capita 
GHG emissions would fall in the same period from 11.1 ton to 6.9 ton, a reduction of 38% 
(Figure 16). 
 
17 It should be stressed that this is a very simple approach to compare different countries’ GHG emission reduction targets, as 
countries’ differences in mitigation potential and costs are not taken into account. There are indications that emission reductions 
are more difficult to achieve and more expensive in Japan compared to Germany. See a more thorough discussion of this topic in 
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Figure 16: Development of per-capita GHG emissions in Japan and Germany 
from 1990 to 2015 and possible target-derived development until 2030 (in t 
CO2-equivalent) 
Source: Own depiction based on scenario parameters 
Additionally, the German government has set itself an 80 to 95% GHG reduction target for 
2050 (relative to 1990), while the Japanese government has set a target of 80% reductions 
by 2050 (with some ambiguity regarding the reference year). The differences in the mid- and 
long-term GHG reduction targets can be used to explain the differences in the level of 
emission reductions ambition between energy scenarios typically discussed in Japan and 
those typically discussed in Germany. For example, many government-commissioned 
energy scenario studies include ambitious scenarios in which Germany reduces its GHG 
emissions by 95% by 2050, relative to 1990, achieving per capita GHG emissions of less 
than 1 ton. The Japanese scenario studies analysed typically do not go as high, not 
exceeding reductions of 80%. 
The different levels of ambition are likely one of the factors behind the much faster expected 
increase in the share of renewables in the primary energy supply in the German scenarios in 
focus, compared to the analysed Japanese scenarios.18 In the German scenarios, the share 
of renewables in the total primary energy supply is expected to increase from 12% in 2016 to 
at least 26% and up to 39% by 2030. In the Japanese scenarios that provide this 
information, a very modest increase is expected, from 10% in 2016 to a maximum of 14% by 
2030 (Table 16).19 
 
18 An additional reason for the differences in the expansion of renewables is the generally different view in both countries on the 
future role of nuclear power. In Japan, nuclear power as an alternative carbon-free source of electricity generation is widely 
expected to play a relevant role in energy supply well beyond 2030, while Germany intents to phase out the use of nuclear power 
by the end of 2022. Furthermore, another reasons leading to very different shares of renewables in primary energy supply in 
German and Japanese scenarios can be seen in the perceived or actual differences in renewable energy endowment in both 
countries (see also Arnold et al. 2017).  
19 Care should be taken when comparing the shares of renewables in primary energy supply between Japan and Germany. While 
energy statistics and energy scenarios in Japan report primary energy supply using the partial substitution method, Germany (as 
well as most international organizations such as the IEA) use the physical energy content method (IEA 2019). Using the latter 
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12% 10% 26% 32% 39% 13% - 14% 10% 
Source: Own compilation based on scenario parameters 
Similarly, and largely in line with Germany’s target for the expansion of renewables in 
electricity generation with current target of 65% by 2030 (BMWi 2019c), German scenarios 
expect the share of renewable energy sources in the power mix to continue to increase 
rapidly in the coming decades. At the same time, nuclear power is phased out in the 
scenarios until the end of 2022 – again in line with Germany’s current energy targets and 
legislation. As Table 16 shows, electricity generation from renewables is expected to 
increase in the selected German scenarios from 188 TWh (~ 677 PJ) in 2016 to at least 312 
TWh (~ 1,123 PJ) (KS80; an increase of 66%) and up to 434 TWh (~ 1,562 PJ) (TM80 and 
TM90; an increase of 131%). The contribution will come mostly from wind (both onshore and 
offshore) as well as solar PV. In the Japanese scenarios, nuclear power is expected to 
rebound, increasing its contribution from 18 TWh (~ 65 PJ) in 2016 to about 230 (~ 828 PJ) 
TWh by 2030. The contribution from renewables is expected to grow more modestly in 
Japan, from 160 TWh (~ 576 PJ) in 2016 to 245 (~ 882 PJ) TWh in 2030. Overall electricity 
supply is expected to increase slightly in Japan, while in Germany, it is expected to decrease 
modestly (in the TM80 and TM95 scenarios) to markedly (KS80 and KS95) by 2030 (Figure 
17).20 
 
20 However, it should be noted that all German scenarios expect the large net electricity exports of Germany (54 TWh in 2016) to 
decline or disappear by 2030 
 




Figure 17: Electricity generation in Germany and Japan in 2016 and in 2030 
for different scenarios 
Source: Own depiction based on scenario parameters 
2.3.2 Comparison of the role of hydrogen in the respective scenarios 
In most of the analysed energy scenarios for both Germany and Japan, the use of hydrogen 
plays a relevant role in the respective energy systems by the middle of the century. As 
Figure 18 shows, hydrogen is used extensively in 2050 in three of the selected four German 
scenarios. They assume a demand for between about 300 and 600 PJ of hydrogen in the 
German energy system.21 This corresponds to 5% to 10% of the envisioned 2050 primary 
energy demand. In the Japanese energy scenarios, hydrogen use in 2050 in the five 
selected scenarios ranges between 600 PJ and 1,600 PJ, which is higher even on a per 
capita basis than in most German scenarios. The figure also shows that hydrogen use is 
typically expected to become relevant after 2030 in both Japanese and German scenarios. 
 
21 As Table 13 shows, one of the analysed scenarios (“Strom und Grünes Gas”, by Bothe et al. 2017) not considered for the 
comparison in this chapter stands out from all other analysed scenarios by assuming an end use sector hydrogen demand of 
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Figure 18: Use of hydrogen in different scenarios in 2030 and 2050 (in PJ) 
Source: Own depiction based on scenario parameters 
The Japanese scenarios tend to lag behind the German scenarios in terms of hydrogen 
demand in 2030, but foresee a larger role for hydrogen by the middle of the century. In 
addition, the role of hydrogen differs considerably between the German and the Japanese 
scenarios analysed in this study. In the two German scenarios by Hecking et al. 2018, 
hydrogen is used mainly in the transport sector and to a lesser extent in industry. In the 
German scenario KS95, hydrogen is also used to provide flexibility and storage in the power 
sector, but mainly to produce other synthetic fuels which are used exclusively in the transport 
sector. In Japan, while hydrogen plays a significant role in the transport sector in some of the 
scenarios (scenarios 1 and 7), it is by and large used mostly for the purpose of power 
generation.22 
This is a notable difference between the scenarios analysed for Germany and Japan. In 
Japan, it has been recognised that hydrogen – a potentially carbon-free source of energy – 
is necessary to significantly reduce CO2 emissions of electricity generation. However, the 
notion seems to be present that a cost-efficient hydrogen production is not viable 
domestically due to insufficient renewables potential. In Germany, on the other hand, it is 
widely believed that there is sufficient domestic renewable energy potential (mainly from 
 
22 It should be noted that apparently some of the Japanese scenarios depicted here as having no use of hydrogen in the transport 
sector actually foresee some limited use in this sector. However, no exact data is available and in these cases the use of hydrogen 
in the transport sector can be expected to be limited. 
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wind and solar) to cover all of or at least the vast majority of the direct23 electricity demand 
by the middle of the century, as well as a share of the hydrogen and other synthetic fuels 
demand. These are to be used mainly in the transport sector as the potential for direct use of 
electricity is considered to be limited in some applications such as air and marine traffic, and 
perhaps also in long-distance road applications. For the same reason, some of the German 
scenarios consider hydrogen necessary for decarbonising industrial and chemical processes 
such as ammonia production, steel generation and other processes requiring high-
temperature heat. 
Related to this is the general observation that the future role of hydrogen strongly depends 
on the efforts to reduce the CO2 emissions across all sectors. A number of both Japanese 
and German business-as-usual scenarios with no (significant) carbon constraint show that 
demand for hydrogen is unlikely to materialise without the necessary climate policy signals. 
Similarly, German studies, often including both an 80% and a 95% GHG emissions reduction 
scenario, show that for achieving the lower end of the reduction target, either no (e.g. KS80 
vs. KS95) or much less (e.g. TM80 vs. TM 95) hydrogen and/or other synthetic fuels are 
used, compared to the more ambitious reductions scenarios. 
In the German scenarios, it is often assumed that most or all of the required hydrogen is 
produced domestically through the use of renewable electricity. In the case of the scenario 
TM95 (Hecking et al. 2018), the vast majority of hydrogen, about 500 PJ, is assumed to be 
produced in Germany in 2050. It is argued that the long-distance transport of hydrogen is 
relatively expensive compared to the transport of other synthetic fuels. Similarly, the roughly 
300 PJ of hydrogen required in the KS95 scenario (Repenning et al. 2015) are also assumed 
to be produced in Germany. In these two scenarios, hydrogen electrolysis will become a key 
source for electricity demand by the middle of the century, constituting the main reason for 
the increase in electricity demand from 2030 to 2050. 
In the Japanese scenarios, as mentioned in chapter 2.2.3, hydrogen is generally assumed to 
be imported from abroad at least in the short term, from countries with better potential for 
clean hydrogen generation. At the same time, many of the scenarios see the role of 
domestic hydrogen production from renewable electricity as unclear.  
While only one of the analysed Japanese scenarios discusses the possibility of using 
synthetic fuels other than hydrogen in the future energy system (scenario 9 assumes that 
synthetic methane will be fed into the city gas grids to replace some of the natural gas), 
many of the German scenarios in focus foresee the use of liquid or non-hydrogen gaseous 
synthetic fuels. Similar to the use of hydrogen, these fuels are typically assumed to be used 
in the transport sector, and in some scenarios, in industry. Contrary to hydrogen, these fuels 
are generally assumed in the German scenarios to be imported from abroad, from countries 
with more abundant renewable energy sources. As in the case of hydrogen, there is a clear 
positive correlation between the demand for non-hydrogen synthetic fuels and the level of 
ambition of GHG emissions reduction. 
 
23 This is in contrast to the „indirect“ electricity demand in the form of synthetic fuels that are assumed to be used in some end use 
sectors (especially in transport) in most of the more ambitious German scenarios. The electricity required to produce these 
synthetic fuels is generally thought to be beyond the domestically available renewable energy potential, which is why most studies 
assume that these fuels will be imported.  
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3 Hydrogen supply chains 
This chapter provides information on three aspects of hydrogen supply chains: the 
framework for a definition of clean hydrogen (chapter 3.1), GHG intensities of different 
hydrogen supply chains (chapter 3.2), and potential partner countries for establishing clean 
hydrogen supply chains (chapter 3.3). 
3.1 Framework for a definition of clean hydrogen 
As of today, almost the entire global hydrogen production stems from CO2-intensive 
processes based on fossil fuels (IEA 2019, see Figure 1 in chapter 1.1). The largest share of 
hydrogen used in industry originates from steam reforming of natural gas. Steam reforming 
can alternatively also be based on other fossil fuels such as coal, oil and liquefied petroleum 
gas (LPG) (CHICH 2016). However, without CCS, these processes release the entire carbon 
content of the primary energy source into the atmosphere. Taking into account the energy 
intensity of hydrogen production, in some applications a switch from conventional fossil 
based technologies to hydrogen stemming from unabated, CO2-intensive processes may 
result in a negative climate balance. 
Therefore, for countries that consider climate policy as a main driver for developing hydrogen 
technologies, it is essential to define criteria which make sure that the consumed hydrogen 
clearly has a positive climate balance, and to establish certifiable standards for this purpose. 
In view of creating international hydrogen supply chains, it is desirable that the standards 
and certification procedures are agreed upon and implemented at international level. 
In this study, clean hydrogen is used as an umbrella term for green and blue hydrogen (see 
terminology text box in chapter 1.1). Green hydrogen is produced from renewable sources 
(with focus on electrolysis from renewable power) and blue hydrogen from fossil fuels in 
combination with CCS. This definition of blue hydrogen thus also excludes hydrogen 
stemming from nuclear power. 
The following chapter 3.1.1 discusses possible sustainability criteria for green hydrogen. 
Chapter 3.1.2 describes the existing certification schemes and standards for green and blue 
hydrogen. Chapter 3.1.3 looks at the similarities and differences between the existing 
schemes and standards and examines to what extent they meet the sustainability criteria for 
green hydrogen explored in chapter 3.1.1. It also discusses possibilities for leveraging 
certification or standards on the international level and how sustainability criteria could be 
incorporated into them. 
3.1.1 Sustainability criteria for green hydrogen  
Neither Germany nor Japan has so far adopted sustainability criteria for green hydrogen. 
The sustainability criteria for biomass foreseen by the EU Renewable Energy Directive (EU-
RED) are not directly applicable to hydrogen and other synthetic fuels. 
Sustainability criteria for green hydrogen and other synthetic fuels have been developed by 
Bracker (2017), in a policy paper of the Oeko-Institut, as well as by Agora Verkehrswende et 
al. (2018). Some key aspects relevant for green hydrogen are: 
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1. GHG emission balance: Both papers suggest a minimum threshold of at least 70% 
GHG emissions reduction achieved by using hydrogen instead of fossil fuels for the 
respective application. The 70% threshold is in line with the threshold for advanced 
biofuels to be considered as renewables according to the EU-RED. The threshold refers 
to the entire hydrogen production chain. Thus, in case of hydrogen produced by 
electrolysis, the GHG intensity of the electricity used must be accounted for. 
2. Electricity demand and additionality of renewables: The electricity needed for the 
entire hydrogen production process (e.g. including water desalination, where applicable) 
has to be generated from additional renewable energy capacities. The additionality 
principle is important to avoid that the additional renewable power purchased to feed the 
electrolysers (and possibly water desalination) only leads to a redistribution of the same 
amount of renewable electricity, while actually bringing more fossil-based sources into 
the mix. However, defining the additionality principle in practice is not always 
straightforward. Agora Verkehrswende et al. (2018) discusses the strengths and 
weaknesses of different approaches. Considering that hydrogen and other synthetic 
fuels would likely be traded internationally to a significant extent, it also raises the 
question of how the use of the best renewable power production sites for PtG and PtL 
intended for exports would affect the domestic decarbonisation efforts in developing 
countries. 
3. Water usage: The water usage for the hydrogen production chain (including electrolysis 
and, where applicable, cleaning the PV modules) could negatively affect the water 
supply in the respective regions. In arid regions, additional seawater desalination plants 
powered by renewable electricity might be needed. In non-arid regions, a sustainable 
water supply for hydrogen production should be ensured in compliance with sustainable 
water management plans. 
4. Land use: The regional/local situation needs to be assessed in order to avoid land-use 
conflicts (e.g. with space for settlements, food production, nature reserves, other 
infrastructure). Hydrogen production sites and the related renewable energy generation 
sites should be prohibited in nature protection areas or other regions with high 
environmental value.  
5. Social and economic impact: The establishment of renewable energy and hydrogen 
production facilities and infrastructure should not negatively impact local communities, 
but instead contribute to sustainable economic development and welfare in the 
respective regions. In developing countries, a share of the revenues could be used to 
fund regional development programs. The involvement of local actors in planning 
procedures and the establishment of fair partnerships between importing and exporting 
countries is important to avoid negative impacts. The social and economic context of 
hydrogen production should be monitored.  
Bracker (2017) and Agora Verkehrswende et al. (2018) also consider other synthetic fuels 
apart from hydrogen that require a carbon input: the CO2 cycle should be closed, i.e. the 
required CO2 should stem from biomass, biogas or the atmosphere. As carbon is not needed 
for the production of green hydrogen this criterion will not be taken into account in the 
discussion below. 
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3.1.2 Criteria for green and/or blue hydrogen in existing certification 
schemes and standards  
3.1.2.1 CertifHy 
The EU-wide CertifHy scheme was initiated by a consortium of European companies and 
research centres, financially supported by the European Union through the FCH-JU, and 
involving a broad set of European and global stakeholders. 
CertifHy is developing the first EU-wide Guarantees of Origin (GoO) certification scheme for 
these two types of “premium” hydrogen: green hydrogen and low-carbon hydrogen. A pilot 
was launched in January 2019 which covers four audited hydrogen production plants and 
has so issued the first GoOs (Bioenergy International 2019). The pilot’s target is to test the 
GoO design, procedures, associated costs for the users, etc. (CertifHy 2019a). CertifHy 
covers the complete certification life cycle of the GoO scheme, including auditing hydrogen 
production plants, certification of respective hydrogen production batches and the issuance, 
trade and usage of certificates (CertifHy 2019b).  
Definition of “premium” hydrogen types and eligibility criteria 
As shown in Figure 19, CertifHy differentiates between green hydrogen and low-carbon 
hydrogen (CertifHy 2019c). Green hydrogen is produced by renewables, i.e. bio, hydro, wind 
and solar energy (zero carbon intensity is assumed as the GHG emissions resulting from 
production of renewable energy generation facilities are not included). Low-carbon hydrogen 
according to CertifHy can also be produced by nuclear electricity or by fossil fuels in 
combination with CCS/CCU Including nuclear electricity. In this case, the CertifHy definition 
diverges from our study’s definitions for clean and blue hydrogen.   
In order to be eligible for CertifHy certification, the GHG emission intensity for both green 
hydrogen and low-carbon hydrogen has to be at least 60% below the GHG intensity by 
hydrogen produced from natural gas, in line with a 60% GHG emission reduction 
requirement for biofuels in 2018 according to the first EU-RED. The benchmark for natural 
gas is set to 91 g CO2eq/MJH2, and thus the threshold lies at 36.4 g CO2eq/MJH2 (CertifHy 
2019d).   
  
Figure 19: Hydrogen definitions according to CertifHy 
Source: CertifHy (2019c)  
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Guarantees of Origin by CertifHy 
With the GoO-system, green hydrogen and low-carbon hydrogen certification becomes 
available across the EU independently from the site of its production. The CertifHy GoO 
process is illustrated in Figure 20. The GoO is an electronic document that provides to the 
final consumer with a guarantee of the origin of the product. Since more than a decade, EU 
legislation mandates the use of GoOs for making claims regarding the source of renewable 
electricity; since 2019, the reformed EU-RED expands this to (amongst others) hydrogen 
(CertifHy 2019c).  
The following information is disclosed in the CertifHy GoOs: 
• Source of hydrogen (green or low-carbon), and the energy source of the hydrogen; 
• The GHG intensity of hydrogen in terms of CO2 equivalent per unit of energy; 
• The hydrogen production plant (location, operator, start date of operation, etc.); 
• Time of hydrogen production. 
A central registry has the authority to issue, transfer and cancel the GoOs. Hydrogen without 
a GoO is classified as hydrogen from the “residual mix”.  
 
Figure 20: CertifHy GoO Process 
Source: CertifHy (2019c)    
3.1.2.2 Standard CMS 70 TÜV SÜD on green hydrogen 
According to the German TÜV SÜD CMS 70 Standard (Version 12/2017, TÜV SÜD 2017), 
green hydrogen can be produced in three ways. The first one is by electrolysis of water or 
saline solution with electricity from renewables. This includes the following conditions: 
• Usage of renewable electricity has to be proved by guarantees of origin (in case it is 
not verifiably generated on site without using the power grid). 
• Within the EU, the origin must be verified in accordance with the EU-RED 
2009/28/EC (or with §79 EEG 2017 in Germany). 
• An increasing use or production of certified hydrogen should at least partly be 
covered by additional – new – plants. Two options to fulfil the required share of new 
renewable electricity are given: 
o At least 30% of renewable electricity has to be produced by new plants (i.e. 
not older than 3 years at the time of first certification; plants older than 10 
years can no longer be considered as new). Or 
o The share of “new” renewables in the renewable electricity has to be at 
least: 
 Small hydropower (< 2 MW): 10% or 
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 Wind power: 7.5% or 
 Solar power, geothermal, biomass: 5% or 
 Biogas / biomethane: 3% 
In addition, for the second option, the initial commissioning date has to be 
after 1st of January 2000. 
Renewable electricity already receiving state support, e.g. in the form of increased 
remuneration per kilowatt hour fed into the grid, is not eligible.  
The second way is biomethane steam reforming. The origin of the biomethane must be 
verified by means of proof in dena’s biogas register or equivalent. Third way is pyro 
reforming of glycerine, if this is a by-product of biodiesel production under the Biofuel 
Sustainability Ordinance. The glycerine must come from a certified plant (Biokraft-NachV 
2018). Proof of correct quantity balancing of the glycerine to avoid double counting must be 
provided. 
The standard further defines requirements for the GHG emissions reduction. Green 
hydrogen must have GHG-reduction potential of at least 50% compared to fossil fuels or 
conventional hydrogen. For hydrogen from electrolysis, the necessary GHG-reduction has to 
be at least 75%. If hydrogen is not produced by electrolysis, the following requirements 
apply: 
• Use in the transport sector: GHG reduction potential of at least 60% compared to the 
currently valid comparative value for fossil fuels in the Biofuel Sustainability 
Ordinance for hydrogen production plants commissioned after 31 December 2016 
(at least 50% for plants commissioned before that date). The comparative value for 
fossil fuels is 83.8 g CO2e/MJ (Biokraft-NachV, Annex 1, number 19).  
• Use other than for transport: GHG reduction potential of at least 60% (for plants 
commissioned after 31 December 2016) or 50% (for plants commissioned before 
that date) compared to conventionally produced hydrogen. The comparative value 
for conventionally generated hydrogen currently stands at 89.7 g CO2e/MJ.  
If hydrogen is produced by electrolysis, GHG reduction potential of at least 75% compared to 
comparative value for fossil fuels under the Biofuel Sustainability Ordinance (for transport) or 
compared to conventionally produced hydrogen (for uses other than transport) has to be 
achieved.   
Emission factors for renewable energy have to take into account the operational emissions 
from energy production (excluding emissions from construction and demolition of generation 
facilities and from the production of other capital goods). The system boundaries for GHG 
balancing extend from the production of the input materials/feedstock and the energy used to 
the delivery of hydrogen to the refuelling station or, in the case of stationary applications, to 
the consumer. Production and supply chains of input materials and energy are included. 
Direct emissions from production processes and transports as well as indirect emissions 
from electricity or heat are taken into account. The emissions from the production of plants, 
vehicles and buildings lie outside the system boundaries, as does administration and 
building management. Emissions from the use (combustion) of hydrogen are assumed to be 
zero. 
3.1.2.3 Clean Energy Partnership     
The Clean Energy Partnership (CEP) is an initiative coordinated by the (German) National 
Organisation for Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Technologies (NOW) and supported by the German 
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Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure. CEP aims at testing the system 
capability of hydrogen in daily use. It currently consists of 14 companies mainly from the 
automotive and the oil & gas sectors, including the Japanese car manufacturers Honda and 
Toyota as well as the German Audi, BMW and Daimler (Clean Energy Partnership 2019).  
According to the definition of the Clean Energy Partnership (CEP) (Clean Energy Partnership 
(2018a), green hydrogen can be produced from:  
• Electrolysis using renewable electricity or 
• Biomass via certified green thermochemical or biological conversion process. The 
CO2 reduction compared to hydrogen production from natural gas reforming has to 
be demonstrated.  
Only the hydrogen production process is considered for the certification of green hydrogen. 
The compression/liquefaction, transport or provision of hydrogen for passenger cars and 
buses at the stations are not taken into account. 
The following conditions apply for renewable electricity used for electrolysis: 
• 100% electricity from renewables, i.e. hydropower, wind, solar, geothermal, biomass, 
landfill gas, sewage gas.24  
• The electricity can be traced back to clear sources and the supplier has to disclose these 
sources. Certificates (a. RECS b. EECS-GoO) can be included as evidence of energy 
sources. If certificates are used, the age of the installations must be as follows:  
o At least one third of the electricity sold is generated in newly built renewable 
power plants, i.e. not older than six years. 
o At least a further third of the electricity sold is generated in renewable power 
plants not older than 12 years. 
• Physical direct or swap contracts may be included. 
• Electricity has to be certified by one of the following labels:  
o TÜV-Nord Ökostrom, 
o TÜV-Süd Ökostrom, 
o Grüner Strom Label, 
o OK Power. 
The green hydrogen used by the companies involved in the CEP fulfils all the criteria and 
requirements of the TÜV Süd CMS 70 standard and also corresponds to the definition of 
"green hydrogen" of the CertifHy process. The requirements for GHG emission reductions 
therefore are the same as defined in the TÜV Süd standard for green hydrogen used in 
transport (Clean Energy Partnership 2018b).  
3.1.2.4 Certification schemes and standards in Japan 
Similarly in Japan, there is no clear definition for clean hydrogen yet. The term “CO2-free 
hydrogen” is commonly used for hydrogen produced with little CO2 emissions usually 
referring to hydrogen produced by fossil fuels in combination with CCS or by renewable 
electrolysis but not explicitly excluding nuclear power as a possible production source. A 
government committee on CO2-free hydrogen discussed the need for establishing a 
standard and certification scheme in Japan and the revised version of the Strategic 
Roadmap for Hydrogen and Fuel Cells (released in March 2019) mentioned there is a need 
 
24 These energy sources are all defined as renewable under the renewable energy surcharge (EEG). 
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for CO2 emission reduction along the whole hydrogen supply chain. However, no specific 
actions for establishing a standard or a certification scheme are observed at the moment. At 
the regional level, the Aichi Prefecture has started its own certification system for CO2-free 
hydrogen in April 2018. It categorizes CO2-free hydrogen into 2 categories: 
1. Hydrogen produced from water electrolysis using renewable electricity or produced 
by steam reforming using biogas; 
2. Hydrogen produced from water electrolysis using grid electricity in combination with 
green electricity certification to compensate the CO2 emissions associated with 
hydrogen production, or hydrogen produced from fossil fuels in combination with the 
J-Credit to compensate the CO2 emissions associated with hydrogen production. 
The J-Credit is issued by the government to certify the amount of GHG emissions 
that are reduced or removed by sinks such as introduction of energy-saving devices 
and management of forests. 
Companies receive a certificate for the hydrogen if they provide proof for one of the two 
categories and pass the reviewing process which is carried out by a third party. The 
offsetting of emissions focuses on the emissions which are directly related to production of 
hydrogen, not on the life cycle emissions (Aichi Prefectural Government 2019).  
3.1.2.5 Other initiatives 
Apart from the initiatives described above, further approaches and standards exist; however, 
these either still have to be finalised, or available information on them is not very detailed. 
Only a brief summary is provided in this subchapter. The French Association on Hydrogen 
and Fuel Cells AFHYPAC is working on GoO for green hydrogen produced from renewable 
energy sources such as renewable electricity and biomethane (AFHYPAC 2016). The 
Directorate General for Energy and Climate (DGEC) and the French Environment and 
Energy Management Agency (ADEME) participate in the responsible working group which 
also aims to identify synergies between the French approach and the European CertifHy 
project (AFHYPAC 2017).  
While the Department of Energy & Climate Change (DECC) of the UK government intends to 
develop a standard for green hydrogen, the criteria still need to be determined and there has 
been no progress observed in recent years. As of 2015, DECC defined green hydrogen as 
low-carbon hydrogen, without taking into account other environmental impacts. The 
technology-neutral position of DECC also incorporates hydrogen production from fossil fuels 
in combination with CCS. For the standard, the carbon emissions of the hydrogen produced 
and used are decisive; however, the emission threshold has yet to be defined. The DECC 
also points out that a strict threshold could hamper the market development of hydrogen 
technologies. Furthermore, while agreeing that emission thresholds should become stricter 
over time, since it is difficult to predict the development of the market, the department is 
opposed to defining a clear trajectory of threshold adjustments. Instead, they recommend 
setting clear dates for reviewing the market situation and discussing the threshold 
development (Department of Energy & Climate 2015).      
Further, hydrogen refuelling station (HRS) companies in Denmark have also introduced a 
green hydrogen certificate as proof of origin. Certification by an accredited certification body 
is granted for hydrogen generated via electrolysis with CO2 neutral electricity which is 
certified by the certification system of electricity distribution companies (HyLaw 2018).  
The regulation of hydrogen under the Senate Bill 1505 in California from 2006 does not set 
standards for a definition of green or blue hydrogen but it determines requirements 
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concerning emissions and renewable share for hydrogen as an alternative fuel in transport. It 
applies to hydrogen stations co-funded by the government and for all hydrogen stations in 
California with throughput of 3,500 metric tons/year or higher. The regulation sets the 
following emission requirements relative to gasoline: 30% GHG reduction (on well-to-wheel 
basis), 50% reduction of nitrogen oxides plus reactive organic gases (well-to-tank), and no 
increase of toxic air contaminants (well-to-tank). Furthermore, at least 33.3% of the hydrogen 
has to be produced from renewable sources (such as biomass, solar thermal, PV, wind, 
geothermal, landfill gas, ocean wave etc.) (Achtelik 2009, Senate Bill No. 1505).  
3.1.3 Assessment 
Clean hydrogen production has to guarantee substantial GHG emission reductions 
compared to the usage of fossil fuels or of conventional hydrogen, and contribute to the 
transition to a sustainable energy system. Chapter 3.1.1 described sustainability criteria that 
could be included in a standard or certification scheme for clean hydrogen. This chapter 
investigates which of the sustainability criteria are addressed to what extent in the existing 
standards and certification schemes summarized in chapter 3.1.2. The sustainability criteria 
in chapter 3.1.1 refer to green hydrogen and thus do not allow for hydrogen production from 
fossil fuels (with CCS/CCU) or nuclear electricity. Nevertheless, except for the criteria 
concerning the energy sources, the other sustainability criteria (emission balance and 
system boundaries, water and land use as well as social impact) are relevant for blue 
hydrogen production as well. 
3.1.3.1 Comparison 
GHG emission balance and system boundaries  
The green hydrogen sustainability criteria in chapter 3.1.1 propose a minimum threshold of 
70% GHG emission reduction compared to the usage of fossil fuels, which is in line with the 
threshold for biofuels under the revised EU-RED. In existing standards and certification 
schemes, the thresholds for GHG reductions differ: The TÜV standard requires at least a 
75% GHG reduction for hydrogen produced by electrolysis from renewable electricity. For 
other production methods, at least a 60% GHG reduction compared to fossil fuels or 
conventional hydrogen must be achieved for plants commissioned after 2017 (50% for plants 
commissioned before). Under the CEP, the same requirements as under the TÜV standard 
have to be fulfilled. CertifHy sets a threshold at 60% GHG reduction compared to hydrogen 
production by natural gas. Under the Aichi Prefecture certification system, no emission 
thresholds are defined and it is sufficient to conduct GHG compensation measures which 
offset the emissions of hydrogen production. The California bill 1505 requires for the usage 
of hydrogen in transport a minimum of 30% reduction of GHG emissions relative to gasoline. 
This is however a requirement for hydrogen in general and not a criterion for defining green 
or clean hydrogen. 
According to the sustainability criteria discussed in chapter 3.1.1, GHG emissions of the 
whole life cycle of the hydrogen production chain should be considered when defining the 
emission thresholds. This includes emissions from the production and extraction of the 
inputs and of the hydrogen production process itself. Additionally, the emissions caused by 
the transportation of the hydrogen or derivate molecules to the point of usage should be 
considered. As it stands, the GHG intensity threshold of CertifHy only includes GHG 
emissions from hydrogen production. The TÜV standard does also take into account 
emissions after the production of hydrogen, including the transport to the point of usage and 
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usage itself (which is assumed to have zero emissions). The California Bill 1505 considers 
well-to-wheel emissions, but is restricted to usage of hydrogen in transport only.  
Energy source and electricity demand 
The sustainability criteria in chapter 3.1.1 refer to renewables-based green hydrogen. Thus, 
they do not allow for fossil fuels (with CCS/CCU) or nuclear electricity as possible energy 
sources. 
Looking at the existing standards, CertifHy, the certification scheme of the Aichi Prefecture 
and DECC all enable certification for both green and blue hydrogen (the CertifHy explicitly 
also allows for hydrogen production from nuclear electricity which diverges from the blue 
hydrogen definition in this study), while TÜV, CEP, AFHYPAC and HRS in Denmark only 
cover green hydrogen produced from renewables. The HRS in Denmark is the only definition 
that restricts green hydrogen production to electrolysis of renewable electricity; all other 
standards also allow at least for green hydrogen production by biomethane/biomass. 
TÜV Süd CMS 70 and CEP are the only standards, which at least partly address the 
additionality criterion discussed in chapter 3.1.1. TÜV defines a minimum threshold for the 
certified hydrogen to be produced from electricity generated by new renewable energy 
plants. The TÜV criterion is not particularly strict: at least 30% of renewable electricity must 
come from plants no older than 3 years at the time of first certification. CEP defines criteria 
for the age of renewable power plants that have to be fulfilled if certificates are used as 
evidence of energy sources. These criteria are not stringent either: at least one third of the 
electricity sold is generated in new plants no older than 6 years; and another third in plants 
no older than 12 years. 
The other sustainability criteria outlined in chapter 3.1.1, concerning the water demand, 
land use and social impact, are not covered by any of the existing standards and 
certification schemes identified in this study.  
3.1.3.2 Standards for clean hydrogen in bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation  
CertifHy, as the first GoO system for green and low-carbon hydrogen in Europe, could 
represent a starting point for an international certification scheme. If CertifHy achieves 
support from policy markets and market actors, it could in the future be formally adopted by 
the EU, possibly in collaboration with non-EU countries. Since CertifHy differentiates 
between green hydrogen and low-carbon hydrogen – the latter from fossil fuels with 
CCS/CCU or nuclear electricity – it can cover both the Japanese and the German approach 
to low-carbon hydrogen. This would allow both countries to focus primarily on the sort of 
hydrogen in line with its strategy, while remaining under the same framework, which could 
arguably help facilitate a future common hydrogen market.  
However, in order to achieve broad acceptance in Germany, the CertifHy standards would 
need to undergo a detailed evaluation and to be further developed and tightened. For 
Germany and other countries which have chosen to phase out nuclear energy, it might not 
be politically acceptable to define nuclear-based hydrogen as clean, notwithstanding the 
globally unresolved problem of nuclear waste disposal and the risk of catastrophic accidents. 
Moreover, as discussed in detail in chapter 3.1.2, CertifHy presently does not consider most 
of the sustainability criteria identified as relevant in chapter 3.1.1. Further, the TÜV standard 
is stricter regarding the emission threshold and the system boundaries.  
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For instance, the CertifHy scheme currently requires a 60% reduction in GHG intensity 
compared to hydrogen production by natural gas. Bracker (2017) as well as Agora 
Verkehrswende et al. (2018) argue for a 70% reduction; this would also be in line with the 
EU-RED (while the TÜV standard goes even higher, to 75%, for hydrogen produced by 
electrolysis). To ensure ambitious but realistic GHG emission thresholds for green and low-
carbon hydrogen, a constant monitoring of technology and market development would be 
necessary, with the possibility of gradual tightening of emission thresholds over time. 
In addition, especially when talking about international supply chains, it might be important to 
also include in the system boundaries the GHG emissions resulting from the transportation 
of hydrogen to the point of end-usage. This is currently not the case under the CertifHy 
scheme. On the other hand, such a scope expansion involves a certain risk of excessively 
increasing the efforts for hydrogen certification.  
Another important point for discussion is the additionality criterion. On one hand, as seen in 
chapter 3.1.1, additionality is important to avoid a mere redistribution of renewable energy 
across different needs and sectors. On the other hand, a too strict additionality criterion 
could hamper the market development of green hydrogen.  
The sustainability criteria concerning water demand, land use and social impact are not 
presently reflected in existing standards and certification schemes. Considering that at least 
for green hydrogen, in the future, a substantial share might be produced in arid regions in 
emerging and developing countries,25 these criteria should certainly be addressed in order to 
avoid potential negative impacts in production countries. One possible approach could be 
that a GoO additionally discloses information on water usage (i.e. water from desalination 
plants, water management plans implemented and monitored) and land use (i.e. monitoring 
and reporting requirements for land use management fulfilled). On the other hand, also 
including the social impact into GoO would likely pose a more complex challenge. For 
projects in developing countries, the requirements addressing social impacts could for 
example be defined as the necessity to involve local actors, additional investments and/or 
reduction of poverty. These requirements would have to be specified in more detail and 
made measurable before they can be integrated into a certification scheme. 
After criteria have been determined and respective standards or certification schemes have 
been implemented, it is important to conduct independent monitoring, reporting and 
verification mechanisms in order to ensure compliance. Such a system would also provide 
information on the development of technology and markets necessary to steer the markets 
by adjusting the criteria, if necessary. 
While a GoO system for clean hydrogen can lead to a shared international definition of green 
and clean hydrogen, and serve as evidence that the necessary criteria are met for the 
hydrogen production, additional government regulation and support is important to 
incentivize an adequate market development for green/clean hydrogen production. The 
investigation of the relevant framework conditions and regulations is outside the scope of this 
study. The results of the HyLaw project could serve as a basis for further investigation. The 
project was funded by FCH2 JU (supported by the EU Horizon 2020 research and innovation 
programme, Hydrogen Europe and Hydrogen Europe Research) and identified a range of 
legal and administrative barriers in the EU for the commercialisation of hydrogen and fuel 
 
25 See chapter 3.3 for countries with largest green and blue hydrogen potential.  
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cells and gives recommendations for adjustments in the EU regulatory framework (HyLaw 
2018).  
3.2 GHG intensities of hydrogen supply chains 
3.2.1 Data 
The GHG intensities for different hydrogen production methods presented in the following 
chapter are based predominantly on JRC (2014). The values for the selected hydrogen 
production paths reflect the European situation and are deemed valid for Germany, despite 
the higher GHG intensity of its electricity mix compared to the EU average. According to 
Shell (2017), this does not lead to fundamentally different conclusions. Moreover, the values 
in JRC (2014) fall in the same order of magnitude as existing Canadian and Japanese 
studies (Argonne National Laboratory 2015, Mizuho Information and Research Institute 
2018). At the end of this chapter, a simplified comparison to the Japanese situation is 
outlined. 
The JRC (2014) study contains energy and GHG balances for a variety of energy sources, 
as well as for different transformation, transport, storage and distribution processes. The 
study divides the hydrogen supply chain into five stages: 
• Production and conditioning at source, i.e. extraction and any form of treatment 
and conditioning of the energy source, before transformation and/or transportation to 
the point of consumption;  
• Transformation at source, e.g. power plants operation, the processes of 
gasification, reforming or electrolysis, liquefaction outside of the EU in case of LNG; 
• Transportation to market, i.e. transport of the energy carrier (e.g. hydrogen, natural 
gas, coal) from the point of production or extraction to hubs in the country of 
consumption in the EU) via shipping, pipelines;  
• Transformation near market, i.e. the same as “transformation at source”, in case it 
happens in the country of consumption;  
• Hydrogen conditioning and distribution, i.e. compression and transport of 
hydrogen to from the hubs or points of transformation to the individual refuelling 
points.  
3.2.2 Results  
Figure 21 shows the GHG intensities for various hydrogen supply chains. Two of the main 
natural gas (NG) import sources for Europe have been modelled for processes based on 
natural gas reforming: Western Siberia (at the distance of 7000 km) and South-West Asia (at 
the distance of 4000 km). For coal, domestic production and gasification near the point of 
extraction is assumed. On-site production means that hydrogen production takes place near 
to end-consumers; central production implies transportation from the production plant to the 
end-consumer is necessary. Average road distance necessary for the distribution for 
centrally produced, compressed hydrogen is assumed to be 50 km; for cryogenic hydrogen, 
it is assumed to be 300 km. For hydrogen entering Europe in cryogenic form by sea, road 
transport over the distance of 500 km from the port of entry hub to the point of consumption 
is assumed. For both gas reforming and electrolysis plants, the JRC (2014) assumes central 
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plants with a capacity of 200 MW on the output side. The small-scale, distributed hydrogen 
plants with a capacity up to 10 MW are used to serve hydrogen refuelling stations. 
According to this modelling, the GHG emissions along the hydrogen supply chain vary 
considerably, depending on various factors. Generally, the hydrogen production process is 
the most energy intensive stage, while transport, distribution and others require much less 
energy. Accordingly, for fossil-based hydrogen production without CCS, all stages other than 
production typically account for 10 to 20 percent of the overall emissions. 
Processes based on natural gas reforming without CCS, liquefaction or cryo-compression 
(bars 1 – 4) have GHG intensities between 100 and 130 g CO2eq/MJ, regardless of the 
transport distance and transport mode or whether reforming has taken place in a central 
plant or on-site. With liquefaction, the energy demand rises slightly (bar 5). If the source was 
LNG, or if hydrogen has been cryo-compressed (bars 6 - 8), the GHG intensities are slightly 
higher again at 125 to 140 g CO2eq/MJ. The use of CCS reduces the GHG intensity by 
between 60% and 70% for natural gas-based processes (bar 9). 
Coal gasification without CCS is the most GHG-intensive supply chain modelled with 237 g 
CO2eq/MJ (bar 10). With CCS, the overall GHG intensity drops by more than three quarters 
to about 56 g CO2eq/MJ (bar 11).  
Electrolysis based on electricity generated from fossil fuels without CCS generally has higher 
GHG than direct transformation via reforming or gasification, due to the higher efficiency 
losses. The three bars (12 – 14) depicting the processes based on combined cycle gas 
turbine (CCGT) or EU power mix all have GHG intensities above 200 g CO2eq/MJ. 
The last five processes depicted in the chart are based on renewable energy. Farmer wood, 
whether directly transformed via gasification or used in a thermal power plant, results in 
GHG emissions between 17 and 25 g CO2eq/MJ (bars 15 – 17). Hydrogen produced by wind 
power-based electrolysis achieves even lower GHG emissions at 13 g CO2eq/MJ (bar 18).26  
The estimated CO2 intensity of hydrogen production via natural gas reforming is in line with 
data obtained by the authors of this study from Japanese sources (around 150 g CO2eq/MJ 
for the entire supply chain for compressed hydrogen and around 170 g CO2eq/MJ for 
liquefied hydrogen) (Mizuho Information and Research Institute 2018). For other production 
processes, it was not possible to obtain information about the assumptions underlying the 
Japanese debate. Thus, a more in-depth comparative evaluation is not possible. For the 
case of green hydrogen from electrolysis, Mizuho Information and Research Institute (2018) 
assumes wind and PV as primary sources of electricity. The estimated CO2 intensity of 
transport, storage and filling at 50 – 73 g CO2eq/MJ is somewhat higher than in JRC (2014). 





26 JRC (2014) altogether analyses 64 different hydrogen supply chains. In this chapter, only the most relevant ones for this study 
have been selected.  
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Figure 21: GHG intensities of hydrogen supply chains 
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3.2.2.1 Hydrogen produced from fossil energy sources 
Hydrogen produced from fossil fuels such as natural gas and coal without the use of CCS 
has roughly an order of magnitude higher overall GHG emission than hydrogen produced by 
electrolysis from renewable electricity or by gasification from biomass. Nevertheless, 
considerable differences in GHG intensities exist between different fossil energy sources if 
CCS is not used: hydrogen production from natural gas is about half as GHG intensive as 
that from coal. 
For fossil fuels-based hydrogen, transforming the fossil primary energy source such as 
natural gas or coal is more efficient when carried out in a centralized manner in larger plants, 
due to better heat recovery. However, this is roughly compensated for by the lower 
distribution efficiency associated with central production. For the supply chains modelled by 
JRC (2014), central transformation is only slightly more efficient than decentralized hydrogen 
production. For fossil fuels-based hydrogen, production of hydrogen near the point of fossil 
fuels extraction and subsequent transport by sea to Europe results in slightly higher overall 
GHG intensity than transport of natural gas to Europe and production of hydrogen closer to 
the point of consumption.  
For fossil fuels-based hydrogen, use of CCS can be an important factor for reducing 
emissions. In the supply chains modelled by the JRC (2014), it reduces the overall emissions 
by 60% to 70% for hydrogen produced from natural gas, and by about three quarters for 
hydrogen produced from coal.  
Using fossil fuels to generate electricity, which in turn is used for producing grey hydrogen 
via electrolysis, leads to high efficiency losses along the conversion chain and to some of the 
highest overall GHG intensities among the modelled processes. This holds true not only for 
coal but also for natural gas, as well as for power mixes primarily based on fossil fuels such 
as those of Germany and Japan. Production of grey hydrogen (without the use of CCS on 
the power production process) thus cannot be considered a viable option for GHG emissions 
reductions.  
Regardless of the energy source for hydrogen production, liquefaction is an energy intensive 
process, generally leading to slightly higher overall GHG intensities.  
3.2.2.2 Hydrogen produced from renewable energy sources 
When hydrogen is derived from biomass via gasification, the resulting life cycle emissions 
remain below one fifth of those resulting from natural gas transforming. Central and 
decentralized production has roughly the same emissions for biomass gasification.  
Production of hydrogen via electrolysis based on renewable power (in this case, wind) 
exhibits the lowest GHG intensities among the modelled processes. Green hydrogen from 
renewable-based electrolysis has about a third of GHG intensity of hydrogen produced from 
natural gas or coal even with the use of CCS, and slightly below that of hydrogen derived 
from biomass.  
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3.3 Identification of potential hydrogen supplier countries  
This chapter provides an analysis of potential clean hydrogen supplying countries, 
differentiating between green hydrogen (based on renewables) and blue hydrogen (based on 
fossil fuels with CCS).  
3.3.1 Methodology 
Of all the countries in the world, the following have been omitted from the analysis: sovereign 
states with less than 300.000 inhabitants, city-states and territories. Next, countries in the 
bottom decile of the distribution (including missing values) for political stability according to 
(World Bank 2018a) have been excluded, as they are unlikely to offer favourable conditions 
for capital intensive investments in new technology. After applying these filters 127 countries 
remain in the dataset.  
As a next step, the green and blue hydrogen production potentials of each country have 
been assessed. The approaches are described in detail in the corresponding chapters. The 
results, in absolute terms of these potential assessments, have then been normalised to the 
value of the first-ranking country on a scale from 0 to 1, where 0 indicates the weakest and 1 
the strongest value, in terms of clean hydrogen production potential. In other words, the first-
ranked country for each indicator always has a value of 1, the others are presented in 
relation to it. The charts show the 20 countries with the highest indicators.  
Finally, the countries with the highest indicators have been clustered under consideration of 
the country-specific contexts, based on existing literature27 and own research. However, 
there still remains a need for a more detailed consideration of the country-specific context, 
as many relevant restrictions have not been considered in this approach. The outcome of 
this chapter should therefore be used for orientation and not as a definitive list of the most 
likely clean hydrogen producers and/or exporters.  
3.3.1.1 Suppliers of green hydrogen: The prodigies 
This section identifies countries with favourable conditions for the production of green, 
renewables-based hydrogen, named the prodigies. As shown in previous analyses such as 
those from Fasihi et al. (2017) and dena (2017), PV-wind hybrid plants generally represent 
the best option to provide green hydrogen and/or synthetic fuels at competitive costs. 
Previous analyses such as Pfennig et al. (2017) and Frontier Economics (2018) have 
already identified regions that offer favourable conditions for green hydrogen production.  
The present document identifies the most favourable regions for green hydrogen production 
on the basis of extensive modelling carried out by the Lappeenranta University of 
Technology (LUT). The LUT modelled the costs of baseload green hydrogen supply for each 
chapter of the earth’s surface at a resolution of 0.45° latitude by 0.45° longitude, roughly 
corresponding to an area of 50 km by 50 km on equator. The modelled hydrogen production 
system consists of a hybrid wind/PV power supply, an electric battery and an electrolyser. To 
reduce complexity, the model only considers island systems not connected to the power grid. 
The model assumes hydrogen storage in salt caverns. However, their availability at the exact 
locations with the best hydrogen production potentials has however not been verified. The 
 
27 E.g. Frontier Economics (2018), Singh et al. (2005) and Drennen et al. (2014). 
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capacities of all components are optimised for lowest hydrogen production cost at the 
specific site under these conditions. The assumed capex and opex levels for all system 
components take into account the effect of learning rates between now and 2030, a time 
when most scenarios for Germany and Japan assume hydrogen demand starts increasing 
considerably (chapter 2). The model assumes a weighted average cost of capital (WACC) of 
7% all over the world. The model does not consider costs and restrictions related to land 
use, nor the costs for transporting the green hydrogen for the production site to the final 
users. Further information on the input parameters can also be found in Ram et al. 2018).28 
 
Figure 22: Levelised cost of on-site green hydrogen production 
Source: LUT modelling done for this study 
The outcomes of the LUT-model can help identify regions and countries with the most 
favourable conditions for green hydrogen production (Figure 22). In a medium term 
perspective (until 2030), it can be assumed that the global green hydrogen market will have 
a relatively modest volume. Therefore, hydrogen production cost, rather than the total 
production potential, will play a central role. Figure 23 visualises the ranking of the 20 
countries (except those excluded, see above) with the lowest levelised cost of green 
hydrogen production. The data refers respectively to the region (see above) with the lowest 
cost level in each country. The lowest cost is modelled in Chile (3.04 EUR cent/kWh), 
followed by Argentina (3.21 EUR cent/kWh); Egypt, ranking 20th, features a production cost 
of 4.43 EUR cent/kWh. 
 
 
28 Geothermal and hydropower have not been considered. Further, factors such as distance of hydrogen production sites from the 
existing transport infrastructure, feasibility and costs of building the necessary transport infrastructure where none exists, 
population density, (desalinated) water availability, terrain topography, ground composition, vegetation, land use, land prices, 
public acceptance for renewable energy infrastructure and own demand for renewable power or clean hydrogen have not been 
considered at this step. 
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Figure 23: Countries with lowest levelised cost of green hydrogen production 
Source: Own depiction based on LUT modelling 
In a longer term perspective (until 2050), energy importers such as Germany and Japan will 
probably require large amounts of green hydrogen (and/or other synthetic fuels) in order to 
decarbonise their energy systems. In this timeframe, the volume of a country’s green 
hydrogen production potential at an acceptable cost level becomes relevant. What cost level 
is deemed acceptable depends on many factors, including the cost of the energy carriers 
that green hydrogen can replace, and the implicit or explicit, politically determined cost of 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
Currently, the US Department of Energy’s cost target for distributed hydrogen production is 
$2.30/kg (~ 2.1 EUR/kg) in 2020 (DOE 2019), while METI targets $3/kg (~ 2.7 EUR/kg) in 
2030 (METI 2017). The more ambitious of the two, the DoE target, corresponds to around 6 
EUR cent/kWh at lower heating value. Below, the land area which offers the technical 
potential for green hydrogen production at 6 EUR cent/kWh or lower is used as a proxy to 
determine a country’s production potential at this cost level. 
Figure 24 shows the 20 countries with the largest land area fulfilling this criterion. Among the 
104 countries able to produce green hydrogen at this cost level, the area itself varies 
considerably. Australia, ranking 1st, can technically produce green hydrogen at this cost 
level on just over 7 Mio. square kilometres, or around 90% of its entire surface; the United 
States with its vast wind potential on great plains ranks second with over 3.8 Mio square 
kilometres. Nigeria on place 20 technically has over 700,000 square kilometres with a 
hydrogen production potential at 6 EUR cent/kWh. 
Of course, the area that any given country will realistically dedicate to green hydrogen 
production is further strongly limited by factors such as distance of hydrogen production sites 
from the existing transport infrastructure, feasibility and costs of building the necessary 
transport infrastructure where none exists, population density, (desalinated) water 
availability, terrain topography, ground composition, vegetation, land use, land prices, public 
acceptance for renewable energy infrastructure and own demand for renewable power or 
clean hydrogen. Considering these factors would require in-depth analysis of local 
conditions, which was not possible within the constraints of this analysis. However, it seems 
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Figure 24: Countries by land area technically allowing green hydrogen 
production at 0.06 EUR/kWh 
Source: Own depiction based on LUT modelling 
Figure 25 merges the two sets of countries shown in the two previous figures – the top 20 
with the regions with lowest production costs and the top 20 with the largest cost competitive 
production potential. 10 countries have been identified which belong to the top 20 for both 
criteria: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, Egypt, Morocco, Namibia, Russia, South Africa 
and the United States.29  
 
 
29 Morocco and Western Sahara were modelled both as separate entities and as one. Separately, only Western Sahara appears 
among the top 20 in terms of lowest cost while Morocco without the disputed area does not, and none of the entities separately 
appears in the top 20 by area where hydrogen production under 6 EUR cent/kWh is possible. By choosing this modelling 
approach, the study authors intended to avoid the impression of assuming a political position on this territorial dispute, either on 
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Figure 25: Potential green hydrogen producers 
Source: Own depiction based on LUT modelling 
By and large, the result is a selection similar to that already identified by previous studies. 
For example, all but six of the 23 countries identified in Frontier Economics (2018) as high 
potential PtX producers also show up in the current analysis. However, some discrepancies 
exist. Our selection of the top 20 countries for green hydrogen production does not include 
Oman (ranking 30th in lowest cost and 35th in area where production under 6 EUR cent/kWh 
is technically possible), Qatar (49th and 68th), United Arab Emirates (47th and 40th), Spain 
(48th and 65th), Kazakhstan (90th and 41st) and Norway (22nd and 56th). One reason for the 
discrepancies is that the model used in the present study only looks at wind and solar 
resources, and does not consider hydropower and geothermal energy as an additional basis 
for green hydrogen electrolysis. This lowers the ranking of countries such as Canada, 
Iceland and Norway. Further factors pertaining to each country’s specific context are likely to 
further influence the outcomes. The absence of a country in our list of the top 20 producers 
does not automatically imply that it should not be considered as a potential green hydrogen 
supplier. 
The LUT-model used in this study also identifies some countries in addition to those 
mentioned in Frontier Economics (2018). Among the top 20 countries in terms of lowest cost, 
a few Northern European countries rank very high, mainly due to good wind potential, with 
the UK ranking 3rd, Ireland ranking 8th, Denmark ranking 11th and New Zealand ranking 13th. 
However, at least for onshore wind, although the land use restrictions in these countries are 
likely to be substantial, all are assumed to have a substantial future domestic demand for 
green hydrogen and renewable power. Among the top 20 countries by area, Tanzania and 
Ethiopia rank 17th and 18th, respectively and exhibit good technical green hydrogen 
production potentials. Besides the parameters considered in the model, they also are 
relatively stable countries with relatively low population densities. Tanzania has access to 
sea, while Ethiopia is landlocked, which complicates both access to fresh water and the 
export route. Another interesting candidate is Zambia, ranking 15th, with relative political 
stability and comparatively low population density, but also a landlocked country.  
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On the other hand, the model also identifies some countries which seem like less viable 
candidates when context is taken into account. For example, Mauritius ranks 17th in terms of 
lowest cost thanks to its good wind and solar potential, but is a very small and densely 
populated country. In Mali, ranking 8th by land area available for production under 6 EUR 
cent/kWh, most of the favourable green hydrogen production locations are located on sand 
dunes – as Frontier Economics (2018) already notes, such terrain is not suitable for the 
necessary infrastructure. The same also partly holds for Niger in 12th place. Apart from that, 
both countries are landlocked and suffer from water scarcity and relatively low political 
stability. Political stability and high population density might also be problematic for Nigeria, 
which otherwise has relatively favourable conditions in terms of wind and solar resources 
and access to sea.     
Of course, not all countries identified as having the potential to produce green hydrogen at 
competitive cost will necessarily be able and willing to export it. For one, they might not 
possess the necessary infrastructure or they may lie at prohibitively long distance from 
hydrogen demand. Another likely constraint is the countries’ own demand for affordable 
carbon-neutral fuels. The model used in this study does not take into account domestic and 
international energy markets. In principle, however, it is presumably safe to assume that 
countries with large, sparsely populated areas and outstanding renewable resources, such 
as Australia, Saudi Arabia, Argentina, Morocco or Namibia are much more likely to produce 
green hydrogen quantities exceeding their own demand than some of the largest energy 
consumers such as United States, the UK, China or Mexico. Countries such as Canada, 
Norway, Iceland, Brazil, Morocco, South Africa and Egypt fall somewhere in between as their 
economic situations and climate policy ambitions might dictate the use of the green 
hydrogen they produce. 
In lower income countries, the revenues from green hydrogen exports might help in financing 
domestic climate mitigation investments. However, there also is a risk that green hydrogen 
production sites are created only for export purposes, while the domestic energy supply 
remains highly GHG intensive. If the renewable generation resources are limited, the 
production of green hydrogen for export might de facto limit the exporting country capacity of 
decarbonising its own energy consumption. In this case, the overall climate benefit of the 
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3.3.1.2 Suppliers of blue hydrogen: The shifters 
This chapter identifies the shifters, i.e. countries with large fossil resources which could be 
used to produce low-carbon blue hydrogen by applying CCS. In this way, these countries 
would adapt to the growing demand for low carbon fuels.  
As discussed more in detail in chapter 1.4.1, in the foreseeable future CCS deployment on 
German soil is unlikely, due to strong political opposition. However, the acceptance level in 
other countries might be sufficiently high and Germany might be open to imports of blue 
hydrogen, so long as it replaces more carbon intensive fossil fuels. 
This chapter estimates the technical potential for blue hydrogen production. The analysis 
compares the volume of grey hydrogen that a country would be able to produce, based on 
data on proven reserves of natural gas, coal and oil as the source of flaring gas (BP 2018).  
This data is then compared to the country’s carbon storage potential according to the Global 
CCS Institute (Global CCS Institute 2018). On this basis, Figure 26 below shows the 20 
countries with the highest technical blue hydrogen production potential. The United States 
ranks first with its massive CCS resources, estimated at upwards of 2.300 Gt. Combined 
with its proven fossil fuels reserves, this gives it a total technical potential of upwards of 14 
billion tonnes of blue hydrogen. The other countries are presented in relation to the US. 
China which ranks on the second place has a potential of just below 8 billion tonnes of blue 
hydrogen. 
It must be noted that the absolute figures are rough estimates, based on the lower end of the 
range of the Global CCS Institute’s country CCS potential estimations. First, the estimates of 
CO2 quantities that have to be injected via CCS are based on simplified models for the 
various fossil energy sources (coal, natural gas and flaring gas). Second, there can be a 
number of restrictions to the full usage of a country’s the carbon storage potential for the 
purpose of blue hydrogen production. Among others, the limiting factors can be public 
acceptance, environmental protection (due to potential impact on the chemical composition 
of the soil), as well as competing uses for the limited reservoir sites. Third, the carbon 
storage potential estimated by the CCS institute includes a significant share of enhanced oil 
and gas recovery (EOGR) sites, where the CO2 injection is used to extract more oil or gas 
out of partly depleted oil and gas reservoirs. In a decarbonisation perspective, oil and natural 
gas extraction should be reduced as rapidly and strongly as possible (and partly replaced by 
clean hydrogen). It is therefore doubtful whether CO2 injection for EOGR purposes is 
compatible with scenarios with high demand for clean hydrogen  
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Figure 26: Countries by blue hydrogen potential  
Source: Own depiction 
The Global CCS Institute provides an indicator which also takes into account the maturity of 
carbon storage potential assessment as well as the progress with deployment of CO2 
injection sites (Figure 27) (Global CCS Institute 2019a). Canada, ranking first, was awarded 
71 points out of the maximum of 100. Figure 27 shows the other countries in relation to 
Canada; the United States ranks 2 with 70 points. The selection of countries with the highest 
indicator roughly corresponds to the countries with large CCS projects already in operation 
or under construction; all of the top 10 countries except Germany, Denmark and Japan have 
at least one such project. USA, Canada and Norway are also the countries which have so far 
injected and stored the largest quantities of CO2 in absolute terms (Global CCS Institute 
2017).  
 
Figure 27: Countries by CCS readiness indicator   
Source: Own depiction 
Among these countries, seven appear in the top 20 for both, the absolute blue hydrogen 
potential and the CCS readiness indicator: Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Germany, 
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factor: Algeria, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Russia, 
Saudi Arabia, South Africa, UAE and Vietnam. Another 13 countries have a high readiness 
factor but their CCS potential is too low to be included in the top 20: Croatia, the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, France, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Poland, South 
Korea, Spain and United Kingdom. Figure 28 depicts the potential blue hydrogen producing 
countries.  
 
Figure 28: Potential blue hydrogen producers 
Source: Own depiction 
Not surprisingly, the 20 countries with the largest blue hydrogen potential also belong to the 
group of largest producers of fossil fuels. Together, they accounted for more than 55% of 
global oil production, more than 65% of natural gas and more than 90% of coal in 2017 (BP 
2018). However, most of them have so far not gathered substantial experience with CCS. 
Nevertheless, those that did – Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Germany, Norway and 
United States – still account for the production of more than 15% of the world’s oil, more than 
35% of natural gas, and more than 65% of coal in 2017. If these countries scale up blue 
hydrogen production, they could produce significant quantities.  
Many European countries have a high CCS readiness indicator, but a low blue hydrogen 
supply potential, due to their limited reserves of fossil energy sources. Nearly all of them are 
also heavily reliant on energy imports. Depending on climate ambitions and domestic 
acceptance for CCS, it cannot be excluded that at least some European countries will store 
the CO2 captured from imported energy carriers.  
Further factors that might influence which countries become blue hydrogen producers and 
perhaps exporters include: the development of domestic demand and of technology costs; 
for example, the relative costs of blue hydrogen production via the natural gas SMR vs. coal 
gasification might favour blue hydrogen production in countries with strong gas or oil 
resources. 
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3.3.2 Results  
Potential green and blue hydrogen producers were already analysed separately in chapters 
3.3.1.1 and 3.3.1.2, respectively. Some distinct patterns emerge when they are compared to 
one another, as well as with countries with potential demand for clean hydrogen.   
Table 17: Potential green and blue hydrogen producers 
 Green hydrogen  Blue hydrogen 
 Lowest cost Volume  
 
Readiness Volume  
Algeria  X   X 
Argentina X X    
Australia X X  X X 
Brazil X X  X X 
Canada  X  X X 
Chile X     
China X X  X X 
Croatia    X  
Czech Republic    X  
Denmark X   X  
Egypt X X    
Ethiopia X X    
France    X  
Germany    X X 
Hungary    X  
Iceland X     
India     X 
Indonesia     X 
Iran, Islamic Rep.     X 
Ireland X     
Italy    X  
Japan    X  
Kazakhstan     X 
Kenya X     
Korea, Rep.    X  
Madagascar X     
Malaysia     X 
Morocco (with Western 
Sahara) X X    
Mexico  X  X  
Namibia X X    
Netherlands    X  
New Zealand X    X 
Norway    X X 
Pakistan     X 
Poland    X  
Russian Federation X X   X 
Saudi Arabia  X   X 
South Africa X X   X 
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Spain    X  
Tanzania  X    
United Arab Emirates     X 
United Kingdom X   X  
United States X X  X X 
Vietnam     X 
Zambia  X    
Source: Own compilation 
Australia, Brazil, China and USA belong to the top 20 for both green and blue hydrogen, in 
all four supply-side indicators analysed in this study (Table 17). These four countries have 
exceptional wind and solar potentials across large land areas, and already are deploying 
substantial capacities of wind and solar power generation. They are potential early producers 
for both green hydrogen (due to low production costs) and blue hydrogen (due to high CCS 
readiness).30 They are additionally incentivised to develop production capacities since they 
are in position to eventually produce large quantities of both green and blue hydrogen, 
should the demand materialise, and are upper middle to high income economies able to 
afford the necessary investments. This line of argumentation holds true regardless of 
whether these countries would consume the hydrogen themselves or export it.  
Canada, Mexico, and Norway might also strive for a similar transition based on their high 
CCS readiness and good green hydrogen potential. Algeria, Egypt, the Russian Federation 
and Saudi Arabia, despite not being in pole positions in terms of CCS readiness, also have 
the wind and/or solar potentials necessary to provide large quantities of green hydrogen in 
the future, are established energy suppliers and are strongly incentivised to secure future 
financial flows from energy exports.  
The crucial difference among the seven countries from the above paragraph might be the 
willingness and ability to take on the additional costs and risks associated with transitioning 
from conventional energy exports to clean hydrogen. As already mentioned in chapter 
3.3.1.1, the importing countries might not provide the necessary economic incentive if they 
decide to continue to import energy in the same form as today and conduct CCS on the 
domestic soil (this argument holds especially true for countries exporting natural gas to 
Europe, such as Norway, Algeria and Russian Federation). This would on the one hand 
enable the exporting countries to keep to their existing business model, but it would also 
preclude them from gaining valuable experience with hydrogen transport and storage 
technologies. Of course, the current exporters with good green hydrogen potential might also 
decide to pursue both paths simultaneously where they continue with their fossil fuels-based 
business models, and simultaneously start investing in the green hydrogen production 
(assuming they are in the position to afford it).  
The second cluster is comprised of countries with large CCS potential (and perhaps even a 
good CCS readiness indicator) but without the top prospects of becoming leading green 
hydrogen producers, based on data for green hydrogen production cost and quantities. The 
data suggests that such countries are India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Iran, Malaysia, Vietnam 
and United Arab Emirates. It has to be noted that further factors might nevertheless justify for 
a country to consider investing in green hydrogen. UAE, ranking 47th in the world in terms of 
lowest green hydrogen production costs and 40th in terms of area where it can be produced 
 
30 Australia seems to be following this strategy, as it is currently developing both lignite-based blue hydrogen (HySTRA project, 
chapter 1.5.3) as well as electrolysis (e.g. Port Lincoln 15 MW electrolyser plant). 
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at under 6 EUR cent/kWh according to the modelling, might see their competitive advantage 
in their established energy market position, access to large investment capital, building of 
competencies along the entire hydrogen value chain, and first-mover advantage. This may 
very well prove enough for it to establish itself as a green hydrogen leader, and also stresses 
the necessity of extensively considering each country’s specific context before passing the 
judgement. 
A third group of countries are those with limited or no CCS potential but exceptional green 
hydrogen production potential: Argentina, Chile, Ethiopia, Denmark, Iceland, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Morocco, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, UK and Zambia. These countries 
are however, very diverse in terms of size, population density,31 climate ambition, as well as 
in terms of income per capita32, making it hard to find a universal characterisation. Three 
nations stand out in both, lowest green hydrogen production cost and the area for green 
hydrogen production under 6 EUR cent/kWh, and have been the proverbial frontrunners for 
becoming green hydrogen champions: Argentina, Namibia and South Africa. These are all 
large countries with low to moderate population densities and higher middle to high income 
per capita, making them exceptionally well suited for deploying the massive infrastructure 
needed for producing large quantities of green hydrogen which could potentially exceed their 
domestic demand. Another country often mentioned as a potential green hydrogen 
powerhouse is Morocco, a lower middle income country with population density closer to that 
of the European countries, but with geographical closeness and strong economic ties to 
Europe, as already noted in Frontier Economics (2018).  
Further candidates include the northern European countries Iceland, UK, Ireland and 
Denmark which all turn up among the top 20 countries in terms of lowest green hydrogen 
production costs in our model. However, their production quantities are limited – combined, 
the area where they can produce green hydrogen below 6 EUR cent/kWh is smaller than 
that of Morocco alone. Iceland, Ireland and Denmark also have ambitious climate protections 
targets which might additionally incentivise domestic green hydrogen production and 
consumption.  
Among the African countries, Ethiopia stands out in both lowest cost and potential volume of 
green hydrogen production, but doesn’t have an exceptionally low population density and is 
landlocked. Kenya and Madagascar are able to achieve very low green hydrogen production 
costs, and Tanzania and Zambia have large production potentials. These are, however, all 
low to lower middle income countries which are more likely to experience difficulties 
financing the necessary infrastructure. They also lie at greater geographical distances from 
the potential early consumption centres in Europe or Eastern Asia.  
Aside from these three groups, there are countries which are hard to characterise based on 
their green and blue hydrogen potentials and other parameters; the roles they assume in the 
international clean hydrogen trade (if any) will likely depend on the specific priorities set by 
their individual energy strategies.  
 
31 Argentina, Chile, Namibia, Iceland and Zambia have low population densities (< 25 /km2); Ireland, Morocco, South Africa, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Madagascar and Tanzania have moderate population densities (< 100 /km2); Denmark and UK have population densities 
exceeding 100 /km2. Data from The World Bank (2019a)  
32 Argentina, Chile, Iceland, Ireland, Denmark and UK are high income countries; Namibia and South Africa are higher middle 
income countries; Kenya, Morocco and Zambia are lower middle income countries; Ethiopia, Madagascar and Tanzania are low 
income countries. Data from The World Bank (2019b)  
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